[Foreign Affairs] Brothers in Trouble?

Gomaa Amin and the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

By Eric Trager and Gavi Barnhard

SEPTEMBER 24, 2014

The Muslim Brotherhood spent 84 years toiling in Egypt’s opposition before winning power in June 2012 only to lose it 369 days later. It has been all downhill for the group since then. In the 14 months since the military responded to huge protests by toppling Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated president, the group has faced an unrelenting crackdown that has practically decimated it as a political force in Egypt. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood’s deteriorating relations with key foreign governments have hindered its attempts to reorganize in exile. Even so, the group hasn’t revised its ideology or changed its strategy. It has refused to seek reconciliation with the new Egyptian regime or question the feasibility of its theocratic agenda. In fact, by selecting the London-based Brotherhood leader Gomaa Amin as acting Supreme Guide -- in other words, its chief executive -- the Brotherhood has likely doubled down.

The period since Morsi’s fall has been the darkest in the Brotherhood’s 86-year history. Within Egypt, at least 1,000 Muslim Brothers have been killed during crackdowns on their anti-coup protests, tens of thousands have been imprisoned, and the group’s notoriously rigid chain of command has been decapitated at both the national and provincial levels. The pro-Morsi National Alliance to Support Legitimacy has also collapsed: Many of the Alliance’s non-Brotherhood leaders were arrested in early July, and two of its main constituent parties -- the Brotherhood offshoot al-Wasat and the Salafist al-Watan -- bolted thereafter. Meanwhile, its cadres’ low-profile insurgency against the state, which targets government buildings and police vehicles, has alienated many potential civilian supporters. Ordinary Egyptians often clash with Muslim Brothers at the organization’s constantly shrinking pro-Morsi demonstrations.

The Brotherhood’s attempt to manage its affairs from abroad is faltering as well. Qatar, which strongly supported Morsi’s presidency and granted many Brotherhood figures asylum when he was ousted, recently responded to pressure from its anti-Brotherhood Gulf neighbors by asking top Brotherhood leaders to leave Doha. (It remains to be seen whether Qatar will adjust the pro-Brotherhood editorial stance of its Al-Jazeera network, or stop funding various other pro-Brotherhood media outlets, many of which employ Muslim Brothers in exile.) The Brotherhood’s safe haven in the United Kingdom -- where the organization has maintained a strong presence, including a media office, for decades -- has also become a little less welcoming. Earlier this year, the British government launched an inquiry into the organization’s London-based activities, and although the investigation reportedly found no direct links between the Brotherhood and terrorist groups, many anticipate curbs on the organization’s activities in the country. Turkey, which is home to the organization’sRabaa TV satellite network, is now the Brotherhood’s only reliable sanctuary, although the group seems keenly aware of its deteriorating international standing and is reportedly investigating Tunisia and Malaysia as backup bases.

Despite these setbacks, the Brotherhood has refused to rethink its approach. In fact, from the group’s standpoint, its members are still engaged in the very same struggle that has defined the Brotherhood’s work since its 1928 founding: It is working to “Islamize” Egyptian society so that the Brotherhood can establish an Islamic state in Egypt, after which it will build a global Islamic state that will repel Western cultural and political influence.

Far from being a “moderate” or “pragmatic” organization, as many optimistic analysts once described it, the Brotherhood is a deeply ideological, closed vanguard.

The Brotherhood’s stubbornness -- even in the face of such severe setbacks -- is not particularly surprising. Far from being a “moderate” or “pragmatic” organization, as many optimistic analysts once described it, the Brotherhood is a deeply ideological, closed vanguard. It seeks, in the words of its founder Hassan al-Banna, to implement Islam as an “all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life,” and deploys its members as foot soldiers to promote this totalitarian vision. To ensure the organization’s ideological purity and unity of purpose, every Muslim Brother undergoes a five-to-eight-year induction process known as tarbiyya, during which rising members are vetted for their commitment to the Brotherhood’s cause and their willingness to follow Brotherhood leaders’ orders in pursuit of it. This is not, in other words, a group of second-guessers. It is an insular society drunk on its own narrative.

Evidence of this can be seen in the apparent selection of the new Supreme Guide. The previous guide was arrested last August, and the leadership of the Brotherhood had been unclear since then. But earlier this month, a former Brotherhood leaderannounced that Gomaa Amin is now leading the organization. Amin is one of the most senior Brotherhood leaders who is neither in prison nor in hiding: The longtime leader of the Guidance Office, which is the Brotherhood’s eighteen-member executive body, was safely in London receiving medical treatment at the time of Morsi’s ouster, and he has fulfilled one of the Supreme Guide’s standard responsibilities in recent months by writing five of the Brotherhood’s weekly statements.

Amin also is one of the foremost contemporary exponents of the Brotherhood’s unique approach to implementing the sharia as an “all-embracing concept” through grassroots work that seeks political, and ultimately global, power. In his book The Slandered Obligation: Jihad in the Path of God, which Muslim Brothers study as part of the organization’s required curriculum, Amin echoes Banna’s interpretation of Islam as a comprehensive system that organizes all aspects of life -- from the cradle to the grave. To implement his vision, Amin calls on his readers to practice jihad, which he argues includes fighting unbelief as well as battling the “rotten conditions of human relations, governance, education and the economy.”

Although Amin embraces the notion of violent jihad under certain circumstances, he primarily advocates “struggling” through indoctrination and preaching, or dawa. “Those working in the Islamic movement must start with a complete knowledge of Islam and believe in the dawa’s ability to solve individual and societal problems,” he writes in his treatise. Amin stresses that reforming the individual and society through jihad and dawa are long-term projects that take time and diligence.

Although this gradualist approach to Islamization sets the Brotherhood apart from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which has already declared an Islamic State through brute force, Amin highlights the severe anti-Westernism that both brands of Islamism embrace. He sees Western cultural influence in Muslim lands as a civilizational threat. “Humanity lives in a big brothel,” he writes. “Look at its exterior, its films, galleries, fashion, beauty competitions, clubs, bars, and radios. Look at its crazy voracity for naked flesh, the provocative conditions and licentiousness in literature, art and the media… on top of the deteriorating morality and societal decadence that started to threaten every soul, every family, every gathering. The fate of all this, is destruction and perdition.”

The only way to correct Western-inspired immorality, according to Amin, is spreading the Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam. Indeed, he argues that doing so is an absolute obligation of every Muslim. “In order for our rights to be protected, our dignity conserved, our identity clear, there will be a fight in the path of God with the intent of threatening the enemies, scaring them of the consequences of assaulting Muslims, their lands and their people.” And this religious duty will remain in effect until the Day of Judgment. In other words, the Brotherhood’s strategies -- no matter the obstacles in Egypt -- must persist.

Amin has reiterated this unyielding commitment to the organization’s ideology in his weekly Muslim Brotherhood newsletters. In decrying the current state of corruption and immorality, Amin writes that, “Islam is in need of a state and authority. One of its most important roles is protecting the [Islamic nation’s] creed that today is mocked, in addition to establishing its rituals and observances until it governs all [aspects] of life.” Despite the Brotherhood’s increasingly precarious political position, in other words, Amin sticks to the exact same ideological vision he espoused over 15 years ago. He believes with absolute certainty that Islam is simply “waiting for generations of men and women who believe in what God has promised.” The question, according to Amin, is not if, but when the Islamists return to power. And so he sees no need to compromise on the Brotherhood’s principles or strategy.

Yet the Brotherhood’s ideological stubbornness may threaten the organization’s long-term viability. To be sure, its hundreds-of-thousands-strong rank-and-file will persist: They have all been vetted for their commitment to the Brotherhood’s ideology and have taken an oath to follow group’s leaders’ edicts, and will likely stay convinced for years. But the Brotherhood’s pool of recruits is likely thinning out: It is now a model of political failure, and its leaders’ commitment to a discredited project won’t win many admirers soon.

[Foreign Affairs] No Middle Road

The Arab Middle Classes' Moral Dilemma

By Tarek Osman

AUGUST 21, 2014

The violence gripping the Middle East has distracted the world from the seismic changes transforming almost all large Arab societies. These changes will confront the Arab middle classes with difficult choices and shape the future of the region.

This tipping point arises out of a relatively subtle shift in the governments' economic policies. In the past two years, several North African, eastern Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf countries have started to restructure their public sector compensation systems, curtail the welfare programs they introduced in 2011 (the height of the Arab uprisings), impose new direct and indirect taxes, and reduce their energy subsidies.

These changes will bring substantial economic pain to Arab societies. The most vulnerable social group, the poor, will likely try to fight back, through strikes and demonstrations. In response, the region’s regimes might attempt to rally their electorate with nationalistic rhetoric and by painting themselves as saviors pursuing tough but necessary measures. Before too long, many of these regimes will also resort to political repression against activists and groups that challenge their policies.

The resulting upheaval will force the Arab middle classes to take a stance. The more educated and mostly urban members of this group will generally benefit from the new reforms, which will improve their countries’ fiscal and monetary positions. As a result, large sections of the Arab middle classes might be tempted to back the state. They might also see the ruling regimes as necessary bulwarks against the violence and chaos that ensnarl much of the Middle East.

But the middle class can hardly ensure its security and good fortune in the long term by unconditionally casting its lot with the ruling elites. Gradually, the erosion of political and civil rights will breed resentment among key social groups: the poor, the civil society, and young, economically marginalized Arabs. Eventually -- sparked by some new social, economic, or political black swan -- that anger will erupt in a new wave of Arab uprisings. It will sweep seemingly stable Arab countries and unleash yet another cycle of uncertainty and violence.

The Arab middle classes thus face a moral dilemma. With their position of inaction, cowed by their fear of disorder, terrorism, and religious extremism, they have effectively condoned authoritarian renewal in the Arab world. Yet their moral imperative is to stand up for democracy even if it might jeopardize their economic and social standing. 

HANGING IN THE BALANCE

To build better futures, the Arab middle classes must confront several challenges. First, excessive concentration of power in most Arab countries, compounded by corruption, will make it extremely difficult for them to ensure a fair design of reforms. Across the region, state institutions are closely tied to the ruling regimes; even if the reforms unlock investment and expand the supply of capital to the private sector, interest groups close to the regimes will benefit vastly more than the middle classes and the poor.

Second, because economic decision-making in most Arab countries is highly centralized, reforms will likely be shortsighted when it comes to fostering broad-based growth in the long term. Governments have a free hand in channeling resources, which will result in substantial investments in infrastructure and potentially manufacturing. This will please the regime’s allies who run these sectors -- and it will lead to some economic growth. But because this growth will come from low-value-added industries, it will be slow and more uneven than progress spurred by research, development, and entrepreneurism, which advances technologies and empowers the private sector. 

The Arab middle classes will also have to cope with the fact that they lack clear political objectives, a shortfall that hobbled the Arab Spring. As a point of comparison, in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the middle classes in eastern and central Europe calmly endured the painful economic adjustments necessary for joining the EU -- a goal that inspired citizens to sacrifice. Arab citizens must likewise endure the economic pain that will come from reforms after decades of mismanagement. But there is no greater political mission to make it worth their while -- no expansion of political freedoms or alleviation of the societal ills that triggered the Arab uprisings in the first place. Unless political reforms accompany economic ones, the rationale for sacrifice will remain weak.

Further complicating matters, the tools through which the Arab middle classes could exert leverage on their regimes are increasingly limited. Although Arab uprisings of the past three years started as revolts of the younger generations against corrupt and inept politicians, they swiftly morphed into broader middle-class movements against the ruling elites, who stood as obstacles to development. And then they changed once again, this time opening even deeper social fissures along religious and sectarian lines. As a result of this devastating outcome, the middle classes no longer see uprisings as a viable political option.

The Arab middle classes also lack experience. Groups that today fall under this definition all arose in the past four decades -- a period of undemocratic rule, social inequality, and assaults on civil society across the region. Unlike in countries such as Brazil, India, Portugal, and South Africa, which have undergone admirable political liberalization over the past thirty years, Arab middle classes never developed the expertise and political savvy to match their demographic and economic clout.

Finally, the middle classes will have to answer three questions about their position in today’s global society as well as the role played by their countries in the world. The first is how they behave toward Israel. As their governments warily eye the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict, with no medium-term solution in sight, the middle classes’ stance may determine the chances of peace, or a wider war, in the Middle East. The second question is how they will react to sectarianism. If the Arab middle classes buy into the Sunni-Shiite rivalry fueling the clashes in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, much bloodier conflicts may be in store for the eastern Mediterranean. And third, their views toward the United States, a country whose close partnerships with most large Arab countries define the existing regional order, will help determine whether that order stands or falls. 

OFF THE SIDELINES

The course chosen by the Arab middle classes will vary based on the austerity measures in each country, the strength of the social safety nets, and the subtleties of individual political systems. The responses of different subgroups within each country’s middle class will also vary. Senior civil servants and successful entrepreneurs, for instance, will support government reforms more strongly than low-level public employees, pensioners, small-business owners, and farmers. But regardless of each country’s unique characteristics, the Arab middle classes will soon need to confront the dilemmas that new economic policies create.

The Arab world is coming to a boil, and its economic woes and lack of political openness are raising the heat. At the moment, the region’s middle classes appear to be passive observers. But their choices in the next few years will carry major consequences for their countries’ economies, governments, and foreign relations -- not to mention the ultimate course of the new wave of chaos sweeping the region.

[Foreign Affairs] Expendable Egypt

Why Cairo Can't Broker a Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas

By Benedetta Berti and Zack Gold

JULY 14, 2014

The similarities between this month’s hostilities between Hamas and Israel and those during their last major confrontation, in November 2012, are striking. Hamas and other Palestinian groups fire rockets deep into Israel, and the Iron Dome defense system knocks the projectiles out of the sky. Israel launches aerial strikes on densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip, and militants there shoot rockets back at Israeli civilians. 

Yet one thing has changed: the relationship between Hamas and Egypt. In the fall of 2012, Hamas was able to count on the political support of the Egyptian government of President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader. The rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt earlier that year had simultaneously provided Hamas with a new regional ally and redefined relations between the group and Egypt, moving from the mutual deep-seated suspicion and antagonism of the Mubarak years to a relationship built on shared political ideals and respect. 

After Morsi was ousted in July 2013, the new Egyptian government launched a crackdown on the Brotherhood at home and assumed an especially harsh posturetoward Hamas, calling the group, which was once a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, a threat to national security. Most significantly, Egypt’s repeated restrictions on the flows of goods and people to and from Gaza and its campaign to crack down on underground tunnels between the strip and Sinai have deeply hurt Hamas’s finances. In March 2014, moreover, Egypt’s judiciary banned Hamas from conducting any political activities in the country.

Unsurprisingly, Hamas felt the loss of Egypt’s political friendship very deeply. Now that it was regionally isolated, internal divisions arose over how to confront the new challenges, with discussions about rekindling relations with Iran as well as about the group’s balance between governance and resistance. Hamas’s troubles also led competing armed factions to challenge the group’s monopoly of force in Gaza, for example by engaging in uncoordinated rocket attacks against Israel. The group also faced a significant cash-flow problem. All together, these pressures arguably pushed Hamas to enter a unity deal with the Fatah movement that controls the West Bank–based Palestinian Authority. In exchange for relinquishing some control of Gaza to Fatah, it seems, Hamas was hoping to receive badly needed financial help from Fatah so that it could pay the salaries of the public employees on its payroll.

In the end, the deal seems to have destabilized Hamas still further, at least in the short term. For years, Hamas had carefully balanced the need to project strength and credibility as the “Islamic resistance” with the desire to preserve full control over Gaza. In turn, Hamas has agreed to enforce cease-fires in Gaza when it was worried that an escalation might jeopardize its status as ruler, going as far as policing other armed factions. 

The unity deal shifted the balance, temporarily tilting Hamas toward resistance. It is overly simplistic, of course, to argue that the combination of Egyptian pressure and the unity deal pushed Hamas toward aggression against Israel; yet these factors did substantially change the group’s calculations, with Hamas increasingly less focused on controlling Gaza and progressively more interested in positioning itself on the national political scene. This might help explain why the group met Israel’s military operations in the West Bank with a rapid escalation.

ENTER EGYPT 

If the way the most recent conflict between Israel and Hamas started is different from last time, so is the way it will end. In the course of the November 2012 confrontation between Israel and Hamas, Egypt took a direct and public role, pushing for a settlement. Morsi’s government was not an honest broker -- Morsipulled Egypt’s ambassador from Tel Aviv, sent his prime minister on a solidarity mission to Gaza, and threatened Israel in his rhetoric -- but it was a responsible one. As the United States pressured Israel, Egypt leveraged its political influence on Hamas. Together, they brought the conflict to a relatively swift end.

This time, given the far more adversarial relationship between Hamas and Egypt’s new president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the political and military actions his government has taken against Hamas in Gaza, it seems unlikely that Cairo will be able to deliver a cease-fire. Indeed, on July 10, U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki acknowledged the lack of influence the current Egyptian leadership has in Gaza, saying, “there’s a difference between the relationship between the prior government to Hamas and the current government to Hamas.” 

Early Egyptian attempts to diffuse the hostilities between the parties reportedly failed, rebuffed by Hamas. On July 9, Egyptian foreign ministry spokesperson Badr Abdelatty tried to save face by arguing that Egypt was not negotiating an agreement but is simply attempting to end the violence on both sides. But the minimalist goals may have been the obstacle in the first place. Cairo initially sought a cease-fire deal akin to those of 2008 and 2009, a pure cessation of hostilities; but Hamas, less interested in following Egypt’s lead this time around, proved unwilling to give up the political gains it was supposed to make with the 2012 cease-fire. 

The 2012 Gaza war was an important test for Egypt’s last president. So, too, is the current conflict a test for Sisi. The Egyptian president has openly stated his desire to be directly involved in restoring calm. Egyptian intelligence and security leaders recognize the detrimental effect of tensions on Egypt’s borders. And so, Israel and the international community are watching to see if Sisi can be an effective partner. At an even deeper level, if Sisi can reach an agreement with Hamas, despite the vitriolic rhetoric directed at the Palestinian group from Cairo, it could also signal the new president’s potential to reconcile with domestic political opponents that have been on the receiving end of similar rhetoric.

Given its regional status and historical role in brokering these types of agreements, there has also been significant international pressure on Egypt to play a productive role in the latest round of the Hamas-Israel saga. Last night, Egyptian officials tried again, floating a proposal that, on paper, would be great for Israel and good for Hamas. The parameters of the deal included not only cessation of hostilities, but also a gradual “opening of the crossings,” a formula with some similarities to the 2012 deal. Israel accepted the deal this morning, whereas Hamas rejected it before even formally receiving the plan.

For Hamas, Egypt’s involvement must go further than reinstating a simple cease-fire based on “quiet-for-quiet” between the two sides, while leaving political developments for future discussions. The recent proposal is strikingly similar to the 2012 agreement, which began to fall apart soon after it became clear that the promised normalization of Gaza would not be forthcoming. Stability between Hamas and Israel will require a long-term political approach for Gaza. Hamas could reasonably conclude that, if the sympathetic Morsi government could not achieve such an outcome, there is little chance that the anti-Hamas Sisi government would accept such a paradigm shift. And, to date, it is indeed unclear that they would.

[Foreign Affairs] Islamist Outlaws

Saudi Arabia Takes on the Muslim Brotherhood

By William McCants

On March 7, Saudi Arabia took the extraordinary step of declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, on par with Hezbollah and al Qaeda. The move came just two days after the kingdom, together with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, withdrew its ambassador from Qatar because of Qatar’s alleged support of Brotherhood interference in internal politics. Although Saudi Arabia’s dislike of Brotherhood political activities abroad is well known, for decades the kingdom has tolerated (and sometimes even worked with) the local Saudi branch of the Brotherhood. Its sudden reversal is an expression of solidarity with its politically vulnerable allies in the region and a warning to Sunni Islamists within its borders to tread carefully.

This story goes back to the Arab Spring, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabia’s longtime ally, was ousted, and Egypt elected Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood­–linked politician, to fill his shoes. Riyadh feared that the group, now empowered, would try to export the Egyptian revolution regionwide, calling for action against the House of Saud and displacing Saudi’s friends and allies such as the UAE. Those fears were not entirely unfounded.

In Saudi Arabia, members of the Muslim Brotherhood had been at the forefront of the Awakening movement, a push in the early 1990s for political change in response to alleged Saudi government corruption and the basing of U.S. troops in the country. But, as the political science professor Stéphane Lacroix documents in his book Awakening Islam, most members of the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood had quickly fallen into line once the regime began to arrest or sanction its leaders. The Saudi Brotherhood simply had too much to lose: its members helped build the Saudi state and occupied important positions in the religious and educational establishment.

That détente ended with the Arab Spring, when a number of prominent Islamists added their names to a 2011 petition calling for political reforms in the kingdom. They also obliquely criticized the lack of political freedom in Saudi Arabia by lavishing praise on fellow travelers in Tunisia and Egypt. Even Nasir al-Umar, a hard-line Sururi (a blend of Brotherhood and ultraconservative Salafism), was singing the praises of democratic change. Then Crown Prince Nayef and future Crown Prince Salman pressed them into silence. According to one person I spoke to on a recent trip to Saudi Arabia, some were forced to sign a pledge to cease criticizing the lack of political freedom in the kingdom. But the renewed détente was fragile, hinging on events in tumultuous Egypt.

There was some reason for Saudi Arabia to fear for its allies in the region as well. Under Mubarak, Egypt had been a dependable Saudi ally. But Morsi sought to chart a neutral course between Saudi Arabia and Iran, following an early fundraising visit to the kingdom with an attempted rapprochement with Iran. The United Arab Emirates was worried, too. The Brotherhood has had a small presence in UAE since the 1960s, but after 9/11 the government started to see the group as a national security threat. It didn’t help that when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt some members of the UAE branch began agitating for political reforms, going so far as to sign a petition calling for elections and real authority for the UAE’s advisory council. The government responded by arresting group members across the country, including men belonging to an alleged terror cell with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

In response to what they saw as Egyptian meddling, Saudi Arabia tried to economically isolate Morsi and hasten his departure. In May 2013, just two months before the military overthrow of Morsi, the Egyptian finance minister complained to the Saudis that Egypt had only received $1 billion of the $3.5 billion in aid promised after Mubarak’s downfall. When the Egyptian military overthrew Morsi just a year into his rule, Saudi Arabia applauded and quickly promised Egypt a new aid package of $5 billion, together with one from the UAE for $3 billion and from Kuwait for $4 billion. When the new regime massacred Brotherhood protestors in August, the taciturn King Abdullah uncharacteristically voiced his public support for the slaughter as a blow against terrorism. When the new Egyptian government declared the group a terrorist organization in late December 2013, Saudi Arabia followed suit. When UAE decided not to replace its departing ambassador in Qatar -- partly to punish Qatar for its refusal to discipline an influential Qatar-based Brotherhood spiritual leader who preached that the UAE is against Islamic rule -- Saudi Arabia recalled its own ambassador in solidarity.

Saudi Arabia’s moves have provoked some unhappiness at home. Saudi Islamists, particularly the Brothers, are convinced that Morsi’s overthrow was part of a Saudi plot to roll back Islamist political gains of the past three years. In defiance, they festooned their social media profiles with symbols of Brotherhood resistance and criticized their government for its complicity. The defiance has become more muted recently, after the local press reported that the government was contemplating declaring the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. According to former members of the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood I spoke with, the 25,000 or so members of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia reacted to the news of the deliberations by preemptively keeping a low profile, closing some of its gatherings so as not to further stoke the government’s ire. Until the Saudi government actually begins making arrests, its recent announcement is more of a shot across the Brotherhood’s bow than an attempt to sink the ship.

Nevertheless, person after person I interviewed asserted that the level of Islamist anger toward the Saudi government is higher than at any time since the early 1990s. That does not mean Brotherhood leaders will move against the regime in the near term. In the 1990s as now, they have too much to lose institutionally. There is also some benefit in a wait-and-see approach, which is why Salman al-Awda, a prominent Saudi Islamist, is privately counselling his followers to wait for the regime’s factions to sort things out among themselves. But the younger rank-and-file Brothers in Saudi, like those in other Brotherhood franchises outside Egypt, are starting to lose hope in peaceful political change. That frustration can lead to apathy. But it can also lead to violence -- and if it does, the Saudi government’s decision to declare the group a terrorist organization will have been a self-fulfilling prophecy.

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/3/17]

[Foreign Affairs] Break Up in the Gulf

What the GCC Dispute Means for Qatar

By Bilal Y. Saab

On March 5, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain announced that they had withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar, claiming that Doha had been violating a clause in the Gulf Cooperation Council charter banning interference in the domestic affairs of fellow GCC members. The decision, unprecedented in the GCC’s history, hints at significant changes to come for the GCC and the balance of power in the Gulf.

The dispute between GCC members had been simmering for a while, and it was only a matter of time before it boiled over. In December, during a GCC Summit in Kuwait, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had been close to singling out Qatar for its alleged financing of terrorism in Syria and elsewhere. But, at the last minute, the Saudis pulled the plug to avoid embarrassing their Kuwaiti hosts. They opted instead to give Doha a stern private warning. A couple of weeks before that, Saudi leaders scolded new Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim during a meeting in Riyadh that was arranged by Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad. The 33-year-old Tamim was asked to make serious adjustments to his country's foreign policy, including that the country stop allegedly funding al Qaeda­–affiliated groups in Syria. The young Tamim reportedly agreed, but requested some time to make the necessary changes.

Tamim eventually managed to reduce Doha's involvement in the Syrian conflict. But, realizing that it had lost in Syria, Doha doubled down on outreach to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in the region, including Hamas. In addition, it continued efforts to cozy up to Iran and Turkey, support the Al Houthi rebels in Yemen, and test the waters with Hezbollah. In doing so, Doha was touching every nerve and ringing every alarm bell in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, where officials were doing all they could to finish off the Muslim Brotherhood (including labeling it as terrorist group and propping up Egypt's military chief, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, by paving the way for his presidency).

No wonder, then, that the Bahrainis, Emiratis, and Saudis soon accused Qatar of trying to undermine the GCC and recalled their ambassadors. But where does this leave Qatar? Tamim has two options, neither of which is good. He can either fully comply with the wishes of Saudi Arabia and the UAE -- which would cost him his relationship with Qatar’s old guard, including his father -- or consolidate his role by working with his father's allies and freeing his country once and for all from the shackles of Saudi influence and an increasingly irrelevant GCC.

Tamim might not survive the first scenario, given how difficult it would be to confront not only his family but also the enormously influential ex-prime minister and foreign minister Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani. But the second option wouldn’t be easy, either. In that scenario, Qatar would more forcefully ally itself with Iran, with which it already has strong economic ties. It would also get politically and economically closer to Oman, which already has friendly relations with Tehran. But that wouldn’t come without costs either. The Sultanate is essentially in the GCC doghouse for refusing to adopt the group’s standard line against Iran. Should Qatar join that club, it will be hard for it to ever reverse course with the GCC.

Should Qatar become friendlier with Iran and Oman, it would signal the death of the GCC and herald a new power alignment in the Gulf. It would also severely complicate U.S. plans in the Middle East. For some time, the United States has encouraged the Arab Gulf States to think and act more collectively to enhance Gulf security. But with increasing tensions among GCC members, including possible divorces, this goal seems increasingly unrealistic. Washington may come to see that its Gulf allies will not be able to provide regional security anytime soon and, as a result, think twice about plans to reduce the U.S. political and military footprint there.

Qatar's spat with its Saudi and Emirati neighbors also creates another policy dilemma for the United States. Washington has strategic relations with all three states, which will become difficult to manage if they aren’t on speaking terms. It is possible that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could even lobby the United States to help shut down money flows out of Doha under the guise of counterterrorism. But Washington might not be receptive. Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base and the Combined Air and Space Operations Center, which coordinated all of the U.S. attack and surveillance missions for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, although the U.S. Treasury Department and State Department may show readiness to entertain Saudi and Emirati punitive measures against Doha, the Pentagon will probably put the brakes on any such plans.

In the coming days, the departure of the Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini ambassadors from Qatar will likely trigger rushed consultations among the Arab Gulf States. And these will probably lead to some sort of political settlement to defuse the crisis. But make no mistake about it, this is a new political era in the Arab Gulf, one in which individual states are charting their own courses and where the idea of unity, no matter how hard Saudi Arabia pushes for it, is rapidly fading.

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/3/6]

[Foreign Affairs] Can a Myth Rule a Nation?

The Truth About Sisi's Candidacy in Egypt

By Joshua Stacher

Anyone who claims to possess full political power in post-Mubarak Egypt is lying. That might be hard to believe, given how large the military looms these days. But the vision of an almighty military -- propagated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), its supporters, and those desperate for stability -- is a mirage. Soon enough, it will dissipate, revealing deep tensions in Egypt and dwindling options for what is often assumed to be Egypt’s strongest institution.

On Monday, SCAF, the governing body of the Egyptian military, unanimously gave Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the military’s commander in chief and Egypt’s current defense minister, its blessing to run for president. (Indeed, it considers his nomination a “mandate and an obligation.”) Sisi, whom the interim president promoted to the rank of field marshal the same day, has yet to announce his candidacy. Still, most everyone has accepted it -- and his eventual presidency -- as a fait accompli, the final step in the military’s reconquest of Egypt and the country’s return to the days of former President Hosni Mubarak.

But that is not the whole story.

Last June, Mubarak supporters and some revolutionaries came together to oust elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. Since then, large parts of society have coalesced around Sisi as the personification of a renewed nationalist strain of Egyptian power. He is lionized in the state media and praised by figures from Mubarak’s defunct ruling party and crony capitalist networks. Much of the general population, outside of the Muslim Brotherhood and revolutionaries, view him as being above the political fray. Brides profess to want to marry him, and men project his masculinity to reinforce their patriarchy. And those clamoring for stability -- from media moguls to average Egyptians and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry -- talk of democratic roadmaps and upcoming elections while sweeping political reality under the rug.

Sisi has tried to cement his position in politics by initiating an antiterror campaign, launched in late July of last year. The state’s coercive machinery has since increased its targeting of antigovernment protests and sit-ins, which has produced a death toll in the thousands. It is more than just a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt’s military-backed government has officially labeled a terrorist organization. The interim government and security forces have also killed and injured non-Brotherhood protesters, jailed revolutionary activists and nonstate-controlled journalists, lodged legal accusations against politicians who rose to prominence after the uprising, and slandered dissenting academics. The campaign has coincided with an uptick in bombings, assassinations, and a Sinai-based insurgency against the state by an Islamist group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. As the body count rises (security forces killed nearly 70 people last weekend), it is becoming clear that the state has actually weakened over the past three years. The government’s policy of using violence against dissenters is merely the latest effort to fix a leaky boat. But it will keep Egypt on the brink of revolution.

To understand why, consider what happened as protesters chased Mubarak’s last government out of office in January and February 2011: The military rolled in to protect infrastructure and its own factories and then carved up Mubarak’s ruling coalition while everyone else focused on Mubarak’s resignation. The SCAF exiled or imprisoned some crony capitalists and the government’s pro­-economic-reform team because it did not control them. It eliminated many of its competitors in the interior ministry and brought them under its authority. For example, the SCAF renamed the State Security Investigations Service(Homeland Security) , Egypt’s draconian domestic spying apparatus and reshuffled its leadership in March 2011.

Other powerful and potentially competitive intelligence agencies were not spared. Take, for instance, Omar Suleiman’s General Intelligence Service. An assassination attempt against him in Cairo during the uprising was never explained, and most accounts speculate that the military was behind the conspiracy because no one was ever apprehended. He can be forgiven, then, for quickly retiring after Mubarak’s departure. Last August’s appointment of Mohamed Farid el-Tohamy -- a former military intelligence officer -- to run the General Intelligence Service demonstrates just how fully the military had dismantled Suleiman’s old networks.

By the time the revolution was over, nearly all political control rested in the SCAF’s hands. At that point, the council had a number of options. It could have governed on its own, but it did not want to. Instead, the generals decided to protect their interests but hide behind a civilian face. So it sought out a civilian administration that could not challenge it. In the process, it whittled Mubarak’s regime, which had been designed to serve multiple constituencies and networks, into a system that would serve the interests of the military alone.

The SCAF reached out to a previous foe, which, it believed, could help demobilize a restive society. The Muslim Brotherhood was given a choice between siding with the revolution or the military. Brotherhood leaders broke toward the generals, believing that, if they were pliant enough, they would be indispensible to the military. In the end, however, Morsi and his group could not deliver what the military wanted: public stability or an end to continuous street activity. In fact, their presence and blatantly partisan rule made protests worse. So the military and its supporters consulted with and allowed the Tamarod protesters to turn up the heat on Morsi. Their street mobilization in late June, in turn, pushed the generals back into action.

In one sense, the military got its way. It demonstrated its sway over the Egyptian state when some observers believed that it had, in fact, been sidelined by Morsi, who forced the retirement of a handful of senior generals in August 2012, including the then defense minister and head of the SCAF, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. But in another sense, the military damaged the foundations of the regime it inherited. By pushing out an elected official, it discredited the notion of elections as a useful tool for rotating and transferring political power among civilian groups. Gone was any last inkling that the military could stand neutrally by, allow electoral victors to emerge, and not interfere with the process.

Now, with no other organized civilian group left to work with and its options limited, the SCAF hurled Sisi into the spotlight and began to create the myth of an Oz-like wizard controlling the state. Doing so bought Egypt’s generals some time, but the task before them -- engineering a new regime -- needs more than that. The longer the transition process drags on, the more cornered the SCAF finds itself. In fact, although Sisi’s nomination for the presidency might have appeared inevitable or destined, one could argue that it was the SCAF’s increasing weakness and paranoia that motivated his impending candidacy. After all, given his popularity, Sisi could anoint anyone as Egypt’s next preferred president. Open elections would likely be a landslide for his chosen candidate, and the process would preserve both the vestige of procedural democracy and the SCAF’s ability to intervene. Yet the generals named Sisi, looking to him to finish off the revolution and reign in the Brotherhood’s participation in politics.

But beyond creepy state press portrayals of Sisi’s virility and Egyptians parading around in gold-colored Sisi masks, as many were in Tahrir Square on the third anniversary of the revolution on January 25, the junta has little upon which to build a real regime. Sisi has no economic policies or political programs to speak of. The military-backed government’s base is narrow, and since it has no way to incorporate dissenters, it will generate more dissent and state-generated violence.

For now, Sisi and the SCAF have amassed the popularity of a fickle public. But the winds could change at any time. In years past, the military was able to pivot at will, showing remarkable flexibility. But now, with Sisi’s nomination, it has made the military the central player in the drama. Its role in politics now publically recognized, it will face more scrutiny as it tries to pull the levers. It has no civilian partner on which to pin the blame, and it is losing the support of its onetime grass-roots ally, Tamarod. As the regime-in-formation resorts more and more frequently to force, it will only exacerbate Egypt’s political crisis.

It is telling that the only institution that emerged with a good hand after Mubarak fell is increasingly playing with limited cards: all clubs and no hearts, diamonds, or spades. Although it might seem in control for now, the public will not tolerate an increasingly iron fist forever. Instability and violence will eat away at the myth of the omnipotent, newly promoted field marshal and the system’s narrative of stability. Once that happens, the ongoing social struggle will move on to its next phase.

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/1/31]