【明報】早稻田大學名譽教授加藤典洋專文

日本右傾化源於優越感迷失

【明報專訊】日本右傾化，確實是近期日本必須憂慮的情况，中國國力的急速增長對於經濟持續停滯的日本構成威脅，日本社會失去「優越感」，日中國境爭議只是副產品之一，長此以往，日本與軍國主義結合的可能性甚大。

2010年中國在經濟上超越日本一事，如今想來，也許是日本社會開始出現閉塞感、反中韓感情激化的導火線，這點加上國民對安倍政權的經濟政策的期望，便構成如今日本社會支持安倍政權的基本感情。戰後，日本人視自身為優秀族群的優越感，正是建基於在東亞地區的經濟優勢。然而，日本的經濟優勢，因始於1990年代前半的「迷失二十年」而被削弱，並在2010年以來中國的經濟規模超越日本後明確地喪失，再加上韓國產業急起直追，對日本的主要產業造成打擊，成為孕育嫌惡、排斥中國及韓國的溫牀，安倍內閣則以此為搖籃，登上政治舞台。

1960年實施「政經分離」政策以來，日本「凍結」了對政治課題的追求。戰後日本將政治、外交目標擱置，放棄對國際社會作出任何貢獻的政治努力，一貫採取對美從屬路線。此後，自1980年代中曾根康弘政權以來，為掩飾政治上的空白，自民黨出現徹底的「復古」傾向，採取將戰前日本的政治性與戰後日本的政治性連繫起來的形態，其象徵包括「參拜靖國」（中曾根、小泉、安倍均積極地以參拜靖國為目標）。那是從根本上擱置確立與戰前時代不同的和平主義、近鄰協調、對美「自立」友好（而非對美「從屬」友好）等政治目標的努力所造成的惡果。最終，日本對美從屬持續近70年的不滿在日本社會壓抑累積，成為現時日本年輕一代產生民族主義的溫牀。反中國、反韓國的感情的背後實質上是反美感情，只是日本對於是否直接展示反美感情猶豫不決，並將之顯現為反中國、反韓國的感情。經濟上的打擊與政治上的復古主義（軍國化）相信由此連繫起來。

接下來談談安倍政權的右傾化與此前的右傾化相異、變得更嚴重的理由。

反中反韓背後是反美

首相安倍晉三的政治認識與過往的自民黨領袖並不相同。雖然作為戰後秩序的東京審判單方面將日本定罪有一定問題，但日本已將之接受（1951年簽訂舊金山和約），並回歸戰後的國際秩序。那是包括自民黨內閣在內的歷屆日本政府的一貫立場。不過安倍首相卻抱持將其否定的立場。（2013年2月12日眾議院預算委員會的發言時，安倍曾稱，關於「過往大戰」的總結並非出自日本人自身之手，「東京審判是根據同盟國一方作出的所謂勝利者判斷對日本定罪」等）首相在國會中正式作出如此發言，從1950年代的復古主義傾向被禁絕後，60年代以來至今的日本政壇中前所未見。

日本和平主義精神衰退

我曾在《紐約時報》撰文（7月），指出日本社會戰後經過近70年，由於戰爭的體驗風化，支撐憲法第9條和平條款的和平主義精神、信念漸漸枯竭。經歷過戰爭的人大多已亡故，戰後的和平主義教育在文部科學省的國家主義指引下大幅倒退，其影響逐漸顯現，證據在於特定秘密保護法、參拜靖國、內閣決議通過行使集體自衛權等完全脫離過往日本政府政治外交方針的「右傾化」路線儘管持續不斷，但民意調查卻顯示安倍內閣的支持率仍然高於不支持率。這樣的情况過往未嘗發生。支持安倍內閣的其中一個理由是對其經濟政策的期望，另一理由則是和平主義精神的衰退。

日本社會劣化的因素之一，也許是2011年東日本大地震及福島核事故。事後，社會失去了對過度「右傾化」的抵抗力。百田尚樹以神風特攻為題材的小說《永遠的0》售出480萬冊，其改編電影吸引700萬人收看。日本社會這種變質與劣化從3．11以後急速發展至現時的地步。人們對於「感動」變得非常脆弱，變得情緒化，理性的抵抗力整體弱化。

狹隘民族主義主張保留

安倍首相施政汲取了首次任期失敗的教訓，今次上任後，改以意識上與自己同調者鞏固統治中樞、排除反對者的強權黨內政治為方針，自民黨自身變成對黨內異論沒有容忍力的政黨。對首相的監察機制幾乎無法運作。自民黨的前首相小泉、福田，昔日黨內中樞、前幹事長野中廣務，前官房長官、眾議院議長河野洋平，前幹事長古賀誠等人雖然均表達了反對聲音，但自民黨未有聽取這些前人的聲音，整體復古的年輕議員所持的狹隘民族主義主張得勢。

要抑制安倍政權的矛盾暴走

在野黨整體勢力大幅減少，令在野黨亦轉趨右傾化。2009年8月，眾議院勢力中民主黨佔308席，自民黨佔119席，但2012年12月以來，自民黨佔294席，民主黨只佔55席。其他在野黨中，親政府的有公明黨31席、日本維新會32席、次世代黨19席、大家黨9席，共佔91席。反建制的在野黨中，日本共產黨佔8席、生活黨佔7席、社會民主黨佔2席，合計只佔17席。1990年2月第39屆大選中，自民黨取得275席，而社會黨（現為社會民主黨）則有136席。

現時安倍政權在探索新秩序之際，更着重於利用高昂的敵對感情，以達成自身目的。我認為那是愚蠢的選擇。面對日本此後將步入少子高齡化社會，中國經濟不論好壞均無可避免成為重大的「存在體」。安倍經濟學前期階段透過向國內提供資金，設定通脹目標等，轉換至積極的財政方向。那也許值得試驗。不過在後期階段，在國際上增加與鄰國，特別是中國的貿易，進行技術合作，活化經濟交流，緩和國際緊張等行動則變得必要。

經濟上的需要，與軍國化、復古路線產生矛盾的階段已出現。今後必須考慮到將恢復經濟為主要着眼點，確立區內友好，在互惠關係的基礎上建立新的經濟安定與友好關係，如何抑制、修正現時抱持「矛盾」暴走的安倍政權路線是現時日本的課題。

（編按：本文是作者專誠替本報撰寫的來稿，原為日文，經本報翻譯成中文。）

加藤典洋

早稻田大學 名譽教授

【明報】中日深度報道（一）：石原慎太郎

石原慎太郎：日本無甲級戰犯

【明報專訊】兩年前，中日關係突然聚焦於一點。當年的東京都知事（即市長）拋出東京市政府購買釣魚島計劃，觸發日本政府「國有化」釣島，令中日關係迅速惡化。身為始作俑者的他，是中國人眼中最右翼的急先鋒，在東京他是連任3次且民望極高的市長，在日本他的前半生是文壇巨匠、後半生就爭得2020年東京奧運會主辦權，為「迷失二十年」的東瀛億萬國民，注下一道久違的興奮劑，他就是爭議不斷的石原慎太郎。

石原上月在東京接受本報專訪，詳盡回應了左右中日關係的多個敏感問題。

「美擲原子彈 非甲級戰犯行為？」

退任東京都知事後，石原慎太郎仍為日本眾議院議員，上月在國會的議員辦公室會見《明報》記者。日本國會議事堂竣工於中國八年抗戰爆發前的1936年，這是日本國會開會的地方。訪談前其助手特意致電記者，態度誠懇，千萬叮囑，石原表明今次訪問期望集中討論「改善日中關係」問題。訪問當天，記者甫進石原辦公室，助手面露難色，緊張地提醒，石原討厭閃光燈，除了訪問前後准拍照外，訪問期間最好別再用閃光燈，否則他隨時會罵人。
跟電視畫面看到的石原一樣，面色凝重，不苟言笑，當記者問及靖國神社供奉甲級戰犯一事時，石原打斷說﹕「你知道什麼是甲級戰犯嗎？」「這是東京審判時美國人第一次提出的，罪名是破壞和平，這個罪名在這之前的國際法庭是沒有的，是美國為了給日本製造的罪名。如果說破壞和平，美國針對喪失制空權的日本，對東京實施無差別轟炸，一個晚上殺掉20萬人。原子彈更殺了幾十萬人，這不就是甲級戰犯行為？東京審判是不合法的，當時在席的印度法官曾質疑審判有問題，但是主審法官無視此觀點。所以，日本根本不存在甲級戰犯。」

聲言日本當年「被迫」參戰

石原續說﹕「為什麼你們（中國）不批判英國？鴉片戰爭時候英國不是殺了很多人？侵略了你們，為什麼你們無視？日中的確是打過仗，但日本是『被迫』參戰的。」「日中戰爭不能說對錯，日本當時遭（美國）經濟封鎖。日本參與的太平洋戰爭，整體來說是『自衛戰爭』。美國的麥克亞瑟將軍做過見證，美國是承認的。發動戰爭的源頭是美國。」說到這裏， 石原質疑記者不了解太平洋戰爭，反問赫爾備忘錄（Hull note）是誰炮製的？（編按﹕赫爾備忘錄為美國逼令日本從中國撤軍的外交文件，日本右翼分子一直揚言這是觸發太平洋戰爭的起因。）

岳父堂兄弟靈位均在靖國

石原說﹕「 我岳父大人和兩個堂兄弟（3人都是二戰軍人），靈位也在靖國裏面，為什麼我不可以去？」記者問及會把有爭議的靈位移離靖國嗎？石原斬釘截鐵說﹕「難道應該讓至今為止供奉在裏面的人統統搬出去嗎？……我認為天皇也應該參拜靖國神社，我向天皇呼籲過，寫過信。」

為什麼日本不能徹底謝罪，把中日百年歷史恩怨一刀了結？石原淡然說﹕「要承認的日本已經承認了。在東京審判也處決了一批人。」

「我反共不反華」

當記者問及中美日3國關係如何發展時，石原說﹕「中國和日本不會成為日美同盟那樣的關係，因為，中共政府無視人權。我和達賴喇嘛關係很好。我不希望日本成為中國的附庸國。也不想和這樣的中國友好。你知道『通州事件』嗎？中國人對日本人非常殘忍的殺害。這是導致日中戰爭的導火線。我仍然是反共不反華。我也希望今年11月中國主持APEC會議，日中能夠修復關係，不過，中國現在應該很擔心吧，中國漸漸正被世界孤立。」（編按﹕有關觸發中日八年抗戰事件和通州事變的普遍公論， 詳見另稿）

（獨家專訪）

明報記者
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「中國航母簡直nonsense」

【明報專訊】若參拜靖國神社是中日關係難解之結，那日本「國有化」釣魚島更是雙方的死結；中國政府的立場是日本必須承認釣魚島主權存在爭議，然而，現屆日本安倍內閣堅持不承認主權存在爭議，日本眾議院議員石原慎太郎不單支持這取態，更揚言中國是賊喊捉賊的「小偷」。

「小偷總覺得自己正確」

石原說﹕「釣魚島是中國領土這荒唐無稽的表達，我是不接受的……要說有爭議，在爭的不就是中國嗎？我們不接受有爭議這種說法。中國常常侵犯別國領空、領海。你看中越衝突（西沙勘探鑽油台事件）也是中國過來衝撞，日中的問題也好，中越的問題也好，中國都不說真話，看新聞的話可以分得很清楚啊。中國的做法在世界不會得到認同。『小偷』總覺得自己很正確。」

指中國航母非日本威脅

究竟釣魚島問題如何解決？石原答﹕「釣魚島只要我們（日本）一直守護，中國能把釣魚島佔為己有嗎？那裏打不起來，離中國太遠，中國拿不到制空權、制海權，如果真的打起來，中國怎麼保證物資輸送？中國又不擁有海洋艦隊。中國的航空母艦（遼寧號）簡直是nonsense（胡鬧），世界上的專家聽到都會笑，絕對成不了日本的問題，完全毋須擔心。」
石原很自信地說，中國的航母是為了試驗起降飛機而買的，連彈射器都沒有，那樣的航母做不了旗艦，完全不會是日本的威脅。此外，中國的空軍師團距離釣魚島有600公里之遙，日本的空軍基地就在旁邊。

記者問及石原主政下的東京市，曾試圖收購釣魚島，有沒有想過此舉會太過刺激中國？石原答﹕「 中國也可以像東京那樣找島主買島，反正東京和中國不可能發動戰爭……東京應該買了釣魚島的，買了的話國民會很關心。如果釣魚島是中國的，那沖繩也就是中國的。」
（編按﹕東京市一度欲購釣魚島，日本政府最終搶先於2012年9月以20.5億日圓從「島主」手上購入釣魚島，稱為日本「國有化」釣魚島事件。此外，石原在訪問中一直稱呼釣魚島為「尖閣諸島」）
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最愛中國人：鄧小平西門慶

【明報專訊】不少人認為石原慎太郎是「反華急先鋒」，石原卻反駁，聲言自己是反共不反華。他很喜歡中國的詩詞和文學，不過現在的中國「什麼都沒有了」，在文化上沒有新東西，也看不到有魅力的文化。

批訪日中國客沒禮貌

石原批評中國遊客訪日時沒有禮貌。他說﹕「來日本的中國人禮儀不好。不遵守規矩。我當東京都知事的時候教訓過中國人。他們來參觀東京都廳展望台，有很多人在排隊，但他們不排隊，我就發火了。」

記者問及他對中國有何寄語時，石原思索一會答道﹕「如果出現鄧小平這樣的領袖就好了。因為， 我最喜歡的中國人是鄧小平和《金瓶梅》的主人公西門慶。
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中國外交部﹕謬論不值一駁

【明報專訊】針對石原慎太郎的言論，中國外交部發言人華春瑩書面回覆本報稱，「石原的極端言論表明，日本國內確實存在一股企圖為軍國主義侵略歷史翻案的極右勢力，他們的荒謬言論在國際公理和歷史正義面前不值一駁」。國防部發言人辦公室則稱，對日本議員的個別言論不予置評。

華春瑩斥圖為侵略翻案

石原慎太郎認為日本是被迫加入戰爭，「這種觀點是絕對錯誤的」。廣州中山大學教授袁偉時接受本報電話訪問稱，日本對華的侵略是有預謀、有步驟的，不能以「通州事件」或者某一事件來說是日本侵華的引發點。日本侵華的原因可以追溯到日本打破鎖國狀態的時期，原本日本在思想上由儒、佛教起支配作用，開埠之後提倡「國學」，排斥儒佛，借用中國「華夷之辨」的思想，認為自己才是「華夏」，中國本身以及其他國家都是「蠻夷」。袁指出，鴉片戰爭之後，中國轉化為現代社會的速度緩慢，制度上既無改革，經濟發展也遲緩，日本認為有責任領導亞洲，「開化」朝鮮、中國。

專家指日民族主義惡性發展

袁偉時說，1890年日本頒布憲法，但沒有憲政，沒有自由民主的觀念，「他們從制度設計上就出了問題，軍隊不受內閣領導，而是特別成立軍部，受天皇領導，主權在天皇，而不是『主權在民』」。在民族主義的惡性發展之下，「日本即使不侵略中國，也要侵略其他國家」。

袁偉時又說，美國是被迫用原子彈對付日本，死亡人數也遠少於日本侵略戰爭。資料顯示，廣島、長崎死亡共約20萬人，而中國在二戰中死亡的軍民達2500萬人，此外，第一次鴉片戰爭僅死亡幾百人。他又認為，少數日本政客不時講些觸犯中韓感情的話，右翼分子一貫興風作浪，高瞻遠矚的政治家應該以國家利益為重，保持大局穩定，不用理會這些小風波。他留意到中國外交部長王毅早前在中日韓外長會議上提出，爭取2020年成立東亞共同體，「如果成功了，對亞洲乃至世界局勢都起好大作用，歐盟那樣，邊界都同省界差不多，那時釣魚島這些問題好容易解決，剩下的只有經濟矛盾」。

【明報】中日深度報道（一）：靖國神社

參拜靖國神社揭秘

【明報專訊】中日百年恩仇，從未一笑泯滅，兩國關係近年急轉直下，明天適逢日本侵略東北的「九一八事變」83周年；《明報》為求「前事不忘，後事之師」，早前遠赴日本，全球首度圖文並茂揭開參拜靖國神社的完整過程，並專訪右翼急先鋒石原慎太郎、親華首相鳩山友紀夫（原名鳩山由紀夫）等，作為明報「深度報道」跳出鯉魚門、明察天下的頭炮。「中日專輯」將一連四期、逢周三刊出，敬希讀者垂注。

靖國神社在中國老百姓眼中可謂「犯眾憎」之地，至今仍是中日之間難以繞開的死結。靖國神社內中究竟有何方「神聖」？日本高官悄悄舉行的「昇殿參拜」又是一個怎樣的儀式？參拜者嚴禁拍攝的本殿內何以有一塊百年古鏡？何以能引發外交風波？本報記者帶同畫師走進靖國神社直擊參拜過程，為讀者揭開它的神秘面紗。

明報記者

供奉246萬戰爭亡靈

靖國神社曾經是日本國家神社，是天皇唯一會去參拜的地方。這裏供奉有明治維新以來戰死的日本軍人及軍屬約246萬人，二戰時日本士兵把死後被祭祀在靖國神社視為最高榮譽。日本戰敗後，靖國神社以宗教機構的形式留存下來，原本不受注目，直至14個甲級戰犯被合祀於此，後來任首相的中曾根康弘以官方身分參拜，才引起軒然大波。此後，橋本龍太郎、小泉純一郎及安倍晉三都曾以首相名義參拜。

靖國神社位於東京市中心的九段下、皇居（天皇居住地）西北面，周邊非常僻靜，綠樹成蔭，與皇居僅隔着一條護城河。每逢8月15日日本戰敗紀念日，穿舊皇軍服、扛軍旗的右翼分子就會聚集。平日為吸引人流而設有跳蚤市場，有市民在此擺攤，還不時有傳統歌舞表演，更像一個遊園地。

神社總面積達10萬平方米，約為香港維園的一半大小，由入口至參拜處共有3個大鳥居（類似牌樓），象徵人神分界。當中最外面的第一鳥居最為宏偉，高25米，青銅製，現存結構是1974年重建，原物在1943年因為腐爛被撤走，另一說是當時戰事吃緊，被拿去做了大炮。穿過3座鳥居及一道神門，才來到靖國神社最核心的地方。

核心區包括3座大殿，最前面是拜殿，垂下的白幔上印有4朵象徵日本皇室的菊花紋，市民、遊客可自由參拜。本殿位於拜殿後，參拜需要申請。在神社最深處，存放着死者名錄「靈璽簿」的奉安殿，則不對外開放。

先繳祭祀費 至少148元

每組參拜者先到參集殿集合，向神女（女性神職人員）繳納不少於2000日圓（約148港元）的祭祀費，稍候片刻，一名身穿白袍的神官前來引導。參拜者需脫鞋，首先走入本殿旁的迴廊，低頭接受神官的修祓之儀（驅邪儀式），神官會在此簡短地念經。然後再隨神官上樓梯步入本殿，整齊地在祭祀台下安靜跪好，神官則拖着長音誦經，為亡魂祈禱。

整個本殿的參拜區十分空曠，室內面積約有200平方米，祭祀台上沒有神像或牌位，中間豎着一面碩大的橢圓形鏡子，四周鑲有木質的鳥形雕刻，前面放有水果等祭品。該鏡是神社供奉的神體之一﹕神鏡。資料顯示，它是用1877年明治天皇捐款所製，被寫進「靈璽簿」的亡靈，據稱被鏡子照過以後，再舉行合祀儀式，就完成了人神合一，即「招魂」。

拜前「修祓」 拜後喝酒

參拜期間，神官用大約兩分鐘時間誦經，內容多不能辨明，之後神官會將名為「玉串」的、帶葉的楊桐樹枝分發給參拜者，示意將玉串獻到前面的台上。最後全體行「二拜二拍手一拜」的正式參拜禮節，默哀片刻後儀式結束。

離開本殿後，參拜者原路返回，神女在迴廊等候，給每人遞上一個裝有清酒的紅碗，參拜者需面向本殿飲下。整個過程很安靜，只聽到有人抽泣的聲音，整個儀式稱為「昇殿參拜」，需時約20分鐘。

「昇殿參拜」需時20分鐘

靖國參拜一直備受爭論，日本國內曾有建議將甲級戰犯搬出靖國分開祭祀。中日問題專家、早稻田大學教授天兒慧指出，分祀曾幾乎成事，小泉時代亦有人提議建立新的國家追悼設施，但遭到黨內安倍派強烈反對。日本戰後社會研究專家加藤典洋則認為，靖國問題並非不能解決，原本靖國神社存在的理由是可以得到天皇的參拜，但昭和天皇不滿合祀甲級戰犯，此後未再參拜，現任天皇也從未參拜，只要天皇的態度不變，問題解決機會仍然很大。

（中日關係系列）

明報深度報道組
___________________________

祭甲級戰犯 成中日心病

【明報專訊】靖國神社百多年歷史，並非一開始即是中日關係的絆腳石。轉折在於1978年，神社新任最高神官（廟祝）決定將14名二戰甲級戰犯加入合祭，自此每逢有日本高官參拜靖國神社，必惹來中國高調譴責。

合祀逾2000戰犯

靖國神社源於1868年明治天皇擊潰德川幕府的日本內戰，為祭祀戰死軍人，於1869年興建靖國神社的前身「東京招魂社」。其後靖國神社廣泛祭祀為國犧牲者，亦成為日本天皇唯一鞠躬的對象。

二戰日本戰敗後，審理戰爭責任的遠東國際軍事法庭，判處超過2000名日本人為戰犯。亦因為戰犯身分，這批人死後不能入祀靖國神社。1959年，日本政府認定戰犯也是殉國者，靖國神社即開始將戰犯合祭。不過，開始時合祭的只有乙級、丙級戰犯，亦即虐待戰俘、從事不人道戰爭行為等傳統觀念下的戰犯，多為中、低階之軍士官。

直到1978年，14名被指決策發動侵略戰爭的甲級戰犯等人亦加入合祭，加上日本首相以官式身分參拜，才令靖國神社逐漸成為中日關係的痛處。

共同社：河野談話調查

聚焦："河野談話"調查報告給日韓關係帶來新難題

2014年06月21日

　　【共同社6月21日電】安倍政府向國會報告了有關"河野談話"的調查結果，指出日韓兩國曾就談話內容協調措辭。"河野談話"是1993年時任官房長官河野洋平發表的談話，其中承認了日軍參與慰安婦問題並帶有強迫性。日本之所以不顧韓國的強烈反彈仍決意調查，主要是由於政府方面將質疑談話內容的首相安倍晉三的"信念"放在了首位。但是，目前日韓關係持續惡化，調查結果必將給明年迎來二戰結束70周年的兩國關係帶來新的難題。

　　▽政治性

　　日本官房長官菅義偉在調查報告提交後的20日傍晚的記者會上表示："日本政府不修改而是繼承河野談話的立場沒有改變。"然而，政府及執政黨內大多數意見都認為，這一發言"包括首相在內，與真心話恰恰相反"（自民党幹部語）。

　　安倍為提交調查報告制定了周密的策略。首先是以國會要求的形式啟動專家組調查；為了不給韓方留下反駁餘地，在公開當時日韓兩國政府間交涉的客觀事實後，又將調查結果的評定交給了國會。

　　日本政府之所以打破外交慣例而在報告中寫入本不應公佈的談判記錄，明顯是為了強調談話的"政治性"，從而敦促以該談話為據追究日本責任的韓方重新考慮此事。

　　安倍嚴令負責專家組秘書工作的外務省"拿出所有能拿出的事實"。有意見認為，貫徹了強勢態度的安倍正考慮在二戰結束70周年的2015年發表"安倍晉三首相談話"。自民黨內也有意見指出，"此次的調查是在為'70年首相談話'做準備"。

　　▽矛盾

　　"積極評價當時的日韓兩國政府為通過制定河野談話而解決慰安婦問題所作的努力。將懷著直面歷史事實的勇氣，構築面向未來的關係。"以這一內容為核心制定'70年首相談話'是安倍描繪的最佳情景。

　　但是，日本政府人士指出，調查結果使日韓關係面臨"崩潰的危機"。雖然外務省官員滿懷信心地表示，"明年還是日韓邦交正常化50周年。希望徹底解決慰安婦問題、改善關係"，但實際上日本將陷入越是貫徹首相信念越"無法制定外交戰略"的矛盾。

　　外務省此前試探韓方，希望下週在首爾召開兩國同意每月舉行一次的局長級磋商。但是，19日接受了報告概要事前說明的韓方回應稱暫時"無法回答"，並於20日早晨在竹島（韓國稱獨島）周邊海域實施了似乎旨在牽制日方的射擊訓練。安倍政府官員表示："日韓關係可能真的面臨破裂。"（完）

[Foreign Affairs] Far Eastern Promises

Why Washington Should Focus on Asia

By Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner

The United States is in the early stages of a substantial national project: reorienting its foreign policy to commit greater attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. This reformulation of U.S. priorities has emerged during a period of much-needed strategic reassessment, after more than a decade of intense engagement with South Asia and the Middle East. It is premised on the idea that the history of the twenty-first century will be written largely in the Asia-Pacific, a region that welcomes U.S. leadership and rewards U.S. engagement with a positive return on political, economic, and military investments.

As a result, the Obama administration is orchestrating a comprehensive set of diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives now known as the “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia. The policy builds on more than a century of U.S. involvement in the region, including important steps taken by the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; as President Barack Obama has rightly noted, the United States is in reality and rhetoric already a “Pacific power.” But the rebalancing does represent a significant elevation of Asia’s place in U.S. foreign policy.

Questions about the purpose and scope of the new approach emerged as soon as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered what remains the clearest articulation of the strategy, and first used the term “pivot” to describe it, in a 2011 article in Foreign Policy. Almost three years later, the Obama administration still confronts the persistent challenge of explaining the concept and delivering on its promise. But despite the intense scrutiny and short-term setbacks faced by the policy, there is little doubt that a major shift is well under way. And whether Washington wants it to or not, Asia will command more attention and resources from the United States, thanks to the region’s growing prosperity and influence -- and the enormous challenges the region poses. The question, then, is not whether the United States will focus more on Asia but whether it can do so with the necessary resolve, resources, and wisdom.

EASTBOUND AND DOWN

Paying more attention to Asia is not an admission of defeat in the Middle East.

The Asia-Pacific region exerts an inescapable gravitational pull. It is home to more than half of the world’s population and contains the largest democracy in the world (India), the second- and third-largest economies (China and Japan), the most populous Muslim-majority nation (Indonesia), and seven of the ten largest armies. The Asian Development Bank has predicted that before the middle of this century, the region will account for half of the world’s economic output and include four of the world’s ten largest economies (China, India, Indonesia, and Japan).

But it is the trajectory of Asia’s evolution, not just its dizzying scale, that makes the region so consequential. According to Freedom House, during the last five years, the Asia-Pacific has been the only region in the world to record steady improvements in political rights and civil liberties. And despite questions about the ability of emerging markets to sustain rapid economic growth, Asian nations still represent some of the most promising opportunities in an otherwise sluggish and uncertain global economy. At the same time, Asia struggles with sources of chronic instability, owing to the highly provocative actions of North Korea, the growth of defense budgets throughout the region, vexing maritime disputes that roil relations in the East China and South China seas, and nontraditional security threats such as natural disasters, human trafficking, and the drug trade.

The United States has an irrefutable interest in the course Asia will take in the coming years. The region is the leading destination for U.S. exports, outpacing Europe by more than 50 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Both U.S. direct investment in Asia and Asian direct investment in the United States have roughly doubled in the past decade, with China, India, Singapore, and South Korea accounting for four of the ten fastest-growing sources of foreign direct investment in the United States, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The United States also has five defense treaty allies in the region (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), as well as strategically important partnerships with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan and evolving ties with Myanmar (also known as Burma). Major U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea are central to Washington’s ability to project power in Asia and beyond.

U.S. military alliances have undergirded the region’s security for decades, and one of the main purposes of the pivot is to deepen such ties. In recent years, Washington has encouraged its partners in Asia to prevent conflicts between major powers, keep sea-lanes open, combat extremism, and address nontraditional security threats. Japan and South Korea are poised to take increasingly prominent roles in joint operations with the United States, and U.S. forces are working with Australia to develop its amphibious capabilities and with the Philippines to boost its capacity to police its own shores. The net result has been more powerful alliances and a more secure region.

None of this suggests an effort to encircle or weaken China. To the contrary, developing a more robust and productive relationship with Beijing represents a principal goal of the rebalancing strategy. Far from seeking to contain China, the United States has in the last several years sought to build a more mature bilateral relationship through unprecedented, frequent top-level meetings across issues and throughout the countries’ respective bureaucracies. Even military-to-military relations are back on track, at times actually taxing the Pentagon’s ability to keep up with Beijing’s proposed levels of activity.

A PIVOT TO -- AND WITHIN -- ASIA

The rebalancing strategy also calls for a substantial increase in U.S. engagement with the multilateral institutions of the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Obama administration, the United States has gained membership in the East Asia Summit, the region’s premier annual gathering of heads of state; signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which signals enhanced U.S. commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and placed a permanent ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta. Although these overlapping institutions can be frustrating, given their slow pace and requirements for consensus, they promote regional cooperation and help build a system of rules and mechanisms to address complex transnational challenges. In June 2013, for example, ASEAN hosted its first-ever humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise, which included more than 3,000 personnel from 18 nations.

Meanwhile, the United States is responding to the new reality that the Asia-Pacific region increasingly drives global economic growth. The Obama administration has advanced U.S. economic interests by bringing the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement into force in 2012 and pushing hard to complete negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a massive free-trade agreement among a dozen countries. A number of the countries participating in the TPP talks are vibrant markets in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore, which reflects the growing geopolitical importance of that subregion. Indeed, the U.S. pivot to Asia has been accompanied by a pivot within Asia. Washington is balancing its historical emphasis on the countries of Northeast Asia with new attention to countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, seeking to augment two-way trade and investment with some of the world’s most vibrant economies. In 2010, Washington and Jakarta established a “comprehensive partnership” to deepen cooperation across a wide range of issues, including health care, science, technology, and entrepreneurship.

A similar desire to realign U.S. priorities in the region helps explain the changes the Pentagon has made to its military posture there. Although U.S. military bases in Northeast Asia remain central to Washington’s ability to project power and fight wars, they are increasingly vulnerable to disabling missile attacks, and they lie relatively far from potential disasters and crises in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, with countries in Southeast Asia expressing growing interest in receiving American military training and assistance with disaster response, the United States has diversified its military footprint in the region, stationing hundreds of U.S. marines in Darwin, Australia, and deploying a pair of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore.

Those changes to the U.S. military’s posture have been criticized as either provocative or meaningless. Both charges are off the mark. These efforts hardly signal aggression; they contribute primarily to peacetime activities, such as responding to natural disasters, and not to U.S. war-fighting capabilities. And the seemingly modest number of marines and ships involved masks the significant benefits they offer to the militaries of U.S. partners, who gain unparalleled opportunities for joint exercises and training with U.S. forces.

The United States must make clear to China that revisionist behavior is incompatible with stable U.S.-Chinese relations.

In pivoting to Asia, the Obama administration seeks not only to advance U.S. economic and security interests but also to deepen cultural and people-to-people ties. The administration further hopes that the pivot will help the United States support human rights and democracy in the region. The new approach has already contributed to advances in Myanmar, where the government has taken remarkable steps, including the release of political prisoners, the implementation of long-overdue economic reforms, and the promotion of organizing rights and greater press freedom. Although more progress is necessary, particularly on the protection of the country’s ethnic minorities, Myanmar serves as a powerful example of a once closed and brutal country taking transformational steps, and the United States has been an essential partner in this reform effort from the start.

FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME

Opponents of the pivot have raised three main objections. First, some worry that the pivot will unnecessarily antagonize China. This misperception ignores the fact that deepening engagement with Beijing has been a central and irrefutable feature of the rebalancing policy. Examples of the new approach include the establishment of the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a comprehensive set of meetings chaired by the U.S. secretaries of state and the treasury and their Chinese counterparts, and the Strategic Security Dialogue, through which the two countries have held unprecedented high-level discussions on such sensitive matters as maritime security and cybersecurity. Tensions might rise due to the increased U.S. military presence in Asia and Washington’s more robust outreach to China’s neighbors. But bilateral ties are developing in such a way that any disagreements produced by the pivot will be addressed in the broader context of a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship.

A second critique stems from the argument that it would be unwise or unrealistic to shift Washington’s focus from the Middle East to Asia given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the instability in Egypt and Iraq, and the long-running confrontation between Iran and the Western powers. But this criticism relies on a caricature of the rebalancing strategy. According to this view, the Middle East and South Asia have sapped U.S. power and prestige and the pivot is really an attempt to cut and run by turning to the more peaceful and profitable shores of the Asia-Pacific. It is certainly true that the Obama administration has tried to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. But even though resources are finite, foreign policy is not a zero-sum game, and the criticism that paying more attention to Asia is somehow an admission of strategic defeat in the Middle East misses a crucial reality: during the past decade, the very Asian countries to which Washington wants to pay more attention have quietly built a substantial stake in the furtherance of peace and stability across the Middle East and South Asia and very much want the United States to preserve its influence in those regions.

Not long ago, most Asian nations were predominantly concerned with developments in their backyards and tended to see problems elsewhere as someone else’s responsibility. One of the most important successes of President George W. Bush’s Asia policy was to encourage the region’s rising powers to contribute more in other parts of the world. Partly in response, during the Bush years, for the first time, many East Asian governments developed an “out of area” perspective and engaged more in diplomacy, development, and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Japan has become a leading supporter of civil society development in Afghanistan, funding schools and civil service organizations and training Afghans in criminal justice, education, health care, and agriculture. In the wake of the Arab Spring, South Korea began supporting development across the Middle East. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have provided material assistance to training programs for doctors, police officers, and teachers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Australia and New Zealand have sent special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has been more active in the behind-the-scenes diplomacy aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, addressing piracy on the high seas, and shaping Afghanistan’s future.

Of course, encouragement from Washington is only one factor behind Asian countries’ growing involvement in the Middle East; another undeniable element is their increasing thirst for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day, more than twice the amount that the EU does. Asian governments know that a hasty U.S. retreat from the Middle East would carry with it unacceptable risks to their countries’ energy security and economic growth. As a result, they have invested substantial political and financial capital in, and in some cases sent military forces to, the Middle East over the course of more than a decade to supplement, not supplant, the stabilizing role of the United States. Put simply, Washington’s Asian partners support the pivot but would hardly cheer the prospect of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East -- and crucially, they do not seem to see any contradiction between these two positions.

A third argument against the pivot concerns the sustainability of the approach during a time of budget cuts: as defense spending falls, skeptics wonder how the United States will be able to invest the resources necessary to reassure its Asian allies and dissuade would-be provocateurs, especially as China’s power and influence continue to grow. The answer is that rebalancing toward Asia will not require dramatic new funding; rather, the Pentagon will need to be more flexible and find better ways to spend. For example, as the United States reduces the overall size of its army, it should sustain its military presence in Asia and invest in naval and air capabilities better suited to the region’s security environment. And given that U.S. defense spending is unlikely to increase significantly anytime soon, Washington should do more to improve the capacity of Asian militaries by conducting more educational and professional exchanges, enhancing multilateral military exercises, passing along equipment that U.S. forces no longer need, and engaging in more joint planning.

BALANCING ACT

Although the most common arguments against the rebalancing do not withstand scrutiny, the policy nevertheless faces major challenges. Perhaps chief among these is a lack of human capital. After more than a decade of war and counterinsurgency, the United States has developed and promoted an entire generation of soldiers, diplomats, and intelligence specialists well versed in ethnic rivalry in Iraq, the tribal differences in Afghanistan, postconflict reconstruction strategies, and U.S. Special Forces and drone tactics. But Washington has not made any comparable effort to develop a sustained cadre of Asia experts across the U.S. government, and a surprising number of senior government officials make their first visits to the region only once they have reached high-level positions near the end of their careers. This is a genuine weakness in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, since even the most accomplished public servant will find it difficult to navigate Asia’s complexities without prior experience in the region. The pivot to Asia will therefore affect the budgets of civilian government agencies, not just that of the Pentagon, as the United States invests more in ensuring that U.S. diplomats, aid workers, trade negotiators, and intelligence professionals have the language skills and exposure to Asia they need to do their jobs well.

The pivot will also be buffeted by the steady stream of crises that other regions -- especially the Middle East -- will surely continue to supply. At the same time, pressure to “come home” seems certain to grow. In the wake of every modern American conflict, from World War I to the 1990–91 Gulf War, the public has put pressure on politicians and officials to refocus on domestic issues. The past 13 years of war have again triggered this instinctive insularity, which has also been fostered by a frustratingly slow economic recovery after the financial crisis. Although internationalist and strong-defense strains still exist in U.S. politics, there are subtle (and not so subtle) signs in Congress that the United States may be entering a new era in which U.S. engagement abroad -- even in areas critical to the country’s economic well-being, such as Asia -- will be a tougher sell. Those political constraints will only make a hard job even harder: when it comes to Asia, the to-do list is long, both for the remaining years of the Obama administration and beyond.

PIVOT PARTNERS

In Asia, economics and security are inextricably linked, and the United States will not be able to sustain its leadership there through military might alone. That is why the successful conclusion of the TPP -- which will require intense negotiations overseas and on Capitol Hill -- is a cardinal priority. The agreement would immediately benefit the U.S. economy and would create a long-term trade system in Asia that could not be dragged down by protectionism. To give the United States added leverage in the negotiations, Congress should quickly reinstate fast-track trade promotion authority. Under that system, after negotiating the TPP and other free-trade agreements, the White House could present them for up-or-down votes in Congress, which would not be able to amend or filibuster the deals. The Obama administration should also leverage the U.S. energy boom and accelerate the export of liquefied natural gas to Asia to enhance the energy security of its allies and partners there and to send a strong signal of U.S. commitment to the region’s development.

Washington’s ever-deepening engagement with Beijing is already yielding dividends as the countries increasingly coordinate their approaches to Iran and North Korea while managing potential crises in the South China Sea. But the United States will only find it more difficult to navigate relations with a rising China that is now both a “strategic partner,” as President Bill Clinton described it in 1998, and a “strategic competitor,” as Bush later dubbed it.

China’s attempts to change the territorial status quo in the East China and South China seas -- for example, by establishing an “air defense identification zone” in the East China Sea over islands administered by Japan -- present an immediate challenge. The United States will have to make clear to China that revisionist behavior is incompatible with stable U.S.-Chinese relations, much less with the “new type of major-country relationship” that President Xi Jinping has proposed to Obama. Washington recently took a step in the right direction when senior administration officials publicly questioned the legality of China’s expansive territorial claims and warned against the establishment of a second air defense identification zone, this one in the South China Sea.

Across the East China Sea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is seeking to steer Japan out of decades of economic malaise and inject the country with a newfound sense of pride and influence. Washington will have to continue to urge Tokyo to act with restraint and sensitivity, especially when it comes to the controversies over Japan’s imperial past. Abe recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some convicted of war crimes committed during War World II. The visit might have helped him with some political constituencies at home, but the international costs were high: it raised questions in Washington, further soured Japan’s relations with South Korea, and made China more resolute in its unwillingness to deal directly with Japan as long as Abe is in power.

Amid this tense diplomatic backdrop, the United States will be working with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces so that Japan can take a more active security role in the region and the world. This will involve countering Chinese propaganda that characterizes Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation and military modernization as reactionary or militaristic, when in fact they are perfectly reasonable steps -- and long overdue. The United States will also have to keep devoting considerable political capital to improving ties between Japan and South Korea; a stronger relationship between those two countries would help in dealing with the enormous and growing threat posed by North Korea.

The challenges in Southeast Asia are quite different from those in the Northeast, but no less important to U.S. national interests. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand, are going through varying degrees of political turmoil that could alter their foreign policies. As the chips fall, Washington must adhere to basic principles of democracy and human rights without doing so dogmatically or in ways that would reduce U.S. leverage and influence. Rather than betting on winners, the best approach would be to focus on issues that matter most to people in the region no matter who is in power, such as education, poverty alleviation, and natural-disaster response.

In addition to increasing U.S. participation in Asia’s multilateral forums, Washington should support the development of a rule-based regional order by throwing its full weight behind efforts to use international law and arbitration to address sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has taken its competing claims with China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Without making judgments (for now) about the merits of specific claims, Washington should help build an international consensus by calling on all states in Asia to publicly support this mechanism, since the tribunal represents a test of whether the region is prepared to manage its disputes through legal and peaceful means.

The United States cannot rebalance to Asia by itself. It will be essential to bring along European countries, which can make substantial contributions in areas such as international law and institution building. If the tenor of its bilateral relations permits, Washington should also explore opportunities for greater collaboration in East Asia with India and Russia. And of course, it will also be necessary for countries in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, to demonstrate leadership and initiative to complement U.S. efforts. The point of the pivot to Asia is to foster an open, peaceful, and prosperous region in which governments rely on rules, norms, and institutions to settle differences, rather than coercion and force. The pivot is a U.S. initiative, but its ultimate success will not depend on Washington alone. 

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/4/19]

[共同社] 約瑟夫•奈：中國應採取克制態度 安倍勿煽動民族情緒

【共同社4月19日電】美國前助理國防部長、提出「軟實力」概念的哈佛大學教授約瑟夫•奈日前接受共同社專訪，就尖閣諸島（中國稱釣魚島）、日本的集體自衛權爭論、美中「新型大國關係」等國際政治的熱點問題發表了見解。

　　奈表示，有人在看到克里米亞脫離烏克蘭加入俄羅斯後擔心中國會強行奪取尖閣諸島，但這樣的事不會發生。他認為克里米亞與尖閣諸島的情況完全不同，俄羅斯憑藉具有壓倒性優勢的軍事力量左右了烏克蘭局勢，中國對日本則不具有軍事優勢。他補充道：「日美之間有安全保障條約，尖閣諸島是該條約第5條的適用對象。烏克蘭與美國之間則沒有這樣的條約。」他還表示：「美國國防部長和國務卿曾明確說過尖閣諸島適用安保條約第5條。我預計奧巴馬總統本月下旬訪日時會向安倍晉三首相清楚地確認這一點。」

　　美國政府表示在尖閣諸島的主權問題上不持立場。奈就此做出了如下解讀：美國政府的意思是「對19世紀末發生了什麼不持特定立場」，那是「很久以前的事」，當事方可以到國際法庭上爭論。他同時強調，1972年沖繩回歸日本時美國把對尖閣諸島的施政權還給了日本，正因如此，尖閣諸島適用《日美安保條約》，「『中國不要對此產生誤判』，這一點美國說得很清楚」。

　　日本政府修改了「武器出口三原則」，並計畫解禁集體自衛權。奈表示，根據《聯合國憲章》日本擁有集體自衛權，但一直單方面地禁止行使這一權利。他認為日本政府可通過修改憲法解釋解禁集體自衛權，沒有必要修改憲法，理由是日本參加了聯合國維和行動及索馬里海域的反海盜護航，在東非國家吉布地擁有自衛隊的活動基地，“實際上已經在行使集體自衛權”。

　　奈認為日本政府修改武器出口政策也是正確的，並稱自己一直對安倍首相的多項新防衛政策給予非常高的評價。另一方面，奈認為「用民族主義包裝這些政策是錯誤的，損害了安倍自身的立場」。他表示：「參拜靖國神社、做出修改‘河野談話’的姿態等等，如果提出歷史問題，會使中國和韓國想起戰前的日本，感到不安。應該停止煽動民族主義情緒，一心務實。」

　　奈就日韓關係的惡化指出：「原因有兩個，一個是韓國自身的民族主義，另一個是日本的可謂愚蠢的錯誤應對。」他認為日方對韓國「生厭」、做出要修改「河野談話」的姿態，反而損害了日本自身的利益。

　　關於中國提倡建立的美中「新型大國關係」，奈表示「誰都不知道中國的真正用意是什麼，這是一種口號」。在他看來，中國國家主席習近平所說的「新型大國關係」的意思似乎是大國之間不要陷入零和博弈。奈表示：「如果是這個意思，那是好事。美中需要在穩定國際金融、應對全球變暖和防治傳染病等方面合作並借助日本等國的力量。」他還指出，如果「新型大國關係」意味著美中兩國的霸權（G2），那是不能接受的，「美國不打算建立G2，明確否認了美中分治太平洋」。奈認為美中關係今後如何發展還需要觀察。他說：「美國不會容忍中國的霸權主義。希望不要忘記東亞穩定的基礎是《日美安保條約》、日美同盟關係將維持下去。」

　　奈認為2008年金融危機後中國覺得自身經濟日漸強盛，美國則走向衰落，因而放棄了從鄧小平時代起執行的低調外交政策，其結果是惡化了與日本、菲律賓、越南和印度等幾乎所有鄰國的關係。他表示「自信越強，所處的境遇就越差。這是中國面臨的一大困局」、「希望中國能重新採取鄧小平時代的克制態度」。

　　奈就目前整個國際局勢表示：「相對而言東亞還是穩定的。《日美安保條約》打下了穩定的基礎，經濟相互依賴程度也很高。令人擔憂的是歐洲。俄羅斯是衰落中的大國，普京總統開始了相當大的賭博。有必要明確地告訴俄羅斯，如果再賭下去會付出高昂代價。」（完）

[共同社 2014-4-19]

明報專訪日本「中國通」天兒慧教授

《天兒慧訪問全文》

【明報專訊】問：不少輿論稱，現在中日關係是中日建交40年來最差的。在日本，對華友好的人士似乎也遭攻擊。我們觀察到，一些日本網民便把天兒先生標籤為「反日」。就天兒先生觀察所得，跟中日友好的1980年代相比，日本社會近年對中國的態度有何轉變？原因是什麼？這轉變會如何左右中日關係？

答：我的立場主要有以下兩點。第一，我既非「反日親中」，亦非「反中親日」。我一直努力不偏向任何一方，以社會科學學者的身分盡可能客觀冷靜地把握事實，加以分析，提出建議，可說是「實事求是派」。因此我不時對日本當局提出逆耳的批評，亦不時對中國當局提出逆耳的批評。第二，我深信日中關係不論在歷史及地緣上或是利益層面上看，都是有如兄弟一般，建立緊密合作、互惠互利的關係才是最重要的；持續對立，甚至陷入戰爭狀態則絕對必須避免，若變成這樣的狀態將是雙方的不幸。

當然，由於我身為日本人，較了解日本的事情，至今對日本有較強烈的立場，所以曾對日本作出許多建議，例如在靖國參拜、歷史認識、歷史教科書記述等問題上，整體而言我一直以批判的態度面對迄今的日本政權。過去我的這類主張為相當多日本知識分子的共通看法，而「日中友好」、「積極協助中國走向現代化」等亦為大部分國民的共同意願。

我的立場始終如一，沒有改變，只是日中關係周邊的狀改變了，那就是中國的經濟與軍事抬頭，以及日本「泡沫經濟崩潰」後長期陷入低迷徬徨的狀。中國經濟崛起對日本而言可大大增加商機，對此日本是歡迎多於抗拒的。不過，在中國聲言要「和平崛起」而周邊地區對中國發動軍事攻擊的可能性極微之際，中國卻自1990年以來每年以兩位數字的幅度持續增加軍費，此外還強行進行核試（1994及1995年）、開發導彈及軍事衛星、建造航空母艦等具攻擊力及威嚇性的武器，演變成恍如對別國施加威脅感的局面。

與此同時，中國國內的大國主義式民族主義感情高漲。相對之下，日本被指「迷失20年」，為此日本對自身出現某種焦慮感、對中國的警戒以及對中國的威脅感亦開始抬頭，日本國內抗拒國際主義的內向民族主義開始膨脹。小泉純一郎首相參拜靖國、象徵日中合作的「東亞共同體」成立受挫（2005年）、日本對中國提供的政府開發援助（ODA）結束等事件，令兩國政府關係徐徐冷卻，日中作為合作伙伴國家的感情亦急速惡化。

日中關係陷入惡性循環，其中直接引發的最大問題就是尖閣諸島（釣魚島）問題。2010年9月的「中國漁船衝突事件」、2012年9月的「尖閣國有化」等各項事件發生後，中國國內隨即出現猛烈的反日攻擊，各地出現騷亂。那正是中國燃起反日民族主義，當局改為展現出對日的強硬姿態。無可否認，中國放棄了「韜光養晦」的方針，由「核心利益」的主張向「海洋強國」的目標推進，改向積極外交，日本的警戒感、威脅感升級，對華感情亦惡化，反華民族主義亦正增加。

日本國內就中日關係冷靜討論的氣氛大幅消退，在此情下，我的理性言論相信會被鷹派或是對華警戒論者視為「親中反日」吧。可是，長遠而言，我認為我的主張必定站得住腳。日本自從1980年代因經濟成長變得強大，加上有補償過去歷史的意願，政府開始了ODA援助，認真手為中國的經濟發展作計劃、提供技術支援、廢棄處理化學武器等，在民間亦透過綠化沙漠行動、支援貧困農村的各種形式，支援中國的發展。我希望如今變得強大的中國，不要煽動「過去戰爭中糾結的問題」和「反日民族主義」，而將兩國外交正常化以來日本對中國的貢獻作出坦誠的評價，如此日本人的反華情緒相信會大大緩和。

問：天兒先生2010年就釣魚島主權問題提出「共同主權」構思，但隨日本政府2012年「購島」，你認為該構思還有可能嗎？釣魚島主權爭議還有什麼出路？

答：我2010年在《朝日新聞》中主張的「共同主權論」，其實是1990年代後半曾於日本地方報章中提出的論說，當時考慮到「尖閣問題」將來必定會成為日中的待決事項，我將之作為處理這問題的「理想形式」。日本國內對此譽參半，有政府人士作出批評，亦有鷹派將我誹謗成「賣國賊」。不過，關於尖閣主權的問題，「釣魚島原是中國的固有領土，於日清戰爭時期遭日本掠奪」這種主張冷靜地看是不合理的。以下這些是客觀存在的事實：

1.當時中國的天下國家論中並沒有海洋國境的觀念；

2.中國雖有考慮到沿海防衛問題，但據記載，明清時期由福州府管轄的沿海防衛涵蓋離岸約100公里範圍（海岸距尖閣諸島約310公里）；

3.琉球冊封使紀錄中記載，當時琉球人的領土為琉球本島至久米島，並細緻載明不包括尖閣，但那是他們的「鄉土觀」，並不是國境意味的領土，即使記載證實為事實，但仍無法用以證明尖閣是中國的領土；

4.中國若真的認為釣魚島是本國領土，那為何在發出「日本領有宣言」以來，截至1971年為止從來沒有提出有關主張？（不過在那期間，《人民日報》等傳媒則反複出現承認尖閣為日本領土的記述）

因此，我在以「日本領土論」為前提下，為了東亞海域成為和平的海域，日中建立共存共榮的牽絆，提出「共同主權論」。如今為了將想法更具體化，我提倡了「一個島嶼、各自表述」的方案。簡言之，就是同時承認「尖閣諸島為日本領土」及「釣魚島為中國領土」，實際管理、營運透過協商決定的方案。這個方案參考了「一個中國、各自表述」的「中台共識」而構想。當然有觀點認為主權是排他性的概念，不能接受共存、共有之類的想法，不過歷史中可見國家的生成、發展、消滅，而主權的涵蓋範圍亦是可變的。再者，海洋本來沒有邊界，漁民一直在海洋自由地捕魚，互相合作。

「一個島嶼、各自表述」的精神，在21世紀以來的歷史中可作為避免國家衝突的智慧，以緩和主權概念，接受雙方主張的同時就具體課題進行協議，處理事件，慎重對待和平關係。這種精神在現今的日本中被接受的空間亦微乎其微，那是因為「中國不可信，要是退讓一步，對方便會要求退讓兩步甚至三步」這種對中國的強烈不信任感正在蔓延。

首先，有必要努力緩和日中之間的不滿感情及不信任感。為此最重要的是希望兩國政府作出保證，讓日本與中國的有識之士，或者包括第三國的有識之士，就這些問題擁有坦誠自由討論的空間。特別是現時中國國內有難以自由發言的嚴峻狀。知識分子自由討論，將之公開發表，可加深真正的互相理解，減少因存有偏見的資訊產生的不信任感。

另一重要的事情是，記取及重新確認日中外交正常化之際，中國總理周恩來所說的「求大同，存小異」論。「尖閣問題」原是小異，如今這個問題雖變成了「大異」，但必須重新認識在這個問題上糾纏的愚蠢與危險性，尋求達成「日中共存共榮」的大同。當再次產生一起探索共存共榮之道的氣氛時，相信可以帶出我的提案或是其他的想法吧。雖然需要時間，但持續不斷的努力才是恢復關係、發展的王道。

問：今年是中日甲午戰爭120周年，又是第一次世界大戰百周年，中國以至西方都有輿論推測中日在不久將來必有一戰。你認為中日有可能爆發戰爭嗎？

答﹕我可以斷言，日本發動戰爭幾乎100%不可能。第二次世界大戰後，日本切身體會戰敗及遭受原子彈轟炸的悲劇（當然亦包括作為加害者的悲劇），也充分了解和平的貴重，走過了自己的道路。這種感受到現在仍為許多日本人所共有。近幾年，中國國內有聲音說「日本的軍國主義復活、日本已變成軍國主義國家了」，但那是很大的誤解。當然，現今日本由於對中國不信任及感到受威脅，正在推動強化國防能力，這事無可否認，不過儘管那是具有攻擊性的力量，但日本並沒有侵略的意圖。

對於爆發戰爭的可能性，我所擔心的是：一、因釣魚島近海及上空意外發生「衡突事件」，引發戰鬥行為；二、中國國內因反日民族主義等理由展開「奪回釣魚島行動」。這些情絕對要避免。就第一點而言，兩國的相關部門需要設立危機管理對話機制。至於第二點，雖然在某程度上我能夠理解中國對於安倍政權言行的不滿，但安倍亦絕對希望避免與中國開戰，並就此認真考慮。日本國民普遍的反戰情感更是強烈，希望中國國民能理解。

包括香港在內的中國輿論正熱烈討論「戰爭的可能性」，這事情本身在日本人眼中無法理解，甚至覺得恐怖。一旦發生戰爭，日中之間將留下無法彌補的禍根。戰爭絕對必須避免。

問：日本首相安倍晉三去年底參拜靖國神社，激起中國強烈反彈，認為日本美化侵略歷史，甚至認為是軍國主義復辟等。歷史問題經常籠罩中日關係，你認為中日雙方應如何走出這困局？

答：對於「過去的戰爭」的認識，安倍等人的歷史觀確實與我的歷史觀有差異。日本接受《波茨坦宣言》、誓言恆久和平、實踐和平憲法，以作為戰後日本和平與發展的出發點，這是大部分日本人的共識。因此，「日本正破壞戰後秩序」的看法亦完全是大大的誤解。我敢斷言，即使是安倍，亦完全沒有絲毫「破壞戰後秩序」的想法。安倍言論的真正意思，是「無法認同戰時日本被視為如同納粹般100%邪惡」，並非全面肯定日本的戰爭。

至於參拜靖國問題，日本人的心情有複雜之處。靖國神社本是明治維新時期起用來供奉為日本捐軀的戰歿者之所，最初並無政治意味，許多日本人至今仍認為參拜靖國的主要意義是追悼戰亡者。但1978年靖國神社秘密將在東京審判中裁定為甲級戰犯的人員亦引入，共同供奉，至此參拜靖國便添加了另一重意義。追悼亡者的國民感情不容否定，而參拜靖國者亦並非全是為了崇拜甲級戰犯，在此外界無法理解日本人的某些心情。

雖然靖國問題有相當棘手之處，但必須繼續為解決問題努力。1978年以來，昭和天皇（裕仁）不再參拜靖國，平成天皇（明仁）亦繼承了其精神，這本身在日本而言有異常之處。我認為解決「參拜靖國問題」的最恰當辦法是「分祀」。當然靖國神社可能以「宗教自由」、「合祭的亡魂無法分開」等理由反對，要說服神社並不容易。可是這個問題如今不為亞洲人民接受，甚至被世界視為問題，除了應重新明確地表達國家對於戰爭責任的態度外，日本國民也許亦應該研究解決問題之道。

[明報 2014-2-6] 

[Foreign Policy] America's Pacific Century

The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.

BY HILLARY CLINTON
OCTOBER 11, 2011

As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.

At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.

With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again.

Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.

Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players.

Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.

President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world.

As secretary of state, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.

WHAT DOES THAT regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.

Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.

As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.

The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese government of more than $5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.

Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.

We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.

AS WE UPDATE our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.

One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.

We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights.

We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity.

As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea.

On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity.

Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.

At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.

Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.

President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.

We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.

EVEN AS WE strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity.

So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.

That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law.

We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace.

In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.

In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.

OUR EMPHASIS ON the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific.

The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.
When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.

Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.

We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.

We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.

Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.

ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.

We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.

How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.

But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.

As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond.

We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.
IN THE LAST decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.

We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us.

Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership.

And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.

As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.
This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.