[Foreign Affairs] The Muslim Martin Luther?

Fethullah Gulen Attempts an Islamic Reformation

By Victor Gaetan

In a video posted on his Web site last December, the Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen called on God to curse Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Gulen, who has lived in exile in the United States since 1999, declared in a sermon broadcast on Turkish television, “Those who don’t see the thief but go after those trying to catch the thief: may God bring fire to their houses, ruin their homes, break their unities.” This went far beyond the normally secular bounds of political debate in Turkey.

But to fixate on Gulen's lack of political polish is to miss the point. Gulen and Erdogan have been described in the West as political rivals, but there has always been more at stake in their clash than earthly affairs. Whereas Erdogan may frequently indulge in Islamist political rhetoric, it is Gulen that has tried to make actual contributions as an Islamic intellectual and develop a genuinely modern school of Islam that reconciles the religion with liberal democracy, scientific rationalism, ecumenism, and free enterprise. Regardless of who wins the battle for Turkey's political future, it is vital that Gulen's religious legacy be preserved.

EGALITARIAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Erdogan has repeatedly portrayed Gulen, and his religious movement, known as Hizmet (which translates to Service), as part of a political conspiracy, calling it a “parallel state” responsible for initiating a series of corruption investigations against his administration. These accusations are impossible to substantiate. Hizmet has no formal membership, no headquarters, and no hierarchy, which makes it impossible to know whether Gulenists are overrepresented in law enforcement and the judiciary, let alone orchestrating a putsch. There are many civic organizations in Turkey that are explicitly linked to Gulen, but, in keeping with Gulen’s teachings, they neither endorse nor reject any political party.

Gulen's theology went hand-in-hand with Turkey's capitalist revolution. The country's new entrepreneurs were pious Muslims who drew on Gulen's teaching to justify their embrace of free enterprise, strong democratic institutions, and dialogue and commerce with other faiths.
Although Gulen has always assumed that pious Muslims would be drawn to politics, he has long warned against allowing religion to be used as a tool to pursue political power. In this sense, Gulen has followed in the footsteps of Said Nursi, a great Turkish scholar of Sufism, who inspired an Islamic revival in the late Ottoman period and under Ataturk’s republic. Nursi's 6,000-page commentary on the Koran, Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light), argued that true spiritual knowledge was accessible to all Muslims without the guidance of a “master.” Nursi considered materialism an enemy of Islam, but he also advocated modern science instruction in Muslim schools.

Gulen has endorsed this same basic approach. Born in eastern Turkey in 1941, he grew up studying the Koran. He began to manage a mosque as well as a study center in the city of Izmir in the 1960s. Pushing beyond Nursi's concept of strengthening religious conscience, or inner discipline, Gulen emphasized the importance of public service as a way for believers to glorify God while repressing selfish impulses.

These teachings were in sharp contrast to the political pronouncements of Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, that gained ground in the Middle East in the mid-twentieth century. Where the Brotherhood considered it a religious obligation to control the state and to make Islamic law the basis of jurisprudence, Gulen argued that religion suffered from politicization. Where the Brotherhood implies that jihad is necessarily an armed struggle, Gulen emphasized that jihad is a moral and spiritual struggle.

In 1970, Gulen was arrested by a newly installed military government, and his license to preach was revoked. But his private talks to small groups -- in mosques, theatres, coffee shops, and schools -- were taped and distributed. Gulen leveraged his growing fame to establish a series of student hostels, or “lighthouses,” that offered private prep courses for university entrance exams. In 1979, personal friends of Gulen set up a publishing business so that he could provide his growing number of students with study materials. Yamanlar College in Izmir, the first Gulen-inspired private high school, followed in 1982. By 1983, he had a wide national following.

Today, Gulen sympathizers run more than 1,500 schools and universities in 120 countries, including Afghanistan, Austria, Bosnia, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Sudan, and the United States. (In Texas alone, Gulen affiliates manage 26 public charter schools.) The Gulen movement provides countless scholarships for the poor to attend their schools, which mostly emphasize science and math. By contributing as volunteers, or financiers, to the movement's education network, supporters also engage in a form of sanctified charity.

His commitment to education as the main solution to problems plaguing most Muslim societies is the most concrete expression of Gulen's religious teachings. Drawing on Islam's sacred texts -- the Koran, hadith (words of the Prophet), and Sira (biography of the Prophet) -- as well as Turkish and Ottoman cultural tradition, Gulen has developed a distinct form of Islamic theology that puts social engagement, not political engagement, at its center.

The Utah-based political scientist Hakan Yavuz, author of Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gulen Movement, sees four defining characteristics in Gulen’s project. First, Gulen emphasizes that a believer's piety can be measured by his practical actions, specifically, the degree to which the person improves the human condition. Second, Gulen argues that Islam must be an ecumenical religion. Muslims, he believes, are obliged to seek consensus in their communities and should value social participation and dialogue with other groups. (Gulen's movement has placed a particular emphasis on interfaith dialogue, especially with Christians and Jews.)

Third, Gulen teaches the inviolability of individual rights. Religious engagement, he maintains, must be voluntary, which is one reason that Gulen's followers are usually referred to as “volunteers” and their total numbers are never officially counted. Finally, the Gulen movement endorses critical thinking as a foundation for knowledge that glorifies God, rather than as something that contradicts revelation. Science, Gulen teaches, is a vehicle for Muslims to honor their religious duty to improve the economic condition of their societies.

To the extent that Gulen has had anything to say about politics, it has almost always been in the service of promoting democracy and cultural tolerance. Asked by The New York Times about his attitude toward the Turkish government, Gulen responded, “I always believe in being on the side of the rule of law, and I also believe in the importance of sharing good ideas with the officials of the state that are going to promise a future for the country. Accordingly, irrespective of whoever is in charge, I try to be respectful of those state officials, keep a reasonable level of closeness and keep a positive attitude toward them.” He has also emphasized the importance of maintaining a healthy civil society outside the control of the state. Private schools, private enterprise, volunteerism -- these were the institutions that Turkey required if it hoped to maintain its traditionally inclusive culture.

Gulen's theology went hand-in-hand with Turkey's capitalist revolution, which was sparked by economic deregulation in the 1980s. The country's new entrepreneurs were pious Muslims who drew on Gulen's teaching to justify their embrace of free enterprise, strong democratic institutions, and dialogue and commerce with other faiths and ethnic groups. Gulen, in turn, urged this new capitalist class to work hard and succeed -- not for personal gain but to enhance the spiritual well-being of society. The prophet Muhammad was also a merchant, he reminded them.

Gulen has shown that he will refuse to be intimidated, but it is still an open question whether his movement can withstand the AKP’s relentless campaign against it.
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

It should come as no surprise that the Gulen movement saw a potential ally in Erdogan's AKP party. In 2002, under the AKP flag, Erdogan spoke out in favor of greater religious and economic freedoms. Like the AKP, the Gulenist movement had identified the military and the old secular economic elite as impediments to those freedoms. Although the Gulenists never offered an explicit endorsement, it seemed keen to work with the AKP. After Erdogan won, the AKP (as well as Justice Department officials said to be affiliated with the Gulenists) supported a series of court cases that landed hundreds of military officers and businessmen in jail. (Although there were many flaws in the trials’ methods, blame falls mainly on the shoulders of the AKP, which had sole authority to direct the proceedings.)

But the alliance did not last. The AKP and the Gulenists have fundamentally different understandings of Turkish identity and how it relates to Islam. The AKP has its roots in Turkey's National View ideology, which was originally advanced by former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in his manifesto Millî Görüş (National View), published in 1969. Erbakan argued that Turkey should turn away from the West and forge a political, economic, and military union with Muslim countries. According to this view, national strength, especially as expressed in conflict with the West, is a bigger priority than healthy democratic institutions. Erbakan is still a clear source of inspiration for the AKP in general, and for Erdogan in particular. When Erbakan died, in 2011, Erdogan cut short a trip to Europe in order to rush back for his funeral, attended by hundreds of thousands in Istanbul. Germany’s most influential Turkish Islamist organization is a Millî Görüş community that Erdogan has encouraged to resist Western assimilation, in accordance with Erbakan’s teachings.

Predictably, Hizmet and the AKP have clashed over Erdogan's bellicose foreign policy and undemocratic domestic maneuvers. When a Turkish NGO attempted to break Israel's blockade of Gaza and was confronted by the Israeli navy (resulting in nine deaths), Erdogan responded by accusing Israel of terrorism and genocide. Gulen responded to Erdogan's belligerence, by calling it not “fruitful,” and adding that he sought Israeli permission anytime his charities wanted to help the people of Gaza.

Another point of contention has been Turkey's relationship with the European Union. As a strong proponent of closer ties with Europe, the Gulenist movement has been frustrated by Erdogan's refusal to pursue more serious accession talks with the EU. Occasionally, Erdogan has pursued policies -- such as legislation restricting Internet access and reducing the independence of prosecutors -- that seem designed to antagonize EU officials. Gulenists have also been concerned by Erdogan's support for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.

Free speech has always been a critical issue for the Gulenist movement, so it has also spoken out against Erdogan's persecution of journalists and his broader disdain for democratic dialogue. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey has incarcerated more journalists over the past two years than any other country in the world. (Close on Turkey's heels: Iran and China.) Gulen sympathizer Alp Aslandogan, president of the New York–based Alliance for Shared Values, a nonprofit umbrella group for Hizmet-affiliated groups, recounted the “intimidation, inspections, and fines” that now confront publishers. “Media group owners face threats to their businesses. Never in Turkish history has a single person or party achieved this level of media subservience.”

Erdogan's response to last summer's Gezi Park protests must have been particularly troubing for the Gulenists. In some sense, the diverse group of protesters, who originally gathered to demonstrate against the demolition of an Istanbul park, were the model of the sort of engaged pluralistic civil society that the Gulenists champion. Erdogan decided to order police to disperse the protests with force, which resulted in days of violent confrontation. Gulen placed the blame on Erdogan for not listening to the protesters' demands in the first place. That seems to have convinced Erdogan to declare war directly on the Gulenist movement. In September, Erdogan announced that the government planned to close all private schools helping students to prepare for university exams: the Gulenist movement runs about 20 percent of such schools in Turkey and they represent a vital source of income, as well as one of the main ways in which Gulen's ideas are introduced to the public.

Erdogan and the AKP have taken to describing Gulen’s movement as a power-hungry conspiracy. But there is little evidence of a concerted Gulenist push for power. The movement has stayed true to its teachings by devoting massive resources and attention to running schools, charity organizations, and media entities, in Turkey and abroad. Gulenists have not made a concerted push to infiltrate the AKP, or to seat their own members in parliament. Gulenists have regularly denounced the AKP’s corruption as a violation of Islamic ethics and Hizmet principles. There is no reason not to take those criticisms at face value.

Gulen has shown that he will refuse to be intimidated, but it is still an open question whether his movement can withstand the AKP’s relentless campaign against it. Erdogan is clearly intent on marginalizing the Gulenist movement, even at the expense of the rule of law in Turkey. This week, President Abdullah Gul signed a law allowing government agencies, without a court order, to block access to any Web site. Last week, parliament passed a bill giving the executive branch complete control over the judiciary, allowing the government to nominate and fire prosecutors at will.

Turkey would clearly be harmed if Gulenist teachings on tolerance and individual rights were successfully quieted. But the loss for Islamic culture would be an even greater tragedy.

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/2/20]

明報專訪日本「中國通」天兒慧教授

《天兒慧訪問全文》

【明報專訊】問：不少輿論稱，現在中日關係是中日建交40年來最差的。在日本，對華友好的人士似乎也遭攻擊。我們觀察到，一些日本網民便把天兒先生標籤為「反日」。就天兒先生觀察所得，跟中日友好的1980年代相比，日本社會近年對中國的態度有何轉變？原因是什麼？這轉變會如何左右中日關係？

答：我的立場主要有以下兩點。第一，我既非「反日親中」，亦非「反中親日」。我一直努力不偏向任何一方，以社會科學學者的身分盡可能客觀冷靜地把握事實，加以分析，提出建議，可說是「實事求是派」。因此我不時對日本當局提出逆耳的批評，亦不時對中國當局提出逆耳的批評。第二，我深信日中關係不論在歷史及地緣上或是利益層面上看，都是有如兄弟一般，建立緊密合作、互惠互利的關係才是最重要的；持續對立，甚至陷入戰爭狀態則絕對必須避免，若變成這樣的狀態將是雙方的不幸。

當然，由於我身為日本人，較了解日本的事情，至今對日本有較強烈的立場，所以曾對日本作出許多建議，例如在靖國參拜、歷史認識、歷史教科書記述等問題上，整體而言我一直以批判的態度面對迄今的日本政權。過去我的這類主張為相當多日本知識分子的共通看法，而「日中友好」、「積極協助中國走向現代化」等亦為大部分國民的共同意願。

我的立場始終如一，沒有改變，只是日中關係周邊的狀改變了，那就是中國的經濟與軍事抬頭，以及日本「泡沫經濟崩潰」後長期陷入低迷徬徨的狀。中國經濟崛起對日本而言可大大增加商機，對此日本是歡迎多於抗拒的。不過，在中國聲言要「和平崛起」而周邊地區對中國發動軍事攻擊的可能性極微之際，中國卻自1990年以來每年以兩位數字的幅度持續增加軍費，此外還強行進行核試（1994及1995年）、開發導彈及軍事衛星、建造航空母艦等具攻擊力及威嚇性的武器，演變成恍如對別國施加威脅感的局面。

與此同時，中國國內的大國主義式民族主義感情高漲。相對之下，日本被指「迷失20年」，為此日本對自身出現某種焦慮感、對中國的警戒以及對中國的威脅感亦開始抬頭，日本國內抗拒國際主義的內向民族主義開始膨脹。小泉純一郎首相參拜靖國、象徵日中合作的「東亞共同體」成立受挫（2005年）、日本對中國提供的政府開發援助（ODA）結束等事件，令兩國政府關係徐徐冷卻，日中作為合作伙伴國家的感情亦急速惡化。

日中關係陷入惡性循環，其中直接引發的最大問題就是尖閣諸島（釣魚島）問題。2010年9月的「中國漁船衝突事件」、2012年9月的「尖閣國有化」等各項事件發生後，中國國內隨即出現猛烈的反日攻擊，各地出現騷亂。那正是中國燃起反日民族主義，當局改為展現出對日的強硬姿態。無可否認，中國放棄了「韜光養晦」的方針，由「核心利益」的主張向「海洋強國」的目標推進，改向積極外交，日本的警戒感、威脅感升級，對華感情亦惡化，反華民族主義亦正增加。

日本國內就中日關係冷靜討論的氣氛大幅消退，在此情下，我的理性言論相信會被鷹派或是對華警戒論者視為「親中反日」吧。可是，長遠而言，我認為我的主張必定站得住腳。日本自從1980年代因經濟成長變得強大，加上有補償過去歷史的意願，政府開始了ODA援助，認真手為中國的經濟發展作計劃、提供技術支援、廢棄處理化學武器等，在民間亦透過綠化沙漠行動、支援貧困農村的各種形式，支援中國的發展。我希望如今變得強大的中國，不要煽動「過去戰爭中糾結的問題」和「反日民族主義」，而將兩國外交正常化以來日本對中國的貢獻作出坦誠的評價，如此日本人的反華情緒相信會大大緩和。

問：天兒先生2010年就釣魚島主權問題提出「共同主權」構思，但隨日本政府2012年「購島」，你認為該構思還有可能嗎？釣魚島主權爭議還有什麼出路？

答：我2010年在《朝日新聞》中主張的「共同主權論」，其實是1990年代後半曾於日本地方報章中提出的論說，當時考慮到「尖閣問題」將來必定會成為日中的待決事項，我將之作為處理這問題的「理想形式」。日本國內對此譽參半，有政府人士作出批評，亦有鷹派將我誹謗成「賣國賊」。不過，關於尖閣主權的問題，「釣魚島原是中國的固有領土，於日清戰爭時期遭日本掠奪」這種主張冷靜地看是不合理的。以下這些是客觀存在的事實：

1.當時中國的天下國家論中並沒有海洋國境的觀念；

2.中國雖有考慮到沿海防衛問題，但據記載，明清時期由福州府管轄的沿海防衛涵蓋離岸約100公里範圍（海岸距尖閣諸島約310公里）；

3.琉球冊封使紀錄中記載，當時琉球人的領土為琉球本島至久米島，並細緻載明不包括尖閣，但那是他們的「鄉土觀」，並不是國境意味的領土，即使記載證實為事實，但仍無法用以證明尖閣是中國的領土；

4.中國若真的認為釣魚島是本國領土，那為何在發出「日本領有宣言」以來，截至1971年為止從來沒有提出有關主張？（不過在那期間，《人民日報》等傳媒則反複出現承認尖閣為日本領土的記述）

因此，我在以「日本領土論」為前提下，為了東亞海域成為和平的海域，日中建立共存共榮的牽絆，提出「共同主權論」。如今為了將想法更具體化，我提倡了「一個島嶼、各自表述」的方案。簡言之，就是同時承認「尖閣諸島為日本領土」及「釣魚島為中國領土」，實際管理、營運透過協商決定的方案。這個方案參考了「一個中國、各自表述」的「中台共識」而構想。當然有觀點認為主權是排他性的概念，不能接受共存、共有之類的想法，不過歷史中可見國家的生成、發展、消滅，而主權的涵蓋範圍亦是可變的。再者，海洋本來沒有邊界，漁民一直在海洋自由地捕魚，互相合作。

「一個島嶼、各自表述」的精神，在21世紀以來的歷史中可作為避免國家衝突的智慧，以緩和主權概念，接受雙方主張的同時就具體課題進行協議，處理事件，慎重對待和平關係。這種精神在現今的日本中被接受的空間亦微乎其微，那是因為「中國不可信，要是退讓一步，對方便會要求退讓兩步甚至三步」這種對中國的強烈不信任感正在蔓延。

首先，有必要努力緩和日中之間的不滿感情及不信任感。為此最重要的是希望兩國政府作出保證，讓日本與中國的有識之士，或者包括第三國的有識之士，就這些問題擁有坦誠自由討論的空間。特別是現時中國國內有難以自由發言的嚴峻狀。知識分子自由討論，將之公開發表，可加深真正的互相理解，減少因存有偏見的資訊產生的不信任感。

另一重要的事情是，記取及重新確認日中外交正常化之際，中國總理周恩來所說的「求大同，存小異」論。「尖閣問題」原是小異，如今這個問題雖變成了「大異」，但必須重新認識在這個問題上糾纏的愚蠢與危險性，尋求達成「日中共存共榮」的大同。當再次產生一起探索共存共榮之道的氣氛時，相信可以帶出我的提案或是其他的想法吧。雖然需要時間，但持續不斷的努力才是恢復關係、發展的王道。

問：今年是中日甲午戰爭120周年，又是第一次世界大戰百周年，中國以至西方都有輿論推測中日在不久將來必有一戰。你認為中日有可能爆發戰爭嗎？

答﹕我可以斷言，日本發動戰爭幾乎100%不可能。第二次世界大戰後，日本切身體會戰敗及遭受原子彈轟炸的悲劇（當然亦包括作為加害者的悲劇），也充分了解和平的貴重，走過了自己的道路。這種感受到現在仍為許多日本人所共有。近幾年，中國國內有聲音說「日本的軍國主義復活、日本已變成軍國主義國家了」，但那是很大的誤解。當然，現今日本由於對中國不信任及感到受威脅，正在推動強化國防能力，這事無可否認，不過儘管那是具有攻擊性的力量，但日本並沒有侵略的意圖。

對於爆發戰爭的可能性，我所擔心的是：一、因釣魚島近海及上空意外發生「衡突事件」，引發戰鬥行為；二、中國國內因反日民族主義等理由展開「奪回釣魚島行動」。這些情絕對要避免。就第一點而言，兩國的相關部門需要設立危機管理對話機制。至於第二點，雖然在某程度上我能夠理解中國對於安倍政權言行的不滿，但安倍亦絕對希望避免與中國開戰，並就此認真考慮。日本國民普遍的反戰情感更是強烈，希望中國國民能理解。

包括香港在內的中國輿論正熱烈討論「戰爭的可能性」，這事情本身在日本人眼中無法理解，甚至覺得恐怖。一旦發生戰爭，日中之間將留下無法彌補的禍根。戰爭絕對必須避免。

問：日本首相安倍晉三去年底參拜靖國神社，激起中國強烈反彈，認為日本美化侵略歷史，甚至認為是軍國主義復辟等。歷史問題經常籠罩中日關係，你認為中日雙方應如何走出這困局？

答：對於「過去的戰爭」的認識，安倍等人的歷史觀確實與我的歷史觀有差異。日本接受《波茨坦宣言》、誓言恆久和平、實踐和平憲法，以作為戰後日本和平與發展的出發點，這是大部分日本人的共識。因此，「日本正破壞戰後秩序」的看法亦完全是大大的誤解。我敢斷言，即使是安倍，亦完全沒有絲毫「破壞戰後秩序」的想法。安倍言論的真正意思，是「無法認同戰時日本被視為如同納粹般100%邪惡」，並非全面肯定日本的戰爭。

至於參拜靖國問題，日本人的心情有複雜之處。靖國神社本是明治維新時期起用來供奉為日本捐軀的戰歿者之所，最初並無政治意味，許多日本人至今仍認為參拜靖國的主要意義是追悼戰亡者。但1978年靖國神社秘密將在東京審判中裁定為甲級戰犯的人員亦引入，共同供奉，至此參拜靖國便添加了另一重意義。追悼亡者的國民感情不容否定，而參拜靖國者亦並非全是為了崇拜甲級戰犯，在此外界無法理解日本人的某些心情。

雖然靖國問題有相當棘手之處，但必須繼續為解決問題努力。1978年以來，昭和天皇（裕仁）不再參拜靖國，平成天皇（明仁）亦繼承了其精神，這本身在日本而言有異常之處。我認為解決「參拜靖國問題」的最恰當辦法是「分祀」。當然靖國神社可能以「宗教自由」、「合祭的亡魂無法分開」等理由反對，要說服神社並不容易。可是這個問題如今不為亞洲人民接受，甚至被世界視為問題，除了應重新明確地表達國家對於戰爭責任的態度外，日本國民也許亦應該研究解決問題之道。

[明報 2014-2-6] 

[Foreign Affairs] Six Markets to Watch: Turkey

How Erdogan Did It -- and Could Blow It

By Daniel Dombey

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2014 ISSUE

For much of last year, Turkey’s economy seemed almost on top of the world. In May, as huge construction projects moved ahead, Ankara paid off its remaining debt to the International Monetary Fund, ending what seemed to many Turks a long history of humiliation. The country received an encouraging investment-grade rating, and foreign funds poured in like never before.

In a flurry of appearances that month, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan feted record-low interest rates, a slide in the unemployment rate from 15 percent to nine percent since 2009, and, above all, the growth that Turkey has enjoyed “due to reforms carried out over the past ten years.” He underlined his point -- and his driving ambition -- on an exuberant visit to Washington. Addressing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, he noted that when his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, at least 20 other economies were bigger than Turkey’s in terms of dollar output. “Now, we are 17th,” he exulted, “and in due course, we are going to be among the ten largest economies.”

The Turkish economy has indeed come a long way during Erdogan’s decade in office, propelling Ankara’s ascent to greater global prominence. In the late 1990s, Turkey was running 90 percent inflation and attracting almost no foreign investment. As recently as 2002, Turkey was using up almost 90 percent of its tax revenues to pay the interest on its debt. Today, these problems have all but disappeared.

But the optimism of May has since faded. Turkey, like many other developing countries, has found itself facing skittish markets, volatile exchange rates, political unrest, and an uncertain outlook. The picture of Turkey today is less flattering but more revealing than before, displaying both the promise and the perils of being an $800 billion emerging economy.

Turkey is still on track to grow faster than much of the industrialized world in the coming years. In October, Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank, hailed the country as “an inspiration to many developing countries.” But the fact remains that Turkey’s success could yet unravel. To live up to its economic potential, Turkey will have to overcome two main challenges: its reliance on fickle foreign funds and the intrusion of heavy-handed politics into its economic life.

SEEDS OF SUCCESS

The seeds of Turkey’s success this century lie in the failure of the period that immediately preceded it. After the liberalizing reforms of Turgut Ozal, the visionary prime minister of the 1980s, who opened up what had been a perennially closed economy, the 1990s were a wretched decade, punctuated by economic crisis, brutal episodes in the country’s Kurdish conflict, a de facto coup, and a devastating earthquake. This was a time when the lack of foreign funds, often the result of spikes in U.S. Treasury yields, could cause economies to seize up, and Turkey was hardly alone in its misery. During these years, macroeconomic shocks also hit Mexico, Russia, and Southeast Asia.

For Turkey, this sorry period came to an end just after a 2001 banking crisis, when Finance Minister Kemal Dervis, with the cooperation of the International Monetary Fund, laid the groundwork for success. Ankara pruned back its spending, brought inflation under control, introduced a floating exchange rate, restructured the country’s banks, and granted more independence to the central bank and regulators. When the AKP took over in 2002, it stuck to this template, which paid off as Turkey’s discussions with the European Union progressed. The prospect of EU membership -- negotiations started in 2005 -- opened the floodgates for foreign direct investment.

A boom in infrastructure development and construction added to the good times. Since the outset of Erdogan’s tenure, the country’s highway network has been expanded by more than 10,000 miles. The number of airports has doubled, to 50, and Turkish Airlines now flies to more than 100 countries, more than any other carrier in the world. New, upscale housing complexes and shopping malls seem to flank every major city.

Turkey’s once-fragile banking sector was strong enough to get through the 2008 financial crisis with only a brief, albeit deep, recession. Then, as the United States unleashed an unprecedented monetary stimulus, Turkey floated on a sea of money. Growth roared ahead: the economy expanded by 9.2 percent in 2010 and 8.8 percent in 2011, although higher interest rates slowed the overheating economy to 2.2 percent growth in 2012.

HOOKED ON FOREIGN FUNDS

Yet for all its strengths, Turkey remains vulnerable. Its first major problem is its dependence on foreign funds. The country suffers from structural weaknesses that have been obscured by the waves of money that have been crashing in because of loose monetary policies elsewhere. It shares this problem with other developing countries, including Brazil and Indonesia, whose governments have grown lazy about reforms and let the quantitative-easing-induced good times roll. This dependence has become particularly worrying since May, when the U.S. Federal Reserve floated the possibility of reining in its monetary stimulus, a step that would likely reduce the funds that have been pouring into emerging economies. For Turkey, the talk of a tighter U.S. monetary policy left a particular mark: amid other troubles, yields on the country’s benchmark two-year bonds doubled.

Turkish markets were sensitive for one reason above all: a lack of balance in the country’s economy. Even though Turkey was expected to have grown by only 3.5 to 4.0 percent in 2013 -- below the level needed to create enough jobs for new entrants into the work force -- the country’s current account deficit stands at about seven percent of GDP. Despite Turkey’s enormous appeal for tourists (36 million arrived in 2012), a manufacturing base well positioned for exports, a $62 billion agricultural sector, a tradition of trading, and ambitions to become an energy hub, the country still relies on domestic consumption to power its economy, and consumption has risen rapidly as savings have fallen. At present, Turkey sucks in foreign goods and relies on foreign cash to finance even lackluster economic expansion.

Making matters worse, the foreign funds that are financing Turkey’s expansion are overwhelmingly short-term investments and could be swiftly pulled out of the country. Net foreign direct investment underwrote just $7.3 billion of the country’s $56.7 billion current account deficit between August 2012 and August 2013. By contrast, five years ago, such investment -- which is intrinsically more stable than short-term portfolio funds -- financed half the deficit.

Turkish officials argue that concerns about the country’s prospects are exaggerated and emphasize that a return to a more traditional U.S. monetary policy should not be compared with traumas on the scale of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. And in fact, with the U.S. economy still troubled, the Federal Reserve has so far held off tapering back its $85 billion of monthly asset purchases: money has returned to Turkey, and the spike in Turkish bond yields has partially subsided. Most analysts predict that Turkey will continue to grow moderately, as the country’s living standards continue to converge toward those of the developed world, albeit at a slower pace than before.

But Washington’s loose monetary policy can’t last forever, and behind the Turkish economy’s ups and downs, deeper problems lurk. The rebound from the 1990s is over, the low-hanging fruit of the last decade’s reforms has been picked, and the foreign money on which the economy depends will eventually be in shorter supply. If Turkey cannot reduce its dependence on short-term foreign capital, it will not be able to grow enough, or at least not sustainably.

To a certain extent, the Turkish story so far has been less than meets the eye. The government trumpets that during its time in office, income per capita has tripled, partly a result of disparities between inflation and the exchange rate. But that growth happened early on, mostly due to the lira’s strengthening in real terms, and for the past half decade, that figure has largely been stuck around $10,500.

Then there are a whole host of structural issues that Turkey must address. Participation in the labor force remains low: only about 50 percent of working-age adults were employed in 2012, compared with an average of 68 percent across the mostly developed countries of the Organ­ization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Part of the reason for this is the fact that Turkey has overlooked the potential of half its population: according to a recent World Economic Forum report, Turkey ranks 120th out of 136 countries in terms of gender equality, and women constitute only 23 percent of the nonagricultural work force. Moreover, Turkey still lags behind the developed world in terms of educational levels. In 2011, two-thirds of Turkey’s working-age population had received only primary education or less, and according to the EU, fully 30 percent of Turkey’s young people are neither receiving education or training nor securing jobs.

The government acknowledges all these concerns. Ankara is seeking to reduce its dependence on foreign fuel, which accounts for almost all its current account deficit, by encouraging alternative sources of energy and attempting to develop Turkey as an energy hub between its oil- and gas-rich neighbors. The government has recently imposed measures to limit credit card and consumer lending to contain private consumption, and it has offered new incentives for pension schemes to encourage saving. The World Bank recently commended the “remarkable improvement” in Turkey’s education system since 2003. And the government’s finances are in admirable shape.

But the existing problems translate into economic facts of life: much of the increase in employment in recent years has come from agriculture, services, and relatively low-technology manufacturing in Anatolia. Outside the greater Istanbul area and beyond the Aegean coastline, two areas that export products such as refrigerators, washing machines, televisions, and vehicles, much of the country produces low-value-added goods, which generate less income and can be more vulnerable to competition.

THE STRONGMAN

Turkey’s other main challenge is political. The concentration of power under Erdogan was once an essential precondition for economic success. Today, however, it could make things worse, not better.

Erdogan’s chief accomplishment has been to establish the supremacy of Turkey’s elected leaders and hence the stability of government on which economic progress often rests. After 40 years in which the military ousted four governments, Turkish democracy no longer operates at gunpoint. Erdogan has pushed aside a host of opponents, some of them antidemocratic, including the military, big business, the country’s old media barons, and the judges who bent laws in a bid to weaken the AKP government. But the consequence is that the prime minister is now master of almost all he surveys, which, combined with his often erratic behavior of late, has raised important questions about the Turkish government’s transparency, rationality, and stability.

The institutions that played a role in Turkey’s success over the past decade now struggle to appear independent of the prime minister’s will. Despite the prospect of an end to the U.S. stimulus -- and inflation of about eight percent -- the central bank has kept the benchmark interest rate at 4.5 percent. Instead of increasing that rate -- what would seem the appropriate response -- the central bank has tightened the money supply with unorthodox and often confusing measures. Underlining the constraints under which the bank operates, Erdogan has long made clear his aversion to high interest rates, not least because of their role in holding back growth, and blamed an “interest-rate lobby” for stoking the Gezi Park protests last summer.

Other examples of the centralization of economic power abound. The Capital Markets Board of Turkey has named three AKP officials, including two former ministers, as directors of Turkcell, the country’s biggest cell-phone company. Last summer, Turkey’s broadcasting watchdog fined television stations that screened footage of the Gezi protests. Most conspicuous, after Erdogan denounced the Turkish conglomerate Koc Holding for sheltering protesters in one of its hotels, in July, tax inspectors accompanied by police raided the offices of several Koc subsidiaries. The case is ongoing and could fizzle out in the long run, but Turkish executives now privately complain that such an atmosphere could scare away the foreign direct investment that Turkey so desperately needs.

Indeed, the risks that Erdogan’s erratic policymaking could wreak economic damage is especially great in a country with few natural resources and little capital of its own. If the government continues to punish the media for broadcasting bad news, if big decisions come to depend on the mood of one man, and if companies fear predatory fines, Turkish growth seems unlikely to continue at the rates to which the country has become accustomed.

Little of this seems to have dawned on Erdogan himself, however: the prime minister has rarely sounded more optimistic. His government projects that Turkey will reach a per capita income of $25,000 by 2023 -- the centenary of the founding of the republic -- and realize its aim of becoming one of the world’s ten biggest economies. The latter target would require barely credible rates of growth -- 15 percent a year, according to Rahmi Koc, the patriarch of Koc Holding -- but it is in keeping with the prime minister’s monumental approach. Erdogan has also backed and begun such giant projects as a vast new airport for Istanbul, a new bridge across the Bosporus, and a new canal to run parallel to the strait. In Turkey’s current political climate, any suggestion that such projects could face financing difficulties leads to howls of outrage by the pro-government press.

As all of this implies, Turkey’s economic potential is decidedly mixed. The country remains alluring to consumer goods companies that want to sell to the country’s youthful population; it has been tried and tested as a manufacturer, and it retains a strong tradition of exporting apparel. But for other foreign investors, it presents more uncertain prospects; government officials acknowledge that foreign direct investment is considerably below where they would like it to be.

Nevertheless, Turkey still stands out amid the troubled economies of southern Europe, not to mention a Middle East in turmoil. In a November survey, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecast that in 2014, Turkey would grow by 3.6 percent -- less than it had previously expected, but still a higher rate than those projected for many of its neighbors. The country’s enviable geographic location and its customs union with the EU remain important competitive advantages.

ANKARA'S AMBITION

The current state of affairs may not necessarily endure. Optimists argue that the country will return to trend, in politics as well as economics. They note that Turkey is incomparably richer and freer than it was 15 years ago. On the economic front, if education improves and Turks save more, the country can continue to grow at an accelerated pace. And on the political front, Erdogan may change course if the drawbacks of his current approach sink in.

In fact, Erdogan might not even be at the helm of government for much longer. Erdogan has sworn not to serve another term as premier (AKP term limits prohibit it), and he has shown great interest in running for the country’s presidency -- currently a largely symbolic post -- in the first direct elections for the position, which will be held later this year. Should he do so, the current president, Abdullah Gul, may well become prime minister. And a country led by Gul could be an entirely different place. Although Gul and Erdogan are old allies who built the AKP together, in recent years, Gul has taken pains to establish himself as a more moderate alternative to his old comrade. During his address at the opening of parliament in October, Gul called for a “new growth policy” and argued that Turkey should address its low savings rate, its educational failings, and the lack of women’s participation in political and economic life, as well as find ways to make “foreign investors and our own entrepreneurs feel safe and secure.”

Whoever leads Turkey next will face strong headwinds. Few analysts predict that Turkey will face the sort of crashes that have done it so much damage in the past. But in a harsh report in September, the International Monetary Fund warned that it would be difficult for Turkey to grow by four or five percent annually -- let alone by the extraordinary levels of recent memory -- “while continuing to accumulate large external liabilities.” It predicted that without structural reform, higher interest rates, and tighter spending policies, the country would be left with an unenviable choice between sluggish growth and bouts of instability.

This is the dilemma that Erdogan faces as he seeks to continue the political and economic advances his country has made since 2002. He has often proved his critics wrong. But Erdogan can achieve his outsized ambitions only if the country and the government do everything right. And the way things currently look, that might simply be too much to expect.

[Foreign Affairs] Can a Myth Rule a Nation?

The Truth About Sisi's Candidacy in Egypt

By Joshua Stacher

Anyone who claims to possess full political power in post-Mubarak Egypt is lying. That might be hard to believe, given how large the military looms these days. But the vision of an almighty military -- propagated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), its supporters, and those desperate for stability -- is a mirage. Soon enough, it will dissipate, revealing deep tensions in Egypt and dwindling options for what is often assumed to be Egypt’s strongest institution.

On Monday, SCAF, the governing body of the Egyptian military, unanimously gave Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the military’s commander in chief and Egypt’s current defense minister, its blessing to run for president. (Indeed, it considers his nomination a “mandate and an obligation.”) Sisi, whom the interim president promoted to the rank of field marshal the same day, has yet to announce his candidacy. Still, most everyone has accepted it -- and his eventual presidency -- as a fait accompli, the final step in the military’s reconquest of Egypt and the country’s return to the days of former President Hosni Mubarak.

But that is not the whole story.

Last June, Mubarak supporters and some revolutionaries came together to oust elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. Since then, large parts of society have coalesced around Sisi as the personification of a renewed nationalist strain of Egyptian power. He is lionized in the state media and praised by figures from Mubarak’s defunct ruling party and crony capitalist networks. Much of the general population, outside of the Muslim Brotherhood and revolutionaries, view him as being above the political fray. Brides profess to want to marry him, and men project his masculinity to reinforce their patriarchy. And those clamoring for stability -- from media moguls to average Egyptians and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry -- talk of democratic roadmaps and upcoming elections while sweeping political reality under the rug.

Sisi has tried to cement his position in politics by initiating an antiterror campaign, launched in late July of last year. The state’s coercive machinery has since increased its targeting of antigovernment protests and sit-ins, which has produced a death toll in the thousands. It is more than just a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt’s military-backed government has officially labeled a terrorist organization. The interim government and security forces have also killed and injured non-Brotherhood protesters, jailed revolutionary activists and nonstate-controlled journalists, lodged legal accusations against politicians who rose to prominence after the uprising, and slandered dissenting academics. The campaign has coincided with an uptick in bombings, assassinations, and a Sinai-based insurgency against the state by an Islamist group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. As the body count rises (security forces killed nearly 70 people last weekend), it is becoming clear that the state has actually weakened over the past three years. The government’s policy of using violence against dissenters is merely the latest effort to fix a leaky boat. But it will keep Egypt on the brink of revolution.

To understand why, consider what happened as protesters chased Mubarak’s last government out of office in January and February 2011: The military rolled in to protect infrastructure and its own factories and then carved up Mubarak’s ruling coalition while everyone else focused on Mubarak’s resignation. The SCAF exiled or imprisoned some crony capitalists and the government’s pro­-economic-reform team because it did not control them. It eliminated many of its competitors in the interior ministry and brought them under its authority. For example, the SCAF renamed the State Security Investigations Service(Homeland Security) , Egypt’s draconian domestic spying apparatus and reshuffled its leadership in March 2011.

Other powerful and potentially competitive intelligence agencies were not spared. Take, for instance, Omar Suleiman’s General Intelligence Service. An assassination attempt against him in Cairo during the uprising was never explained, and most accounts speculate that the military was behind the conspiracy because no one was ever apprehended. He can be forgiven, then, for quickly retiring after Mubarak’s departure. Last August’s appointment of Mohamed Farid el-Tohamy -- a former military intelligence officer -- to run the General Intelligence Service demonstrates just how fully the military had dismantled Suleiman’s old networks.

By the time the revolution was over, nearly all political control rested in the SCAF’s hands. At that point, the council had a number of options. It could have governed on its own, but it did not want to. Instead, the generals decided to protect their interests but hide behind a civilian face. So it sought out a civilian administration that could not challenge it. In the process, it whittled Mubarak’s regime, which had been designed to serve multiple constituencies and networks, into a system that would serve the interests of the military alone.

The SCAF reached out to a previous foe, which, it believed, could help demobilize a restive society. The Muslim Brotherhood was given a choice between siding with the revolution or the military. Brotherhood leaders broke toward the generals, believing that, if they were pliant enough, they would be indispensible to the military. In the end, however, Morsi and his group could not deliver what the military wanted: public stability or an end to continuous street activity. In fact, their presence and blatantly partisan rule made protests worse. So the military and its supporters consulted with and allowed the Tamarod protesters to turn up the heat on Morsi. Their street mobilization in late June, in turn, pushed the generals back into action.

In one sense, the military got its way. It demonstrated its sway over the Egyptian state when some observers believed that it had, in fact, been sidelined by Morsi, who forced the retirement of a handful of senior generals in August 2012, including the then defense minister and head of the SCAF, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. But in another sense, the military damaged the foundations of the regime it inherited. By pushing out an elected official, it discredited the notion of elections as a useful tool for rotating and transferring political power among civilian groups. Gone was any last inkling that the military could stand neutrally by, allow electoral victors to emerge, and not interfere with the process.

Now, with no other organized civilian group left to work with and its options limited, the SCAF hurled Sisi into the spotlight and began to create the myth of an Oz-like wizard controlling the state. Doing so bought Egypt’s generals some time, but the task before them -- engineering a new regime -- needs more than that. The longer the transition process drags on, the more cornered the SCAF finds itself. In fact, although Sisi’s nomination for the presidency might have appeared inevitable or destined, one could argue that it was the SCAF’s increasing weakness and paranoia that motivated his impending candidacy. After all, given his popularity, Sisi could anoint anyone as Egypt’s next preferred president. Open elections would likely be a landslide for his chosen candidate, and the process would preserve both the vestige of procedural democracy and the SCAF’s ability to intervene. Yet the generals named Sisi, looking to him to finish off the revolution and reign in the Brotherhood’s participation in politics.

But beyond creepy state press portrayals of Sisi’s virility and Egyptians parading around in gold-colored Sisi masks, as many were in Tahrir Square on the third anniversary of the revolution on January 25, the junta has little upon which to build a real regime. Sisi has no economic policies or political programs to speak of. The military-backed government’s base is narrow, and since it has no way to incorporate dissenters, it will generate more dissent and state-generated violence.

For now, Sisi and the SCAF have amassed the popularity of a fickle public. But the winds could change at any time. In years past, the military was able to pivot at will, showing remarkable flexibility. But now, with Sisi’s nomination, it has made the military the central player in the drama. Its role in politics now publically recognized, it will face more scrutiny as it tries to pull the levers. It has no civilian partner on which to pin the blame, and it is losing the support of its onetime grass-roots ally, Tamarod. As the regime-in-formation resorts more and more frequently to force, it will only exacerbate Egypt’s political crisis.

It is telling that the only institution that emerged with a good hand after Mubarak fell is increasingly playing with limited cards: all clubs and no hearts, diamonds, or spades. Although it might seem in control for now, the public will not tolerate an increasingly iron fist forever. Instability and violence will eat away at the myth of the omnipotent, newly promoted field marshal and the system’s narrative of stability. Once that happens, the ongoing social struggle will move on to its next phase.

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/1/31]

[FP] Zero Problems in a New Era

Realpolitik is no answer to the challenges posed by the Arab Spring.

BY Ahmet Davutoglu

Following its electoral victory in 2002, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) embarked on an ambitious reform program in both domestic and foreign policy. The Middle East has changed dramatically over the past decade, but our government's foreign policy philosophy remains the same. In particular, our "zero problem with neighbors" principle remains alive and well -- and more relevant than ever to resolving the challenges facing our region.

From the moment the AK Party government was formed, it faced enormous foreign-policy challenges. On the one hand, Turkey was confronted with an immediate crisis, as the ill-fated U.S. war on Iraq was fast impending. On the other hand, Turkey was plagued by chronic foreign-policy disputes with nearly all of its neighbors -- disputes that served as tremendous barriers to the normalization of regional relations.
In many ways, Turkey's diplomacy during the Iraq war and beyond, where it sought to mediate between all major political groups, foretold the efforts we, the AK Party, were going to undertake in the coming years. It was our goal to liberate
Turkey from its problematic relations with neighboring countries, address the persistent fault lines and tensions in its vicinity through regional cooperation, and act with a clear foreign-policy vision underpinned by proactive rather than reactive policies. This forward-looking foreign policy led to a redefinition of Turkey's policy toward its neighbors.

As a scholar of international relations, I have long asserted that a major reason for Turkey's relative isolation from its neighborhood had to do with the framework that dominated the mindset of Turkish foreign-policy elites for decades -- a mindset that erected obstacles between Turkey and its neighbors physically, mentally, and politically. The new AK Party government hoped to reintegrate Turkey with its surroundings, and this new strategy necessitated a major break with the old foreign-policy culture. In its electoral platform, the AK Party resolved to improve relations with Turkey's neighbors and pursue a more dynamic and multidimensional foreign policy. This was a foreign-policy vision I had been advocating in academia, and was thus more than happy to make my own contribution toward the realization of that new approach.

When I became Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's chief foreign-policy advisor, I not only worked to advise him on the practical handling of Turkey's external affairs, but also endeavored to set forth new ideas that would guide my country's foreign policy in the new era. I proposed that our foreign policy would be based upon six core principles: a balance between security and freedom, zero problems with neighbors, a multidimensional foreign policy, a pro-active regional foreign policy, an altogether new diplomatic style, and rhythmic diplomacy.

Though these principles were by no means static, they have since inspired our institutional foreign policy approach. Together, they formed an internally coherent set of principles -- a blueprint, so to speak -- that both guides our approach to regional crises and helps Turkey reassert itself as a preeminent country in the international system.
It is with this fresh and innovative thinking that the AK Party government has also delivered numerous domestic reforms to expand the scope of democratic freedoms at home. Without a stable domestic order that meets its citizens' demands for liberties, after all, Turkey cannot pursue a proactive foreign-policy agenda abroad.

As Turkey achieved greater domestic peace, my country became more capable of realizing its foreign-policy objectives. The government undertook numerous groundbreaking initiatives, including but not limited to efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue, end enmity with Syria, and normalize relations with Armenia. Similarly, we expanded our efforts to bolster Turkey's ties with emerging actors in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. We also adopted new foreign-policy instruments ranging from mediation to development assistance, which became cornerstones of the new pro-active Turkish diplomacy.

Particularly after I assumed the post of minister of foreign affairs, "zero problems with neighbors" became the most publicized of Turkey's foreign-policy principles. Taken literally, this was obviously an idealistic model -- however, it also represented a clear change of mentality in Turkish foreign policy. Under subsequent AK Party governments, we have broken ground in reconnecting with the Balkans, Black Sea region, Caucasus, and Middle East. Turkey's foreign-policy agenda is no longer dominated by the chronic disputes with neighbors that used to consume its energy in regional and international affairs. Thus, Turkish people started to see their neighborhood not as a source of problems and potential threats, but as an arena of cooperation and partnership.

When the recent wave of democratic protests started to shake the Middle East, the validity of our new conceptual framework was once again confirmed. At the root of the regional turmoil was the Arab people's genuine demand for good governance that respected their civil rights, honor, and integrity. Previously, the AK Party had argued on many occasions that just as we continuously reformed our economic and political systems, the rulers in the wider Middle East needed to initiate similar domestic reforms. Unfortunately, their failure to take timely steps to meet their citizens' demands forced upon them a rapid transformation, which not only resulted in the death and misery of innocent people but also poses a risk to regional peace and stability.

The Arab Spring, thus, presented us all with difficult decisions: We either could maintain ties with these oppressive rulers, or we could support the popular uprisings to secure basic democratic rights. More significantly, the uprisings also posed a challenge to the conceptual foundations of our new foreign policy, which we had carefully nurtured over the years. Turkey naturally opted for the second alternative with regard to Syria, leading many analysts to argue that we have abandoned the "zero problems with neighbors" policy, or claim that it had simply failed. Many critics of our foreign policy, it appears, have interpreted the "zero problems" principle in a simplistic way, as if it suggested we would continue to follow this ideal at all costs and condone regime-inflicted violence on innocent civilians.

Those criticizing Turkey's foreign policy, however, fail to understand how our policy toward the Arab Spring was formulated. It was through a balanced consideration of our foreign-policy principles, and an acknowledgment of the fact that "zero problems with neighbors" made sense only when it was considered in conjunction with other principles. Notably, Turkey balanced the "zero problems" principle with our belief in achieving a balance between security and freedom, which formed the core of our policy toward the Arab Spring. Our key principles, together with the "zero problems" policy, have not failed -- nor have they been rejected. Instead, they continue to guide our foreign policy in our neighborhood.

Those who narrowly focus on the "zero problems" principle miss Turkey's greater foreign- policy vision. As we readjusted our policies in response to the new strategic situation in the Middle East, we also embarked on new initiatives. Turkey has drawn attention to the problems of the least-developed countries, led a campaign to mobilize the international community to assist famine victims in Somalia, sustained its engagement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and reenergized its bid for European Union membership. More remarkably, these initiatives have been carried out while Turkey was working to address the humanitarian tragedy unfolding on its border with Syria.

When the revolutionary events in the Middle East began, we were determined that we would not be passive bystanders, but active agents that impacted this historic transformation of the region. Our government, therefore, made an unequivocal decision from the very first day of the Arab Spring to extend our assistance to the people of the region, so that they could enjoy the same universally acknowledged rights as their peers do elsewhere in the world. We refused to stand idly by as the basic democratic rights enjoyed by the Turkish people were denied to others by violence and oppression.

We thus called for peaceful and gradual political transformation, such that the new regional governments could be shaped by the popular demands of their citizens. When some Arab regimes ignored such calls, we did not hesitate to support the people's legitimate struggle for reinstituting popular sovereignty as the basis of political authority and regional stability.

Our emphasis on zero problems with neighbors neither prevented us from taking that bold position nor ceased to serve as a blueprint for our foreign policy in the region. When we initiated the "zero problems" policy, it was in no way meant to suggest that Turkey would pursue a values-free realpolitik agenda, solely focused on advancing its economic and security interests. Rather, it meant to eliminate the barriers preventing Turkey's reintegration with its neighbors, irrespective of where those obstacles came from. Our main objective was to ensure deep inter-societal communication, notably between our people and the people of the region, which we called "maximum cooperation."

Today, the "zero problems" vision means that we cannot make a decision that will alienate us from the hearts and minds of our region's people. If the main challenge to that vision of peace comes from those who deny the people's basic rights by oppressive means, we cannot remain silent. If we don't stand against oppression today, we cannot face the future generations with dignity. We also might erect new and lingering barriers between Turkey and the region, which would hinder our efforts at reintegration.

The "zero problems" principle, in the sense of friendly relations with regional states, still forms the basis of our policy in the region. We still pursue stronger ties with rulers who respect their people's demands for freedom and offer a secure and stable domestic order. In the countries that are going through a political transition, we are doing our utmost to help reestablish a balance between freedom and security. Our "zero problems" initiatives in the Middle East in the years preceding the popular uprisings also enabled us to establish valuable ties not only with neighboring regimes, but also societal actors. The leverage we gained in this process put us in a better position to address the challenges of the current regional transformation.

The vision of cooperation and dialogue implied by the "zero problems" principle is still urgently needed to address the current challenges in the Middle East. As the future of regional peace and stability is threatened by deepened ethnic and sectarian conflict, Turkey has warned against a new Cold War. We must not allow new barriers to divide the societies of our region -- such barriers are the biggest challenges to our search for cooperation and integration. Just as we tried to spread this notion through our "Countries Neighboring Iraq" initiative, we are again working to convince our neighbors to embrace a new language of inclusion, inspired by our common history and value system.

The current regional transformation will no doubt prove painful. Turkey, however, will continue to pursue its multidimensional foreign policy and draw on its new diplomatic assets to assist its neighbors undergoing this difficult phase. It is a historic responsibility for Turkey to assume that role: We believe that the regional order can be rebuilt only after people's demands for honor, freedom, and good governance are expressed in their political systems.

Once the regional transition is completed, we will continue our work toward regional integration within the spirit of the "zero problems with neighbors" principle. It will shape our foreign policy as a responsible member of international community -- and also serve as a guide for channeling a new collective conscience of solidarity into a spirit of regional integration.

[Foregin Policy Website 2014/3/21]

[Foreign Policy] America's Pacific Century

The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.

BY HILLARY CLINTON
OCTOBER 11, 2011

As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.

At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.

With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again.

Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.

Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players.

Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.

President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world.

As secretary of state, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.

WHAT DOES THAT regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.

Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.

As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.

The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese government of more than $5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.

Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.

We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.

AS WE UPDATE our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.

One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.

We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights.

We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity.

As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea.

On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity.

Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.

At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.

Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.

President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.

We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.

EVEN AS WE strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity.

So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.

That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law.

We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace.

In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.

In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.

OUR EMPHASIS ON the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific.

The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.
When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.

Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.

We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.

We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.

Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.

ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.

We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.

How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.

But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.

As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond.

We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.
IN THE LAST decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.

We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us.

Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership.

And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.

As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.
This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.