2014/9/24

[Foreign Affairs] Brothers in Trouble?

Gomaa Amin and the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

SEPTEMBER 24, 2014

The Muslim Brotherhood spent 84 years toiling in Egypt’s opposition before winning power in June 2012 only to lose it 369 days later. It has been all downhill for the group since then. In the 14 months since the military responded to huge protests by toppling Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated president, the group has faced an unrelenting crackdown that has practically decimated it as a political force in Egypt. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood’s deteriorating relations with key foreign governments have hindered its attempts to reorganize in exile. Even so, the group hasn’t revised its ideology or changed its strategy. It has refused to seek reconciliation with the new Egyptian regime or question the feasibility of its theocratic agenda. In fact, by selecting the London-based Brotherhood leader Gomaa Amin as acting Supreme Guide -- in other words, its chief executive -- the Brotherhood has likely doubled down.
The period since Morsi’s fall has been the darkest in the Brotherhood’s 86-year history. Within Egypt, at least 1,000 Muslim Brothers have been killed during crackdowns on their anti-coup protests, tens of thousands have been imprisoned, and the group’s notoriously rigid chain of command has been decapitated at both the national and provincial levels. The pro-Morsi National Alliance to Support Legitimacy has also collapsed: Many of the Alliance’s non-Brotherhood leaders were arrested in early July, and two of its main constituent parties -- the Brotherhood offshoot al-Wasat and the Salafist al-Watan -- bolted thereafter. Meanwhile, its cadres’ low-profile insurgency against the state, which targets government buildings and police vehicles, has alienated many potential civilian supporters. Ordinary Egyptians often clash with Muslim Brothers at the organization’s constantly shrinking pro-Morsi demonstrations.
The Brotherhood’s attempt to manage its affairs from abroad is faltering as well. Qatar, which strongly supported Morsi’s presidency and granted many Brotherhood figures asylum when he was ousted, recently responded to pressure from its anti-Brotherhood Gulf neighbors by asking top Brotherhood leaders to leave Doha. (It remains to be seen whether Qatar will adjust the pro-Brotherhood editorial stance of its Al-Jazeera network, or stop funding various other pro-Brotherhood media outlets, many of which employ Muslim Brothers in exile.) The Brotherhood’s safe haven in the United Kingdom -- where the organization has maintained a strong presence, including a media office, for decades -- has also become a little less welcoming. Earlier this year, the British government launched an inquiry into the organization’s London-based activities, and although the investigation reportedly found no direct links between the Brotherhood and terrorist groups, many anticipate curbs on the organization’s activities in the country. Turkey, which is home to the organization’sRabaa TV satellite network, is now the Brotherhood’s only reliable sanctuary, although the group seems keenly aware of its deteriorating international standing and is reportedly investigating Tunisia and Malaysia as backup bases.
Despite these setbacks, the Brotherhood has refused to rethink its approach. In fact, from the group’s standpoint, its members are still engaged in the very same struggle that has defined the Brotherhood’s work since its 1928 founding: It is working to “Islamize” Egyptian society so that the Brotherhood can establish an Islamic state in Egypt, after which it will build a global Islamic state that will repel Western cultural and political influence.
Far from being a “moderate” or “pragmatic” organization, as many optimistic analysts once described it, the Brotherhood is a deeply ideological, closed vanguard.
The Brotherhood’s stubbornness -- even in the face of such severe setbacks -- is not particularly surprising. Far from being a “moderate” or “pragmatic” organization, as many optimistic analysts once described it, the Brotherhood is a deeply ideological, closed vanguard. It seeks, in the words of its founder Hassan al-Banna, to implement Islam as an “all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life,” and deploys its members as foot soldiers to promote this totalitarian vision. To ensure the organization’s ideological purity and unity of purpose, every Muslim Brother undergoes a five-to-eight-year induction process known as tarbiyya, during which rising members are vetted for their commitment to the Brotherhood’s cause and their willingness to follow Brotherhood leaders’ orders in pursuit of it. This is not, in other words, a group of second-guessers. It is an insular society drunk on its own narrative.
Evidence of this can be seen in the apparent selection of the new Supreme Guide. The previous guide was arrested last August, and the leadership of the Brotherhood had been unclear since then. But earlier this month, a former Brotherhood leaderannounced that Gomaa Amin is now leading the organization. Amin is one of the most senior Brotherhood leaders who is neither in prison nor in hiding: The longtime leader of the Guidance Office, which is the Brotherhood’s eighteen-member executive body, was safely in London receiving medical treatment at the time of Morsi’s ouster, and he has fulfilled one of the Supreme Guide’s standard responsibilities in recent months by writing five of the Brotherhood’s weekly statements.
Amin also is one of the foremost contemporary exponents of the Brotherhood’s unique approach to implementing the sharia as an “all-embracing concept” through grassroots work that seeks political, and ultimately global, power. In his book The Slandered Obligation: Jihad in the Path of God, which Muslim Brothers study as part of the organization’s required curriculum, Amin echoes Banna’s interpretation of Islam as a comprehensive system that organizes all aspects of life -- from the cradle to the grave. To implement his vision, Amin calls on his readers to practice jihad, which he argues includes fighting unbelief as well as battling the “rotten conditions of human relations, governance, education and the economy.”
Although Amin embraces the notion of violent jihad under certain circumstances, he primarily advocates “struggling” through indoctrination and preaching, or dawa. “Those working in the Islamic movement must start with a complete knowledge of Islam and believe in the dawa’s ability to solve individual and societal problems,” he writes in his treatise. Amin stresses that reforming the individual and society through jihad and dawa are long-term projects that take time and diligence.
Although this gradualist approach to Islamization sets the Brotherhood apart from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which has already declared an Islamic State through brute force, Amin highlights the severe anti-Westernism that both brands of Islamism embrace. He sees Western cultural influence in Muslim lands as a civilizational threat. “Humanity lives in a big brothel,” he writes. “Look at its exterior, its films, galleries, fashion, beauty competitions, clubs, bars, and radios. Look at its crazy voracity for naked flesh, the provocative conditions and licentiousness in literature, art and the media… on top of the deteriorating morality and societal decadence that started to threaten every soul, every family, every gathering. The fate of all this, is destruction and perdition.”
The only way to correct Western-inspired immorality, according to Amin, is spreading the Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam. Indeed, he argues that doing so is an absolute obligation of every Muslim. “In order for our rights to be protected, our dignity conserved, our identity clear, there will be a fight in the path of God with the intent of threatening the enemies, scaring them of the consequences of assaulting Muslims, their lands and their people.” And this religious duty will remain in effect until the Day of Judgment. In other words, the Brotherhood’s strategies -- no matter the obstacles in Egypt -- must persist.
Amin has reiterated this unyielding commitment to the organization’s ideology in his weekly Muslim Brotherhood newsletters. In decrying the current state of corruption and immorality, Amin writes that, “Islam is in need of a state and authority. One of its most important roles is protecting the [Islamic nation’s] creed that today is mocked, in addition to establishing its rituals and observances until it governs all [aspects] of life.” Despite the Brotherhood’s increasingly precarious political position, in other words, Amin sticks to the exact same ideological vision he espoused over 15 years ago. He believes with absolute certainty that Islam is simply “waiting for generations of men and women who believe in what God has promised.” The question, according to Amin, is not if, but when the Islamists return to power. And so he sees no need to compromise on the Brotherhood’s principles or strategy.
Yet the Brotherhood’s ideological stubbornness may threaten the organization’s long-term viability. To be sure, its hundreds-of-thousands-strong rank-and-file will persist: They have all been vetted for their commitment to the Brotherhood’s ideology and have taken an oath to follow group’s leaders’ edicts, and will likely stay convinced for years. But the Brotherhood’s pool of recruits is likely thinning out: It is now a model of political failure, and its leaders’ commitment to a discredited project won’t win many admirers soon.

2014/9/17

【明報】早稻田大學名譽教授加藤典洋專文

日本右傾化源於優越感迷失

【明報專訊】日本右傾化,確實是近期日本必須憂慮的情况,中國國力的急速增長對於經濟持續停滯的日本構成威脅,日本社會失去「優越感」,日中國境爭議只是副產品之一,長此以往,日本與軍國主義結合的可能性甚大。

2010年中國在經濟上超越日本一事,如今想來,也許是日本社會開始出現閉塞感、反中韓感情激化的導火線,這點加上國民對安倍政權的經濟政策的期望,便構成如今日本社會支持安倍政權的基本感情。戰後,日本人視自身為優秀族群的優越感,正是建基於在東亞地區的經濟優勢。然而,日本的經濟優勢,因始於1990年代前半的「迷失二十年」而被削弱,並在2010年以來中國的經濟規模超越日本後明確地喪失,再加上韓國產業急起直追,對日本的主要產業造成打擊,成為孕育嫌惡、排斥中國及韓國的溫牀,安倍內閣則以此為搖籃,登上政治舞台。

1960年實施「政經分離」政策以來,日本「凍結」了對政治課題的追求。戰後日本將政治、外交目標擱置,放棄對國際社會作出任何貢獻的政治努力,一貫採取對美從屬路線。此後,自1980年代中曾根康弘政權以來,為掩飾政治上的空白,自民黨出現徹底的「復古」傾向,採取將戰前日本的政治性與戰後日本的政治性連繫起來的形態,其象徵包括「參拜靖國」(中曾根、小泉、安倍均積極地以參拜靖國為目標)。那是從根本上擱置確立與戰前時代不同的和平主義、近鄰協調、對美「自立」友好(而非對美「從屬」友好)等政治目標的努力所造成的惡果。最終,日本對美從屬持續近70年的不滿在日本社會壓抑累積,成為現時日本年輕一代產生民族主義的溫牀。反中國、反韓國的感情的背後實質上是反美感情,只是日本對於是否直接展示反美感情猶豫不決,並將之顯現為反中國、反韓國的感情。經濟上的打擊與政治上的復古主義(軍國化)相信由此連繫起來。

接下來談談安倍政權的右傾化與此前的右傾化相異、變得更嚴重的理由。

反中反韓背後是反美

首相安倍晉三的政治認識與過往的自民黨領袖並不相同。雖然作為戰後秩序的東京審判單方面將日本定罪有一定問題,但日本已將之接受(1951年簽訂舊金山和約),並回歸戰後的國際秩序。那是包括自民黨內閣在內的歷屆日本政府的一貫立場。不過安倍首相卻抱持將其否定的立場。(2013年2月12日眾議院預算委員會的發言時,安倍曾稱,關於「過往大戰」的總結並非出自日本人自身之手,「東京審判是根據同盟國一方作出的所謂勝利者判斷對日本定罪」等)首相在國會中正式作出如此發言,從1950年代的復古主義傾向被禁絕後,60年代以來至今的日本政壇中前所未見。

日本和平主義精神衰退

我曾在《紐約時報》撰文(7月),指出日本社會戰後經過近70年,由於戰爭的體驗風化,支撐憲法第9條和平條款的和平主義精神、信念漸漸枯竭。經歷過戰爭的人大多已亡故,戰後的和平主義教育在文部科學省的國家主義指引下大幅倒退,其影響逐漸顯現,證據在於特定秘密保護法、參拜靖國、內閣決議通過行使集體自衛權等完全脫離過往日本政府政治外交方針的「右傾化」路線儘管持續不斷,但民意調查卻顯示安倍內閣的支持率仍然高於不支持率。這樣的情况過往未嘗發生。支持安倍內閣的其中一個理由是對其經濟政策的期望,另一理由則是和平主義精神的衰退。

日本社會劣化的因素之一,也許是2011年東日本大地震及福島核事故。事後,社會失去了對過度「右傾化」的抵抗力。百田尚樹以神風特攻為題材的小說《永遠的0》售出480萬冊,其改編電影吸引700萬人收看。日本社會這種變質與劣化從3.11以後急速發展至現時的地步。人們對於「感動」變得非常脆弱,變得情緒化,理性的抵抗力整體弱化。

狹隘民族主義主張保留

安倍首相施政汲取了首次任期失敗的教訓,今次上任後,改以意識上與自己同調者鞏固統治中樞、排除反對者的強權黨內政治為方針,自民黨自身變成對黨內異論沒有容忍力的政黨。對首相的監察機制幾乎無法運作。自民黨的前首相小泉、福田,昔日黨內中樞、前幹事長野中廣務,前官房長官、眾議院議長河野洋平,前幹事長古賀誠等人雖然均表達了反對聲音,但自民黨未有聽取這些前人的聲音,整體復古的年輕議員所持的狹隘民族主義主張得勢。

要抑制安倍政權的矛盾暴走

在野黨整體勢力大幅減少,令在野黨亦轉趨右傾化。2009年8月,眾議院勢力中民主黨佔308席,自民黨佔119席,但2012年12月以來,自民黨佔294席,民主黨只佔55席。其他在野黨中,親政府的有公明黨31席、日本維新會32席、次世代黨19席、大家黨9席,共佔91席。反建制的在野黨中,日本共產黨佔8席、生活黨佔7席、社會民主黨佔2席,合計只佔17席。1990年2月第39屆大選中,自民黨取得275席,而社會黨(現為社會民主黨)則有136席。

現時安倍政權在探索新秩序之際,更着重於利用高昂的敵對感情,以達成自身目的。我認為那是愚蠢的選擇。面對日本此後將步入少子高齡化社會,中國經濟不論好壞均無可避免成為重大的「存在體」。安倍經濟學前期階段透過向國內提供資金,設定通脹目標等,轉換至積極的財政方向。那也許值得試驗。不過在後期階段,在國際上增加與鄰國,特別是中國的貿易,進行技術合作,活化經濟交流,緩和國際緊張等行動則變得必要。

經濟上的需要,與軍國化、復古路線產生矛盾的階段已出現。今後必須考慮到將恢復經濟為主要着眼點,確立區內友好,在互惠關係的基礎上建立新的經濟安定與友好關係,如何抑制、修正現時抱持「矛盾」暴走的安倍政權路線是現時日本的課題。

(編按:本文是作者專誠替本報撰寫的來稿,原為日文,經本報翻譯成中文。)

加藤典洋

早稻田大學 名譽教授

【明報】中日深度報道(一):石原慎太郎

石原慎太郎:日本無甲級戰犯

【明報專訊】兩年前,中日關係突然聚焦於一點。當年的東京都知事(即市長)拋出東京市政府購買釣魚島計劃,觸發日本政府「國有化」釣島,令中日關係迅速惡化。身為始作俑者的他,是中國人眼中最右翼的急先鋒,在東京他是連任3次且民望極高的市長,在日本他的前半生是文壇巨匠、後半生就爭得2020年東京奧運會主辦權,為「迷失二十年」的東瀛億萬國民,注下一道久違的興奮劑,他就是爭議不斷的石原慎太郎。

石原上月在東京接受本報專訪,詳盡回應了左右中日關係的多個敏感問題。

「美擲原子彈 非甲級戰犯行為?」

退任東京都知事後,石原慎太郎仍為日本眾議院議員,上月在國會的議員辦公室會見《明報》記者。日本國會議事堂竣工於中國八年抗戰爆發前的1936年,這是日本國會開會的地方。訪談前其助手特意致電記者,態度誠懇,千萬叮囑,石原表明今次訪問期望集中討論「改善日中關係」問題。訪問當天,記者甫進石原辦公室,助手面露難色,緊張地提醒,石原討厭閃光燈,除了訪問前後准拍照外,訪問期間最好別再用閃光燈,否則他隨時會罵人。
跟電視畫面看到的石原一樣,面色凝重,不苟言笑,當記者問及靖國神社供奉甲級戰犯一事時,石原打斷說﹕「你知道什麼是甲級戰犯嗎?」「這是東京審判時美國人第一次提出的,罪名是破壞和平,這個罪名在這之前的國際法庭是沒有的,是美國為了給日本製造的罪名。如果說破壞和平,美國針對喪失制空權的日本,對東京實施無差別轟炸,一個晚上殺掉20萬人。原子彈更殺了幾十萬人,這不就是甲級戰犯行為?東京審判是不合法的,當時在席的印度法官曾質疑審判有問題,但是主審法官無視此觀點。所以,日本根本不存在甲級戰犯。」

聲言日本當年「被迫」參戰

石原續說﹕「為什麼你們(中國)不批判英國?鴉片戰爭時候英國不是殺了很多人?侵略了你們,為什麼你們無視?日中的確是打過仗,但日本是『被迫』參戰的。」「日中戰爭不能說對錯,日本當時遭(美國)經濟封鎖。日本參與的太平洋戰爭,整體來說是『自衛戰爭』。美國的麥克亞瑟將軍做過見證,美國是承認的。發動戰爭的源頭是美國。」說到這裏, 石原質疑記者不了解太平洋戰爭,反問赫爾備忘錄(Hull note)是誰炮製的?(編按﹕赫爾備忘錄為美國逼令日本從中國撤軍的外交文件,日本右翼分子一直揚言這是觸發太平洋戰爭的起因。)

岳父堂兄弟靈位均在靖國

石原說﹕「 我岳父大人和兩個堂兄弟(3人都是二戰軍人),靈位也在靖國裏面,為什麼我不可以去?」記者問及會把有爭議的靈位移離靖國嗎?石原斬釘截鐵說﹕「難道應該讓至今為止供奉在裏面的人統統搬出去嗎?……我認為天皇也應該參拜靖國神社,我向天皇呼籲過,寫過信。」

為什麼日本不能徹底謝罪,把中日百年歷史恩怨一刀了結?石原淡然說﹕「要承認的日本已經承認了。在東京審判也處決了一批人。」

「我反共不反華」

當記者問及中美日3國關係如何發展時,石原說﹕「中國和日本不會成為日美同盟那樣的關係,因為,中共政府無視人權。我和達賴喇嘛關係很好。我不希望日本成為中國的附庸國。也不想和這樣的中國友好。你知道『通州事件』嗎?中國人對日本人非常殘忍的殺害。這是導致日中戰爭的導火線。我仍然是反共不反華。我也希望今年11月中國主持APEC會議,日中能夠修復關係,不過,中國現在應該很擔心吧,中國漸漸正被世界孤立。」(編按﹕有關觸發中日八年抗戰事件和通州事變的普遍公論, 詳見另稿)

(獨家專訪)

明報記者
______________________

「中國航母簡直nonsense」

【明報專訊】若參拜靖國神社是中日關係難解之結,那日本「國有化」釣魚島更是雙方的死結;中國政府的立場是日本必須承認釣魚島主權存在爭議,然而,現屆日本安倍內閣堅持不承認主權存在爭議,日本眾議院議員石原慎太郎不單支持這取態,更揚言中國是賊喊捉賊的「小偷」。

「小偷總覺得自己正確」

石原說﹕「釣魚島是中國領土這荒唐無稽的表達,我是不接受的……要說有爭議,在爭的不就是中國嗎?我們不接受有爭議這種說法。中國常常侵犯別國領空、領海。你看中越衝突(西沙勘探鑽油台事件)也是中國過來衝撞,日中的問題也好,中越的問題也好,中國都不說真話,看新聞的話可以分得很清楚啊。中國的做法在世界不會得到認同。『小偷』總覺得自己很正確。」

指中國航母非日本威脅

究竟釣魚島問題如何解決?石原答﹕「釣魚島只要我們(日本)一直守護,中國能把釣魚島佔為己有嗎?那裏打不起來,離中國太遠,中國拿不到制空權、制海權,如果真的打起來,中國怎麼保證物資輸送?中國又不擁有海洋艦隊。中國的航空母艦(遼寧號)簡直是nonsense(胡鬧),世界上的專家聽到都會笑,絕對成不了日本的問題,完全毋須擔心。」
石原很自信地說,中國的航母是為了試驗起降飛機而買的,連彈射器都沒有,那樣的航母做不了旗艦,完全不會是日本的威脅。此外,中國的空軍師團距離釣魚島有600公里之遙,日本的空軍基地就在旁邊。

記者問及石原主政下的東京市,曾試圖收購釣魚島,有沒有想過此舉會太過刺激中國?石原答﹕「 中國也可以像東京那樣找島主買島,反正東京和中國不可能發動戰爭……東京應該買了釣魚島的,買了的話國民會很關心。如果釣魚島是中國的,那沖繩也就是中國的。」
(編按﹕東京市一度欲購釣魚島,日本政府最終搶先於2012年9月以20.5億日圓從「島主」手上購入釣魚島,稱為日本「國有化」釣魚島事件。此外,石原在訪問中一直稱呼釣魚島為「尖閣諸島」)
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最愛中國人:鄧小平西門慶

【明報專訊】不少人認為石原慎太郎是「反華急先鋒」,石原卻反駁,聲言自己是反共不反華。他很喜歡中國的詩詞和文學,不過現在的中國「什麼都沒有了」,在文化上沒有新東西,也看不到有魅力的文化。

批訪日中國客沒禮貌

石原批評中國遊客訪日時沒有禮貌。他說﹕「來日本的中國人禮儀不好。不遵守規矩。我當東京都知事的時候教訓過中國人。他們來參觀東京都廳展望台,有很多人在排隊,但他們不排隊,我就發火了。」

記者問及他對中國有何寄語時,石原思索一會答道﹕「如果出現鄧小平這樣的領袖就好了。因為, 我最喜歡的中國人是鄧小平和《金瓶梅》的主人公西門慶。
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中國外交部﹕謬論不值一駁

【明報專訊】針對石原慎太郎的言論,中國外交部發言人華春瑩書面回覆本報稱,「石原的極端言論表明,日本國內確實存在一股企圖為軍國主義侵略歷史翻案的極右勢力,他們的荒謬言論在國際公理和歷史正義面前不值一駁」。國防部發言人辦公室則稱,對日本議員的個別言論不予置評。

華春瑩斥圖為侵略翻案

石原慎太郎認為日本是被迫加入戰爭,「這種觀點是絕對錯誤的」。廣州中山大學教授袁偉時接受本報電話訪問稱,日本對華的侵略是有預謀、有步驟的,不能以「通州事件」或者某一事件來說是日本侵華的引發點。日本侵華的原因可以追溯到日本打破鎖國狀態的時期,原本日本在思想上由儒、佛教起支配作用,開埠之後提倡「國學」,排斥儒佛,借用中國「華夷之辨」的思想,認為自己才是「華夏」,中國本身以及其他國家都是「蠻夷」。袁指出,鴉片戰爭之後,中國轉化為現代社會的速度緩慢,制度上既無改革,經濟發展也遲緩,日本認為有責任領導亞洲,「開化」朝鮮、中國。

專家指日民族主義惡性發展

袁偉時說,1890年日本頒布憲法,但沒有憲政,沒有自由民主的觀念,「他們從制度設計上就出了問題,軍隊不受內閣領導,而是特別成立軍部,受天皇領導,主權在天皇,而不是『主權在民』」。在民族主義的惡性發展之下,「日本即使不侵略中國,也要侵略其他國家」。

袁偉時又說,美國是被迫用原子彈對付日本,死亡人數也遠少於日本侵略戰爭。資料顯示,廣島、長崎死亡共約20萬人,而中國在二戰中死亡的軍民達2500萬人,此外,第一次鴉片戰爭僅死亡幾百人。他又認為,少數日本政客不時講些觸犯中韓感情的話,右翼分子一貫興風作浪,高瞻遠矚的政治家應該以國家利益為重,保持大局穩定,不用理會這些小風波。他留意到中國外交部長王毅早前在中日韓外長會議上提出,爭取2020年成立東亞共同體,「如果成功了,對亞洲乃至世界局勢都起好大作用,歐盟那樣,邊界都同省界差不多,那時釣魚島這些問題好容易解決,剩下的只有經濟矛盾」。

【明報】中日深度報道(一):靖國神社

參拜靖國神社揭秘

【明報專訊】中日百年恩仇,從未一笑泯滅,兩國關係近年急轉直下,明天適逢日本侵略東北的「九一八事變」83周年;《明報》為求「前事不忘,後事之師」,早前遠赴日本,全球首度圖文並茂揭開參拜靖國神社的完整過程,並專訪右翼急先鋒石原慎太郎、親華首相鳩山友紀夫(原名鳩山由紀夫)等,作為明報「深度報道」跳出鯉魚門、明察天下的頭炮。「中日專輯」將一連四期、逢周三刊出,敬希讀者垂注。

靖國神社在中國老百姓眼中可謂「犯眾憎」之地,至今仍是中日之間難以繞開的死結。靖國神社內中究竟有何方「神聖」?日本高官悄悄舉行的「昇殿參拜」又是一個怎樣的儀式?參拜者嚴禁拍攝的本殿內何以有一塊百年古鏡?何以能引發外交風波?本報記者帶同畫師走進靖國神社直擊參拜過程,為讀者揭開它的神秘面紗。

明報記者



供奉246萬戰爭亡靈

靖國神社曾經是日本國家神社,是天皇唯一會去參拜的地方。這裏供奉有明治維新以來戰死的日本軍人及軍屬約246萬人,二戰時日本士兵把死後被祭祀在靖國神社視為最高榮譽。日本戰敗後,靖國神社以宗教機構的形式留存下來,原本不受注目,直至14個甲級戰犯被合祀於此,後來任首相的中曾根康弘以官方身分參拜,才引起軒然大波。此後,橋本龍太郎、小泉純一郎及安倍晉三都曾以首相名義參拜。

靖國神社位於東京市中心的九段下、皇居(天皇居住地)西北面,周邊非常僻靜,綠樹成蔭,與皇居僅隔着一條護城河。每逢8月15日日本戰敗紀念日,穿舊皇軍服、扛軍旗的右翼分子就會聚集。平日為吸引人流而設有跳蚤市場,有市民在此擺攤,還不時有傳統歌舞表演,更像一個遊園地。

神社總面積達10萬平方米,約為香港維園的一半大小,由入口至參拜處共有3個大鳥居(類似牌樓),象徵人神分界。當中最外面的第一鳥居最為宏偉,高25米,青銅製,現存結構是1974年重建,原物在1943年因為腐爛被撤走,另一說是當時戰事吃緊,被拿去做了大炮。穿過3座鳥居及一道神門,才來到靖國神社最核心的地方。

核心區包括3座大殿,最前面是拜殿,垂下的白幔上印有4朵象徵日本皇室的菊花紋,市民、遊客可自由參拜。本殿位於拜殿後,參拜需要申請。在神社最深處,存放着死者名錄「靈璽簿」的奉安殿,則不對外開放。



先繳祭祀費 至少148元

每組參拜者先到參集殿集合,向神女(女性神職人員)繳納不少於2000日圓(約148港元)的祭祀費,稍候片刻,一名身穿白袍的神官前來引導。參拜者需脫鞋,首先走入本殿旁的迴廊,低頭接受神官的修祓之儀(驅邪儀式),神官會在此簡短地念經。然後再隨神官上樓梯步入本殿,整齊地在祭祀台下安靜跪好,神官則拖着長音誦經,為亡魂祈禱。

整個本殿的參拜區十分空曠,室內面積約有200平方米,祭祀台上沒有神像或牌位,中間豎着一面碩大的橢圓形鏡子,四周鑲有木質的鳥形雕刻,前面放有水果等祭品。該鏡是神社供奉的神體之一﹕神鏡。資料顯示,它是用1877年明治天皇捐款所製,被寫進「靈璽簿」的亡靈,據稱被鏡子照過以後,再舉行合祀儀式,就完成了人神合一,即「招魂」。

拜前「修祓」 拜後喝酒

參拜期間,神官用大約兩分鐘時間誦經,內容多不能辨明,之後神官會將名為「玉串」的、帶葉的楊桐樹枝分發給參拜者,示意將玉串獻到前面的台上。最後全體行「二拜二拍手一拜」的正式參拜禮節,默哀片刻後儀式結束。

離開本殿後,參拜者原路返回,神女在迴廊等候,給每人遞上一個裝有清酒的紅碗,參拜者需面向本殿飲下。整個過程很安靜,只聽到有人抽泣的聲音,整個儀式稱為「昇殿參拜」,需時約20分鐘。



「昇殿參拜」需時20分鐘

靖國參拜一直備受爭論,日本國內曾有建議將甲級戰犯搬出靖國分開祭祀。中日問題專家、早稻田大學教授天兒慧指出,分祀曾幾乎成事,小泉時代亦有人提議建立新的國家追悼設施,但遭到黨內安倍派強烈反對。日本戰後社會研究專家加藤典洋則認為,靖國問題並非不能解決,原本靖國神社存在的理由是可以得到天皇的參拜,但昭和天皇不滿合祀甲級戰犯,此後未再參拜,現任天皇也從未參拜,只要天皇的態度不變,問題解決機會仍然很大。

(中日關係系列)

明報深度報道組
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祭甲級戰犯 成中日心病

【明報專訊】靖國神社百多年歷史,並非一開始即是中日關係的絆腳石。轉折在於1978年,神社新任最高神官(廟祝)決定將14名二戰甲級戰犯加入合祭,自此每逢有日本高官參拜靖國神社,必惹來中國高調譴責。

合祀逾2000戰犯

靖國神社源於1868年明治天皇擊潰德川幕府的日本內戰,為祭祀戰死軍人,於1869年興建靖國神社的前身「東京招魂社」。其後靖國神社廣泛祭祀為國犧牲者,亦成為日本天皇唯一鞠躬的對象。

二戰日本戰敗後,審理戰爭責任的遠東國際軍事法庭,判處超過2000名日本人為戰犯。亦因為戰犯身分,這批人死後不能入祀靖國神社。1959年,日本政府認定戰犯也是殉國者,靖國神社即開始將戰犯合祭。不過,開始時合祭的只有乙級、丙級戰犯,亦即虐待戰俘、從事不人道戰爭行為等傳統觀念下的戰犯,多為中、低階之軍士官。

直到1978年,14名被指決策發動侵略戰爭的甲級戰犯等人亦加入合祭,加上日本首相以官式身分參拜,才令靖國神社逐漸成為中日關係的痛處。

2014/9/1

[Foreign Affairs] Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin



According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.
But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. 
Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.
But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.
U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border.
THE WESTERN AFFRONT
As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand.
The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ... The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries.
Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.” 
Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.”
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.
The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion. 
The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.
When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”
CREATING A CRISIS
Imagine the American outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico.
The West’s triple package of policies -- NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion -- added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. 
Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster.
For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them wanted out of Ukraine. 
Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball.
THE DIAGNOSIS
Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. 
Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.
Officials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them.
To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. 
But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”
The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer.
Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe.
And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little difficulty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement. After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. 
So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the first decade of this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.”
In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. 
BLAME GAME
In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. 
Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. 
This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. 
Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people -- one-third of Ukraine’s population -- live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of the resulting sanctions.
But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not offensive.
A WAY OUT
Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-profile banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sectors of the Russian economy. 
Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule.
Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government.
The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. 
There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.
To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers. 
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States.
One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor.
Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially if its defense is not a vital interest. Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. 
Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time -- and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course.
Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. 
The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.