[Foreign Affairs] Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

By John J. Mearsheimer

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2014 ISSUE

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. 

Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.

But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.

U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border.

THE WESTERN AFFRONT

As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand.

The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ... The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries.

Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.” 

Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.”

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.

The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion. 

The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.

When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

CREATING A CRISIS

Imagine the American outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico.

The West’s triple package of policies -- NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion -- added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. 

Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster.

For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them wanted out of Ukraine. 

Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball.

THE DIAGNOSIS

Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. 

Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.

Officials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them.

To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. 

But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”

The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer.

Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe.

And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little difficulty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement. After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. 

So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the first decade of this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.”

In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. 

BLAME GAME

In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. 

Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. 

This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. 

Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people -- one-third of Ukraine’s population -- live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of the resulting sanctions.

But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not offensive.

A WAY OUT

Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-profile banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sectors of the Russian economy. 

Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule.

Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government.

The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. 

There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.

To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers. 

Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States.

One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor.

Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially if its defense is not a vital interest. Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. 

Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time -- and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course.

Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. 

The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.

[Foreign Affairs] More than Mosul

Nuri al-Maliki's Plans for a Divided Iraq

By Reidar Visser

JUNE 13, 2014

Lately, Iraqi politics has been full of contradictions. On April 30, millions of voters -- including millions of Sunni Arabs -- selected mostly moderate candidates in the country’s third general election since its current constitution was adopted in 2005. Just weeks later, the local government in the largest Sunni city, Mosul, fell to a group of Syria-based radicals called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Iraqi security forces barely resisted.

With the situation in Mosul rapidly deteriorating, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki seems to be considering two main alternatives: proceed with forming a new cabinet, which, to achieve a modicum of stability, would require him to include at least some of his political enemies, or consolidate his influence among Iraqi Shia, with little regard for what happens to the Sunni and Kurdish parts of the country. 

These two alternatives reflect two very different strategies, both of which Maliki has pursued over the last several years. Since he became prime minister in 2006, Maliki has sometimes tried to transcend the ethno-sectarianism that has characterized Iraqi politics since the 2003 U.S. invasion. By going after hardliners within his own Shia community, especially the Sadrists, Maliki tried to paint himself as a prime minister for all Iraqis. By insisting on a centralized energy policy, he broke down the Shia-Kurdish compact that had been so central to Iraqi politics in earlier years. He also alienated many fellow Shia in Basra and in the far south, who had hoped for greater energy autonomy. Finally, by standing firm against Kurdish claims to territories in the north, he won friends outside his own ethno-religious community, including the Sunni Turkmens, Sunni Arabs, and Christians living in those areas.

Maliki’s attempts to overcome Iraq’s divided politics were more enthusiastic between 2008 and 2010, when he discovered that he could increase his own power by challenging fellow Shia politicians and appealing to Iraqis more broadly. His plans fell by the wayside after the 2010 general election thanks, not least, to a concerted effort by other Shia parties and Iran to bring him back into the sectarian fold. Maliki did try, however, to revive his old strategies before the general election this year. In that race, he spoke of Iraq’s “political majority” and seemed to assume that he’d be able to win over at least some Sunni Arabs, who would join forces with him in the struggle to stamp out Kurdish attempts at an ever more independent energy policy.

At the same time, though, a very different -- more sectarian -- Maliki has been lurking just around the corner. In his first term, for example, Maliki was one of the few Shia leaders to urge moderation in the regime’s de-Baathification program. But he was highly selective in his moderation; regardless of legal criteria, Shia former Baathists were often allowed to continue to serve and Sunnis tended to be dismissed. In his second term, Maliki also became associated with projects that smacked of sectarianism. Sometimes, they went even further than schemes he had criticized back in 2005, such as a plan by some of his Shia political competitors to create a Shia federal canton. At the time, Maliki had dismissed the idea as a recipe for the partition of Iraq. But, just before this year’s general election, he backed similar legislation to create new provinces in a number of areas in northern Iraq -- a move that would protect Shia minorities there from Sunni control and potentially connect them with the Shia-dominated Baghdad province. More generally, despite plenty of opportunities during his two terms in office, Maliki failed to reach out to Sunni Arab communities beyond striking personal friendships with selected tribal sheikhs and local politicians.

Maliki’s ambiguity on sectarian politics informed his reaction to the fall of Mosul. The rapid withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Mosul and other Sunni areas suggests that Maliki simply gave up on defending them, preferring instead to consolidate his control over Shia zones. The moves have added fuel to discussions about the potential partition of Iraq.

At the same time, however, Maliki has tried to distance himself from the army’s withdrawal, calling it a conspiracy and hinting at subversive local Sunni politicians’ involvement. Maliki knows that, to finally form a government after the April 30 election -- out of which he emerged with the largest number of seats but not an outright majority -- he would need to join with at least one major Kurdish or Sunni leader. Until now, his hubris has seemed to prevent him from doing so, but events in Mosul may have finally injected some much-needed realism into his political thinking.

Maliki must know that he has already lost many of his cards. For example, to the extent that some Sunni politicians were previously interested in dealing with him, it was predicated on Maliki’s tough stance on Kurdish claims to disputed territories. Following the ISIL attack, though, Kurdish forces have occupied most of those territories, thereby depriving Maliki of what little leverage he had over Sunni Arab politicians. If Maliki wants to try to strike a partnership with the Kurds instead -- probably the most realistic alternative at present-- he will find that they have already secured much of what they want on their own. The only things Maliki would have left to offer are more generous payments to the Kurdish armed forces out of the central government’s coffers and painful compromises on the independence of the Kurdish oil sector.

Alternatively, Maliki could be thinking that a smaller, Shia-dominated Iraq offers him the best chance of staying in power, since he does enjoy a clear parliamentary majority in Shia areas. But any move toward a formal partition of the country will meet will considerable regional resistance. Despite its support for Iraqi Kurds, Turkey probably is not ready to recognize a fully independent Kurdistan. For its part, Saudi Arabia would likely feel threatened if the ISIL were to build bases beyond Syria. Even Iran, although potentially tempted by the emergence of a smaller and more Shia Iraq that might be easier to dominate, would not be happy about having its access to Syria blocked by an explicitly Sunni political entity in western Iraq.

So far, Maliki’s response to the crisis has indicated that he wants to further concentrate power instead of sharing it more broadly. Just after Mosul fell, he attempted to impose emergency rule, a plan the Iraqi parliament failed to embrace. When his supporters responded by threatening to involve Iraq’s supreme court, one felt a sense of déjà vu. Maliki, it seems, could be aiming to amass power based on his strong Shia majority and a belief that the rest of Iraq simply does not count. If this tendency prevails over coming weeks, it would mean that Maliki learned nothing from the dramatic fall of Mosul.

[Foreign Affairs] Treacherous Triangle

China, Russia, the United States, and the New Superpower Showdown

By David Gordon and Jordan Schneider

MAY 22, 2014

This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in China, looking to deepen ties between his country and his neighbor to the south. The trip could mark the start of a new era in U.S.-Russian-Chinese relations, the trilateral relationship that dominated the final decades of the Cold War and is now making a comeback. After Russia’s aggression in Crimea, Moscow and Washington are locked in conflict. Beijing has thus become the new fulcrum, the power most able to play one side off the other.

It is hard to overstate just how significant the shift could be. During the Cold War, the United States capitalized on the constant, at times extreme, Sino-Soviet tension. Thanks to the United States’ closer relations with China, first illustrated during U.S. President Richard Nixon’s famous 1972 visit to Beijing, the Soviet Union feared total isolation. It consequently became more willing to accommodate U.S. demands. American leverage increased, manifesting itself in the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty just three months after Nixon’s trip, and in the Helsinki Accords three years later. In return for Chinese support, Washington gradually normalized its dealings with Beijing, culminating in 1979 in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, which had been suspended after the communist takeover.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the shock of Tiananmen Square marked the end of the first era of triangulation. In the post–Cold War unipolar era, the United States did not need to use a reeling Russia against an internally focused China to achieve its goals. But, thanks to China’s rise as a major power and Russia’s newfound assertiveness, trilateral dynamics are back. This time, though, the United States isn’t the dominant player.

CHINA'S CHOICE

If animosity between China and the Soviet Union defined trilateral relations during the Cold War, today it is U.S.-Russian tensions that drive the triad’s dynamics. Clashing interests, a real ideological divide, and the likely escalation of U.S. sanctions will add to the strain. Unlike U.S. President Barack Obama at the start of his first term, though, the next president will not likely attempt a “reset” with Russia, if only to avoid the domestic political blowback. Likewise, Putin has his own reasons for keeping tensions high; he would like to stir up nationalism to preserve his popularity at home, especially in the face of continued economic contraction.

Between these two clashing powers lies China. As the nation in the triad with the broadest policy options, China is positioned to play Russia and the United States off each other, much as the United States did with China and Russia in years past.

Putin has hoped to convince China to use its influence to provide Russia significant economic and political support. In that, he is likely to be disappointed. For one, the two sides don’t have the same strategic goals. China wants global respect for its peaceful rise to great power status. Russia wants to challenge and undermine the West at every opportunity. Further, China sees the United States as its most important partner because of the two nations’ economic interdependence. In other words, even as China balances between the United States and Russia, it won’t risk provoking a real falling out with the United States. It will, however, drive hard bargains and extract concessions from both sides, particularly from Russia.

For example, Putin would like China to legitimize Russia’s aggressive regional stance. To this, China won’t say “no,” but it won’t say “yes” either. The last thing the country would want to do is lend public support to the principle that issues of sovereignty can be decided through referenda. The spillover effects in Hong Kong, Inner Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang would be too severe. What Russia can reasonably expect, though, is for China’s leaders to maintain their benign neglect, continuing to abstain on UN votes against Russia and undermining Western sanctions.

Putin has also been looking to dramatically expand Russia’s role as an energy provider to Beijing, which would create leverage for Russia in its energy dealings with Europe. And, after a decade of false starts, during the first part of Putin’s trip to China, Moscow and Beijing did ink an agreement for the “Power of Siberia” pipeline, presaging a new phase in bilateral energy relations. On this issue, Moscow’s desire to expand energy exports intersects with Beijing’s search for greater energy security. And although Russia secured some $25 billion in prepayment to finance the pipeline -- very important in the face of Western sanctions -- China got the better the deal. Russia will supply it natural gas at significantly lower-than-market rates, saving China tens of billions of dollars and pushing down the price of gas across Asia.

In addition to energy, China would like Russia to make it easier for Chinese firms to invest in Russia and sell to Russians. For China, Russia’s middle class economy is a huge market opportunity, especially now that Western firms have started to defer investment there. Russia, fearful of competition, has tended to restrict access to the Russian market for Chinese companies. But in the new geopolitical triangle, Russian and Chinese economic interests will converge; Moscow is already loosening restrictions on Chinese investment and will likely speed up the process.

China might also ask Russia for access to Russia's most advanced military technology. Moscow has been reluctant to sell Beijing its highest-end materiel, partially out of fear that China might someday use these weapons against Russia. Russia might now be more willing to share some technology in return for strategic concessions, but such a policy shift will be gradual. And it might have spillover effects outside of the triangle, for instance driving India into the arms of U.S. arms manufacturers in its search to match China’s increased military capabilities.

TRIFECTA

Just as the United States was emboldened by its lead position in the U.S.-Russian-Chinese triad during the Cold War, so too will China's resolve increase as Russia pursues its affections. For instance, China might become less eager to liberalize its foreign investment policy, something the United States has long wanted as a way to drive down the bilateral trade deficit. With new economic opportunities to China’s north, it simply won’t be as desperate for U.S. money. And the more Russia opens up its technological storehouse, the more willing China will be to press its interests in the South and East China Seas.

Unlike during the Cold War, however, when Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing pressured Moscow to change many aspects of its global policy, the closer Russian-Chinese relationship is unlikely to change U.S. policymakers’ calculations on most major U.S.-Chinese issues. Thus, the dynamics of the new triangle will not exactly mimic the old.

A rising China supported by a desperate Russia will make for a formidable geopolitical pair. Even so, the United States will not weaken its commitments to its allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, in the face of increased Chinese confidence. It will continue to pursue its flagship regional trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it will press China on its state-sponsored commercial espionage with increasing vigor. Unlike the Soviet Union, the odd nation out in the first triangle relationship, the United States today has the military, financial, and political strength -- coupled with a global network of alliances -- to stand on its own. But an emboldened Beijing will nevertheless make it harder for the United States to maintain its current position as the Pacific’s regional balancer.

[Foreign Affairs] Far Eastern Promises

Why Washington Should Focus on Asia

By Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner

The United States is in the early stages of a substantial national project: reorienting its foreign policy to commit greater attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. This reformulation of U.S. priorities has emerged during a period of much-needed strategic reassessment, after more than a decade of intense engagement with South Asia and the Middle East. It is premised on the idea that the history of the twenty-first century will be written largely in the Asia-Pacific, a region that welcomes U.S. leadership and rewards U.S. engagement with a positive return on political, economic, and military investments.

As a result, the Obama administration is orchestrating a comprehensive set of diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives now known as the “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia. The policy builds on more than a century of U.S. involvement in the region, including important steps taken by the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; as President Barack Obama has rightly noted, the United States is in reality and rhetoric already a “Pacific power.” But the rebalancing does represent a significant elevation of Asia’s place in U.S. foreign policy.

Questions about the purpose and scope of the new approach emerged as soon as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered what remains the clearest articulation of the strategy, and first used the term “pivot” to describe it, in a 2011 article in Foreign Policy. Almost three years later, the Obama administration still confronts the persistent challenge of explaining the concept and delivering on its promise. But despite the intense scrutiny and short-term setbacks faced by the policy, there is little doubt that a major shift is well under way. And whether Washington wants it to or not, Asia will command more attention and resources from the United States, thanks to the region’s growing prosperity and influence -- and the enormous challenges the region poses. The question, then, is not whether the United States will focus more on Asia but whether it can do so with the necessary resolve, resources, and wisdom.

EASTBOUND AND DOWN

Paying more attention to Asia is not an admission of defeat in the Middle East.

The Asia-Pacific region exerts an inescapable gravitational pull. It is home to more than half of the world’s population and contains the largest democracy in the world (India), the second- and third-largest economies (China and Japan), the most populous Muslim-majority nation (Indonesia), and seven of the ten largest armies. The Asian Development Bank has predicted that before the middle of this century, the region will account for half of the world’s economic output and include four of the world’s ten largest economies (China, India, Indonesia, and Japan).

But it is the trajectory of Asia’s evolution, not just its dizzying scale, that makes the region so consequential. According to Freedom House, during the last five years, the Asia-Pacific has been the only region in the world to record steady improvements in political rights and civil liberties. And despite questions about the ability of emerging markets to sustain rapid economic growth, Asian nations still represent some of the most promising opportunities in an otherwise sluggish and uncertain global economy. At the same time, Asia struggles with sources of chronic instability, owing to the highly provocative actions of North Korea, the growth of defense budgets throughout the region, vexing maritime disputes that roil relations in the East China and South China seas, and nontraditional security threats such as natural disasters, human trafficking, and the drug trade.

The United States has an irrefutable interest in the course Asia will take in the coming years. The region is the leading destination for U.S. exports, outpacing Europe by more than 50 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Both U.S. direct investment in Asia and Asian direct investment in the United States have roughly doubled in the past decade, with China, India, Singapore, and South Korea accounting for four of the ten fastest-growing sources of foreign direct investment in the United States, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The United States also has five defense treaty allies in the region (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), as well as strategically important partnerships with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan and evolving ties with Myanmar (also known as Burma). Major U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea are central to Washington’s ability to project power in Asia and beyond.

U.S. military alliances have undergirded the region’s security for decades, and one of the main purposes of the pivot is to deepen such ties. In recent years, Washington has encouraged its partners in Asia to prevent conflicts between major powers, keep sea-lanes open, combat extremism, and address nontraditional security threats. Japan and South Korea are poised to take increasingly prominent roles in joint operations with the United States, and U.S. forces are working with Australia to develop its amphibious capabilities and with the Philippines to boost its capacity to police its own shores. The net result has been more powerful alliances and a more secure region.

None of this suggests an effort to encircle or weaken China. To the contrary, developing a more robust and productive relationship with Beijing represents a principal goal of the rebalancing strategy. Far from seeking to contain China, the United States has in the last several years sought to build a more mature bilateral relationship through unprecedented, frequent top-level meetings across issues and throughout the countries’ respective bureaucracies. Even military-to-military relations are back on track, at times actually taxing the Pentagon’s ability to keep up with Beijing’s proposed levels of activity.

A PIVOT TO -- AND WITHIN -- ASIA

The rebalancing strategy also calls for a substantial increase in U.S. engagement with the multilateral institutions of the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Obama administration, the United States has gained membership in the East Asia Summit, the region’s premier annual gathering of heads of state; signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which signals enhanced U.S. commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and placed a permanent ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta. Although these overlapping institutions can be frustrating, given their slow pace and requirements for consensus, they promote regional cooperation and help build a system of rules and mechanisms to address complex transnational challenges. In June 2013, for example, ASEAN hosted its first-ever humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise, which included more than 3,000 personnel from 18 nations.

Meanwhile, the United States is responding to the new reality that the Asia-Pacific region increasingly drives global economic growth. The Obama administration has advanced U.S. economic interests by bringing the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement into force in 2012 and pushing hard to complete negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a massive free-trade agreement among a dozen countries. A number of the countries participating in the TPP talks are vibrant markets in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore, which reflects the growing geopolitical importance of that subregion. Indeed, the U.S. pivot to Asia has been accompanied by a pivot within Asia. Washington is balancing its historical emphasis on the countries of Northeast Asia with new attention to countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, seeking to augment two-way trade and investment with some of the world’s most vibrant economies. In 2010, Washington and Jakarta established a “comprehensive partnership” to deepen cooperation across a wide range of issues, including health care, science, technology, and entrepreneurship.

A similar desire to realign U.S. priorities in the region helps explain the changes the Pentagon has made to its military posture there. Although U.S. military bases in Northeast Asia remain central to Washington’s ability to project power and fight wars, they are increasingly vulnerable to disabling missile attacks, and they lie relatively far from potential disasters and crises in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, with countries in Southeast Asia expressing growing interest in receiving American military training and assistance with disaster response, the United States has diversified its military footprint in the region, stationing hundreds of U.S. marines in Darwin, Australia, and deploying a pair of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore.

Those changes to the U.S. military’s posture have been criticized as either provocative or meaningless. Both charges are off the mark. These efforts hardly signal aggression; they contribute primarily to peacetime activities, such as responding to natural disasters, and not to U.S. war-fighting capabilities. And the seemingly modest number of marines and ships involved masks the significant benefits they offer to the militaries of U.S. partners, who gain unparalleled opportunities for joint exercises and training with U.S. forces.

The United States must make clear to China that revisionist behavior is incompatible with stable U.S.-Chinese relations.

In pivoting to Asia, the Obama administration seeks not only to advance U.S. economic and security interests but also to deepen cultural and people-to-people ties. The administration further hopes that the pivot will help the United States support human rights and democracy in the region. The new approach has already contributed to advances in Myanmar, where the government has taken remarkable steps, including the release of political prisoners, the implementation of long-overdue economic reforms, and the promotion of organizing rights and greater press freedom. Although more progress is necessary, particularly on the protection of the country’s ethnic minorities, Myanmar serves as a powerful example of a once closed and brutal country taking transformational steps, and the United States has been an essential partner in this reform effort from the start.

FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME

Opponents of the pivot have raised three main objections. First, some worry that the pivot will unnecessarily antagonize China. This misperception ignores the fact that deepening engagement with Beijing has been a central and irrefutable feature of the rebalancing policy. Examples of the new approach include the establishment of the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a comprehensive set of meetings chaired by the U.S. secretaries of state and the treasury and their Chinese counterparts, and the Strategic Security Dialogue, through which the two countries have held unprecedented high-level discussions on such sensitive matters as maritime security and cybersecurity. Tensions might rise due to the increased U.S. military presence in Asia and Washington’s more robust outreach to China’s neighbors. But bilateral ties are developing in such a way that any disagreements produced by the pivot will be addressed in the broader context of a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship.

A second critique stems from the argument that it would be unwise or unrealistic to shift Washington’s focus from the Middle East to Asia given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the instability in Egypt and Iraq, and the long-running confrontation between Iran and the Western powers. But this criticism relies on a caricature of the rebalancing strategy. According to this view, the Middle East and South Asia have sapped U.S. power and prestige and the pivot is really an attempt to cut and run by turning to the more peaceful and profitable shores of the Asia-Pacific. It is certainly true that the Obama administration has tried to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. But even though resources are finite, foreign policy is not a zero-sum game, and the criticism that paying more attention to Asia is somehow an admission of strategic defeat in the Middle East misses a crucial reality: during the past decade, the very Asian countries to which Washington wants to pay more attention have quietly built a substantial stake in the furtherance of peace and stability across the Middle East and South Asia and very much want the United States to preserve its influence in those regions.

Not long ago, most Asian nations were predominantly concerned with developments in their backyards and tended to see problems elsewhere as someone else’s responsibility. One of the most important successes of President George W. Bush’s Asia policy was to encourage the region’s rising powers to contribute more in other parts of the world. Partly in response, during the Bush years, for the first time, many East Asian governments developed an “out of area” perspective and engaged more in diplomacy, development, and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Japan has become a leading supporter of civil society development in Afghanistan, funding schools and civil service organizations and training Afghans in criminal justice, education, health care, and agriculture. In the wake of the Arab Spring, South Korea began supporting development across the Middle East. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have provided material assistance to training programs for doctors, police officers, and teachers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Australia and New Zealand have sent special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has been more active in the behind-the-scenes diplomacy aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, addressing piracy on the high seas, and shaping Afghanistan’s future.

Of course, encouragement from Washington is only one factor behind Asian countries’ growing involvement in the Middle East; another undeniable element is their increasing thirst for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day, more than twice the amount that the EU does. Asian governments know that a hasty U.S. retreat from the Middle East would carry with it unacceptable risks to their countries’ energy security and economic growth. As a result, they have invested substantial political and financial capital in, and in some cases sent military forces to, the Middle East over the course of more than a decade to supplement, not supplant, the stabilizing role of the United States. Put simply, Washington’s Asian partners support the pivot but would hardly cheer the prospect of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East -- and crucially, they do not seem to see any contradiction between these two positions.

A third argument against the pivot concerns the sustainability of the approach during a time of budget cuts: as defense spending falls, skeptics wonder how the United States will be able to invest the resources necessary to reassure its Asian allies and dissuade would-be provocateurs, especially as China’s power and influence continue to grow. The answer is that rebalancing toward Asia will not require dramatic new funding; rather, the Pentagon will need to be more flexible and find better ways to spend. For example, as the United States reduces the overall size of its army, it should sustain its military presence in Asia and invest in naval and air capabilities better suited to the region’s security environment. And given that U.S. defense spending is unlikely to increase significantly anytime soon, Washington should do more to improve the capacity of Asian militaries by conducting more educational and professional exchanges, enhancing multilateral military exercises, passing along equipment that U.S. forces no longer need, and engaging in more joint planning.

BALANCING ACT

Although the most common arguments against the rebalancing do not withstand scrutiny, the policy nevertheless faces major challenges. Perhaps chief among these is a lack of human capital. After more than a decade of war and counterinsurgency, the United States has developed and promoted an entire generation of soldiers, diplomats, and intelligence specialists well versed in ethnic rivalry in Iraq, the tribal differences in Afghanistan, postconflict reconstruction strategies, and U.S. Special Forces and drone tactics. But Washington has not made any comparable effort to develop a sustained cadre of Asia experts across the U.S. government, and a surprising number of senior government officials make their first visits to the region only once they have reached high-level positions near the end of their careers. This is a genuine weakness in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, since even the most accomplished public servant will find it difficult to navigate Asia’s complexities without prior experience in the region. The pivot to Asia will therefore affect the budgets of civilian government agencies, not just that of the Pentagon, as the United States invests more in ensuring that U.S. diplomats, aid workers, trade negotiators, and intelligence professionals have the language skills and exposure to Asia they need to do their jobs well.

The pivot will also be buffeted by the steady stream of crises that other regions -- especially the Middle East -- will surely continue to supply. At the same time, pressure to “come home” seems certain to grow. In the wake of every modern American conflict, from World War I to the 1990–91 Gulf War, the public has put pressure on politicians and officials to refocus on domestic issues. The past 13 years of war have again triggered this instinctive insularity, which has also been fostered by a frustratingly slow economic recovery after the financial crisis. Although internationalist and strong-defense strains still exist in U.S. politics, there are subtle (and not so subtle) signs in Congress that the United States may be entering a new era in which U.S. engagement abroad -- even in areas critical to the country’s economic well-being, such as Asia -- will be a tougher sell. Those political constraints will only make a hard job even harder: when it comes to Asia, the to-do list is long, both for the remaining years of the Obama administration and beyond.

PIVOT PARTNERS

In Asia, economics and security are inextricably linked, and the United States will not be able to sustain its leadership there through military might alone. That is why the successful conclusion of the TPP -- which will require intense negotiations overseas and on Capitol Hill -- is a cardinal priority. The agreement would immediately benefit the U.S. economy and would create a long-term trade system in Asia that could not be dragged down by protectionism. To give the United States added leverage in the negotiations, Congress should quickly reinstate fast-track trade promotion authority. Under that system, after negotiating the TPP and other free-trade agreements, the White House could present them for up-or-down votes in Congress, which would not be able to amend or filibuster the deals. The Obama administration should also leverage the U.S. energy boom and accelerate the export of liquefied natural gas to Asia to enhance the energy security of its allies and partners there and to send a strong signal of U.S. commitment to the region’s development.

Washington’s ever-deepening engagement with Beijing is already yielding dividends as the countries increasingly coordinate their approaches to Iran and North Korea while managing potential crises in the South China Sea. But the United States will only find it more difficult to navigate relations with a rising China that is now both a “strategic partner,” as President Bill Clinton described it in 1998, and a “strategic competitor,” as Bush later dubbed it.

China’s attempts to change the territorial status quo in the East China and South China seas -- for example, by establishing an “air defense identification zone” in the East China Sea over islands administered by Japan -- present an immediate challenge. The United States will have to make clear to China that revisionist behavior is incompatible with stable U.S.-Chinese relations, much less with the “new type of major-country relationship” that President Xi Jinping has proposed to Obama. Washington recently took a step in the right direction when senior administration officials publicly questioned the legality of China’s expansive territorial claims and warned against the establishment of a second air defense identification zone, this one in the South China Sea.

Across the East China Sea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is seeking to steer Japan out of decades of economic malaise and inject the country with a newfound sense of pride and influence. Washington will have to continue to urge Tokyo to act with restraint and sensitivity, especially when it comes to the controversies over Japan’s imperial past. Abe recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some convicted of war crimes committed during War World II. The visit might have helped him with some political constituencies at home, but the international costs were high: it raised questions in Washington, further soured Japan’s relations with South Korea, and made China more resolute in its unwillingness to deal directly with Japan as long as Abe is in power.

Amid this tense diplomatic backdrop, the United States will be working with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces so that Japan can take a more active security role in the region and the world. This will involve countering Chinese propaganda that characterizes Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation and military modernization as reactionary or militaristic, when in fact they are perfectly reasonable steps -- and long overdue. The United States will also have to keep devoting considerable political capital to improving ties between Japan and South Korea; a stronger relationship between those two countries would help in dealing with the enormous and growing threat posed by North Korea.

The challenges in Southeast Asia are quite different from those in the Northeast, but no less important to U.S. national interests. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand, are going through varying degrees of political turmoil that could alter their foreign policies. As the chips fall, Washington must adhere to basic principles of democracy and human rights without doing so dogmatically or in ways that would reduce U.S. leverage and influence. Rather than betting on winners, the best approach would be to focus on issues that matter most to people in the region no matter who is in power, such as education, poverty alleviation, and natural-disaster response.

In addition to increasing U.S. participation in Asia’s multilateral forums, Washington should support the development of a rule-based regional order by throwing its full weight behind efforts to use international law and arbitration to address sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has taken its competing claims with China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Without making judgments (for now) about the merits of specific claims, Washington should help build an international consensus by calling on all states in Asia to publicly support this mechanism, since the tribunal represents a test of whether the region is prepared to manage its disputes through legal and peaceful means.

The United States cannot rebalance to Asia by itself. It will be essential to bring along European countries, which can make substantial contributions in areas such as international law and institution building. If the tenor of its bilateral relations permits, Washington should also explore opportunities for greater collaboration in East Asia with India and Russia. And of course, it will also be necessary for countries in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, to demonstrate leadership and initiative to complement U.S. efforts. The point of the pivot to Asia is to foster an open, peaceful, and prosperous region in which governments rely on rules, norms, and institutions to settle differences, rather than coercion and force. The pivot is a U.S. initiative, but its ultimate success will not depend on Washington alone. 

[Foregin Affairs Website 2014/4/19]

[共同社] 約瑟夫•奈：中國應採取克制態度 安倍勿煽動民族情緒

【共同社4月19日電】美國前助理國防部長、提出「軟實力」概念的哈佛大學教授約瑟夫•奈日前接受共同社專訪，就尖閣諸島（中國稱釣魚島）、日本的集體自衛權爭論、美中「新型大國關係」等國際政治的熱點問題發表了見解。

　　奈表示，有人在看到克里米亞脫離烏克蘭加入俄羅斯後擔心中國會強行奪取尖閣諸島，但這樣的事不會發生。他認為克里米亞與尖閣諸島的情況完全不同，俄羅斯憑藉具有壓倒性優勢的軍事力量左右了烏克蘭局勢，中國對日本則不具有軍事優勢。他補充道：「日美之間有安全保障條約，尖閣諸島是該條約第5條的適用對象。烏克蘭與美國之間則沒有這樣的條約。」他還表示：「美國國防部長和國務卿曾明確說過尖閣諸島適用安保條約第5條。我預計奧巴馬總統本月下旬訪日時會向安倍晉三首相清楚地確認這一點。」

　　美國政府表示在尖閣諸島的主權問題上不持立場。奈就此做出了如下解讀：美國政府的意思是「對19世紀末發生了什麼不持特定立場」，那是「很久以前的事」，當事方可以到國際法庭上爭論。他同時強調，1972年沖繩回歸日本時美國把對尖閣諸島的施政權還給了日本，正因如此，尖閣諸島適用《日美安保條約》，「『中國不要對此產生誤判』，這一點美國說得很清楚」。

　　日本政府修改了「武器出口三原則」，並計畫解禁集體自衛權。奈表示，根據《聯合國憲章》日本擁有集體自衛權，但一直單方面地禁止行使這一權利。他認為日本政府可通過修改憲法解釋解禁集體自衛權，沒有必要修改憲法，理由是日本參加了聯合國維和行動及索馬里海域的反海盜護航，在東非國家吉布地擁有自衛隊的活動基地，“實際上已經在行使集體自衛權”。

　　奈認為日本政府修改武器出口政策也是正確的，並稱自己一直對安倍首相的多項新防衛政策給予非常高的評價。另一方面，奈認為「用民族主義包裝這些政策是錯誤的，損害了安倍自身的立場」。他表示：「參拜靖國神社、做出修改‘河野談話’的姿態等等，如果提出歷史問題，會使中國和韓國想起戰前的日本，感到不安。應該停止煽動民族主義情緒，一心務實。」

　　奈就日韓關係的惡化指出：「原因有兩個，一個是韓國自身的民族主義，另一個是日本的可謂愚蠢的錯誤應對。」他認為日方對韓國「生厭」、做出要修改「河野談話」的姿態，反而損害了日本自身的利益。

　　關於中國提倡建立的美中「新型大國關係」，奈表示「誰都不知道中國的真正用意是什麼，這是一種口號」。在他看來，中國國家主席習近平所說的「新型大國關係」的意思似乎是大國之間不要陷入零和博弈。奈表示：「如果是這個意思，那是好事。美中需要在穩定國際金融、應對全球變暖和防治傳染病等方面合作並借助日本等國的力量。」他還指出，如果「新型大國關係」意味著美中兩國的霸權（G2），那是不能接受的，「美國不打算建立G2，明確否認了美中分治太平洋」。奈認為美中關係今後如何發展還需要觀察。他說：「美國不會容忍中國的霸權主義。希望不要忘記東亞穩定的基礎是《日美安保條約》、日美同盟關係將維持下去。」

　　奈認為2008年金融危機後中國覺得自身經濟日漸強盛，美國則走向衰落，因而放棄了從鄧小平時代起執行的低調外交政策，其結果是惡化了與日本、菲律賓、越南和印度等幾乎所有鄰國的關係。他表示「自信越強，所處的境遇就越差。這是中國面臨的一大困局」、「希望中國能重新採取鄧小平時代的克制態度」。

　　奈就目前整個國際局勢表示：「相對而言東亞還是穩定的。《日美安保條約》打下了穩定的基礎，經濟相互依賴程度也很高。令人擔憂的是歐洲。俄羅斯是衰落中的大國，普京總統開始了相當大的賭博。有必要明確地告訴俄羅斯，如果再賭下去會付出高昂代價。」（完）

[共同社 2014-4-19]

[Foreign Policy] America's Pacific Century

The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.

BY HILLARY CLINTON
OCTOBER 11, 2011

As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.

At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.

With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again.

Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.

Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players.

Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.

President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world.

As secretary of state, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.

WHAT DOES THAT regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.

Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.

As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.

The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese government of more than $5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.

Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.

We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.

AS WE UPDATE our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.

One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.

We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights.

We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity.

As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea.

On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity.

Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.

At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.

Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.

President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.

We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.

EVEN AS WE strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity.

So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.

That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law.

We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace.

In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.

In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.

OUR EMPHASIS ON the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific.

The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.
When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.

Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.

We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.

We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.

Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.

ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.

We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.

How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.

But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.

As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond.

We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.
IN THE LAST decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.

We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us.

Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership.

And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.

As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.
This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.