（一）亞洲巨型都市的步步崛起
Vanessa Collingridge / 2014年6月30日
無論你在深圳中心商業區的哪一座摩天大廈內向外眺望，都會有種城市無邊無際之感。
目力所及，幾乎全然不間斷的龐然大物，錚亮高樓群和鱗次櫛比的低矮辦公樓、倉庫，還有車輛川流不息的主幹道，這就是城市景觀的經典標誌。借用迪士尼動畫人物巴斯光年（Buzz Lightyear）的話來說，城市景觀似乎延伸向“無窮遠處！”
但有一點常被人們忽略，這種城市景觀代表著整個人類歷史中最卓越非凡的變革之一。西方有倫敦、巴黎等大城市，而亞洲，則是特大城市在不斷地崛起壯大。
特大城市一般指常住居民超過1000萬的城市。回顧1950年代初，這樣的城市在全球都只有兩個——紐約和東京；據聯合國資料顯示，到2010年，特大城市數量飆升至24個。據聯合國的預測，在2025年將有39個這樣的超大型城市。這些數位揭示了我們是如何選擇、組織我們的生活的。但進一步挖掘這些資料之後，另一個迷人的趨勢也得到揭示：發展速度最快的新興城市並非位於歐美的傳統強國中，而是在亞洲國家和南半球國家。 2010年，全球特大城市中亞洲只佔其九；根據預測，滾動15年後會有39座特大城市，其中21座將會是亞洲城市，其中人口增長量可能性最大的是位於南亞和東亞的新興城市，或目前較默默無聞的城市。
不過，城市人口或絕對規模的快速增長，並非是令這些特大城市充滿吸引力的唯一原因。這些城市的外觀、感受和行為方式也都均全然不同。
“無論是從人文還是商業的角度來看，我都會選擇'能量'這個詞，這在亞洲尤為明顯。”英國列斯大學東亞國際政經教授克里斯多夫·鄧特（Christopher Dent）說， “這些特大城市的外貌特點並不一定都與經典的曼哈頓型天際線類似：香港、新加坡確實高樓林立，但有些新興城市卻並沒有多少摩天大廈。不過，它們確有共同之處，那就是活力四射的中心商業區，以及能為城市輸入能量的龐大人流。
“其他地區的城市也在不斷壯大、彼此融合，但亞洲城市的這一發展進程要快出許多，因此無論是發展規模還是發展速度，給人的印像都最為深刻。這些巨型城市均為創業活力和商業活力的產物——它們通過吸引國內外企業家前來發展而自我壯大。我每次去曼谷、馬尼拉、東京，最讓我震撼的都是這些城市的能量。”
亞洲的大規模城市化起步也許晚，但規模及速度都是空前驚人的。
“以中國為例，”克里斯多夫•鄧特說，“也許你不久前還將中國經濟歸類為農村經濟。該國1960年代的城市人口只佔總人口的9%，加上戶籍制度的限制，人們很難搬離自己居住和工作的地方。”
“如今，隨著那些限制的放鬆，支持城市化政策的出臺，城市人口已超過總人口的50%，在過去四十年左右的時間中，約五億人搬進了城市。中國已經轉型，泰國、印尼、菲律賓、馬來西亞也是如此——這份名單還在繼續擴大。”
陳仲偉（Frank Chen）是跨國房地產企業世邦魏理仕（CBRE）中國區研究部執行董事，他密切關注著亞洲城市的人口大爆炸。
“儘管許多亞洲國家都在大刀闊斧地城市化，但中國一直以來的發展都叫人刮目相看，尤其是在2000年之後。當時的城市人口約為35%，而截至去年末，城市人口已漲至54 %。這是有史以來最大規模的人口遷徙，在全球任何地方都不曾出現過。”
當下城市化進程之快之壯觀的一個跡像是，“特大”一詞已不足以形容頂級的城市巨人了。這些城市已經加入了“超特大城市”精英俱樂部。中國有兩個這樣的“超特大城市”：北京和上海。
“北京、上海、廣州和深圳都是特大城市，”陳仲偉說，“但北京和上海可謂鶴立雞群，人口已遠超2000萬。”
那麼，究竟是什麼因素推動或吸引人們朝這些龐然大物聚集呢？
“幾乎可以說經濟就是唯一的原因，人們都是為了追求更高的薪酬。”克里斯多夫•鄧特說，“農村以農業和採掘業為主，而這兩類行業的薪水普遍低於製造業，因此令農村人對城市產生嚮往，畢竟那裡工廠數量更多。另外，城市的基礎設施'更安逸'——比如更好的交通、更充足的供電、更便捷的通訊、更多更高品質的醫療和教育服務，一般來說，城市給一個家庭提供的前景確實更多——這就是亞洲的情況。”
現居上海的陳仲偉篤定道：“是工作！最好的工作絕大多數都集中在主要城市。單看數據：《財富》雜誌世界500強企業，上海能找到493家，北京有480家——這些企業在為當地帶來工作崗位的同時，也帶來了商機，以及更好的資源，比如教育和醫療。”
這些其實都是他的親身經歷。
“城市裡有更好的工作機會，所以我年少時就從農村搬到了（廣州）城裡，當時的我與絕大多數年輕人一樣，雄心勃勃，壯志滿懷，欲開創更美好的人生。事實也正是如此——儘管大城市裡擁堵和污染的問題很嚴重，但確實提供了更多的發展機會。對包括我在內的絕大多數人來說，進城的決定是值得的。”
27歲的尹晶晶（音譯）正在深圳攻讀語言和跨文化研究專業的碩士學位。她的故事很典型，能代表亞洲的許多新城裡人。
“1995年，我們一家為過上更好的生活搬到深圳。做此決定的主要原因是鄧小平推出了改革政策——深圳（在1980年）成為了全國第一個經濟特區，發展迅猛，也帶來了大量的工作機會。搬家前，我父母是江西省某發電廠的職工，而江西是中國最不發達的省份之一。父母希望我能擁有更美好的未來，所以他們在從朋友兒子處聽得對方搬去深圳的故事，以及深圳機會如何之多後，也帶著我們搬了家。”
“第一次見到深圳時，我大概八歲，我記得自己對它的第一印像是，巨大而忙碌的城市，所有人看上去都那麼年輕！在80年代和90年代初，當地工廠數量眾多，大量18、19歲，沒受過什麼教育的農村年輕人被吸引而來，而現在，深圳完成了產業升級，那些工廠都已遷往別處，所以在此工作的人，年紀普遍更大了——但時至今日，深圳大街上仍鮮有老年人的身影。”
“兩年前，深圳當地媒體做了一項調查，調查顯示深圳人口的平均年齡為28歲，而現在的平均年齡漲到了33歲左右——但這個年齡也已經非常非常年輕了。”
尹晶晶明顯深愛著這座養育她的城市。
“儘管這座城市並沒有北京、上海那樣悠久的歷史，但它充滿活力與刺激，'年輕'已經成為深圳的一種優勢，成為這座富有創新力量的城市的身份標誌之一。
“當然，它的面積遠小於另外那兩座城市，但這就意味著居民穿梭於市內時，花在巴士或列車上的時間少了。我的住處距離工作地有15公里左右，所以上下班得坐上差不多半小時的巴士，但這種情況並不算糟，我完全可以忍受，郊區的交通更糟糕一些。”
就連無處不在的污染也沒有給她造成困擾。
“真的沒有那麼糟糕。其實，就空氣質素而言，深圳是排在中國前二十名城市之列的，這裡目前正在集中力量發展高科技，所以絕大多數的重工業企業都搬去了東莞。”
其實，市內極其不完善的排水系統才是尹晶晶唯一的擔憂和不滿。
“深圳的管道系統糟糕透頂。當猛烈暴風雨來襲，坐在自己公寓裡就能欣賞海景了！向樓下望去，到處都是水。如果這種情況出現在歷史古城，我還能接受，但出現在深圳，我真是接受不了，它明明是座那麼年輕的城市。”
就在35年前，深圳這片廣闊的土地上還只有幾個小漁村。今天，它已經是中國發展最快的特大城市之一，根據最近一次人口普查的結果，深圳人口已突破1000萬大關。不過，眾所周知，官方資料並不可靠，基本不可能涵蓋最新人口流入狀況。真實性受到廣泛認可的資料是接近1500萬，而非官方資料甚至高達1900萬。
但尹晶晶並不擔心城市的擴張，相反，她對此相當歡迎。
“建築完工速度令人震驚：據說國貿購物中心整個的樓層建設只用了三天！這是一項記錄，但並非什麼特例，它完全符合城市在過去幾十年中的發展方式。深圳會越來越大，會吸收更多周邊地區都是必然的。當地規劃了眾多新區，其中一些將有效連接深圳、香港兩地。我認為這是件好事——我們將吸引來更多外企，與香港建立起更緊密的聯繫，這樣一來，我們就可以免簽赴港了。”
由鄧小平開始的這項事業，現正在李克強總理的領導下繼續快速發展：他將城市化描述為經濟發展的主要驅動力之一，他確信城市仍將是中國的未來所在。
“如果你仔細注意下中國經濟發展的地理分佈就會發現，自80年代以來，改革的紅利絕大多數都流入了城市而非農村。”陳仲偉說，“城市受益越多，前往城市的農村居民也就越多。如果你將中國主要城市一一梳理一遍就會發現，它們在過去二三十年裡都經歷了快速發展。”
但陳仲偉發現了這種人口遷徙中的細微變化。
“在過去的幾十年中，地方政府為了吸引外資，給外國跨國企業提供了稅收和租金上的優惠。不過，儘管人們仍舊將留下世界500強企業視作推進發展的主要方式，但我國企業，無論是規模還是重要性都在不斷擴大，所以追趕外企的壓力也相應減少了。再者，沿海地區政府渴望通過吸引附加值高的企業在當地落戶來優化當地產業結構。”
這一切對房地產市場又意味著什麼呢？
“至少就北京而言，基本就是供小於求。”陳仲偉解釋道，“2009年到2012年間，北京辦公室租金翻了一番，金融街上辦公室租用成本躋身世界第三、四位，僅次於倫敦西區和香港中環。”
成本如此之高，也無怪乎特大城市的城市性質會不斷發生改變了。
“中國城市普遍擯棄向外擴張，選擇在現存宅地上投資開發兩個、甚至三個中心商業區。將現有宅地改造成完整的中心商業區並非易事，但卻又實實在在地發生著：天津已新增三個中心商業區，分別位於濱海新區、響螺灣和於家堡。隨著郊區地價飆升，各地政府都非常歡迎在郊區開發新中心商業區的專案，因為收益極其可觀。有些地方政府已有超過50%的收入來自土地銷售，因此土地銷售也可看作是造成這一變化的主要驅動力。不過，另一些城市需要新建的原因只是舊的已破敗而已。”
香港能夠向外發展的空間非常有限，因此也積極採用了這種“多中心”的發展模式。陳錦平（Marcos Chan）是陳仲偉同事，任世邦魏理仕港澳臺研究部門主管，他一直都在密切關注香港的發展。
“如果你問我香港如何能發展成為特大城市，”他說，“至少就商業地產來說，答案就是在九龍東開發戰略性'中心商業區2'。至今，這一方法已經沿用了10到15年，觀塘和九龍灣的老工業區內有大量廢棄的工廠和倉庫，政府為了促進商業發展，對這些地區進行了再分區。中環仍將是香港排名第一的中心商業區這一點我並不懷疑，但大家也可以預見，九龍東將發展成為香港特區最重要的辦公空間供應區。正如我們所見，一些大型銀行已根據各部門性質對其作了地理性拆分——將面向客戶、拉業務的部門留在中環，因為留在中環能更靠近股票交易所、政府各部門總部和許多銀行客戶，但工作在辦公室內即可完成的部門都遷到了九龍東，那裡的租金相對較低，連續空間更充足。”
但在頭條新聞的背後，我們要知道，亞洲這些特大城市無休止的發展除了帶來好處，也必然有其代價。對克里斯多夫·鄧特來說，最大的難題就是環境挑戰：他們該拿電“怎麼辦”？
“現今這種大規模的城市化非常耗電，而這些城市中有許多是依賴位於數百英里外的發電廠供電，這不僅給當地帶來了電能供給和污染的問題，還造成了全球性問題。當然，有觀點認為住在公共交通發達、樓宇密集的大城市更節能，但城市物質條件非常豐富，城市居民的生活方式高度依賴物質；他們對電能的消耗遠超農村。中國所面臨的這些問題尤其嚴重，甚至出現了外遷危機——外國人不願意住在北京這樣霧霾重、沙塵大的地方，北京也知道這個問題必須解決，但這樣做不僅是為了吸引外商資本，也是為了替當地居民謀福祉。”
“今年3月，中國政府啟動了一場空氣污染'攻堅戰'——不過他們也承諾要將'權力還給人民'，所以具體發展尚難把握。”克里斯多夫•鄧特說，“當今中國，污染已超越吸煙，正威脅著更多人的生命。另外，對腐敗和貧富差距日益擴大的擔憂，以及特大城市內的社會緊張狀態，也已突然成為不容忽視的問題。”
不過，對於接受過良好教育的年輕人來說，特大城市讓他們看到了實現更好生活的可能，至少現在是如此。
“我真的很熱愛深圳。”尹晶晶說，“這裡讓我獲得了踏實的歸屬感。這裡的機會數不勝數——因為這裡大都是年輕人，所以社交很活躍。我希望自己能在未來幾年中在大型國際企業中謀得一份工作，但我並不想離開深圳。這座城市幾乎可以滿足你對優質生活的所有需求。這裡政府工作效率高，生活便捷，能滿足我的一切需求。”
“我又怎麼會想要搬去別處呢？”
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（二）水泥叢林所面臨的危險
Vanessa Collingridge / 2014年7月4日
從香港出發，驅車一小時即可抵達一塊建築工地，滿地都是紅棕色的土。在卡車碾壓出的一道道車轍間，數名頭戴安全帽的男子正在討論著這塊15平方公裡的荒地的改造計畫，這裡很快就會以“珠三角的曼哈頓”之名為人們所熟知。
前海是現代城市中心的典型代表，其正式名稱為“前海深港現代服務業合作區”。
從照片上看，它就像是從星球大戰中走出來的一樣：眾多摩天大樓在這片被回收的濱海土地上拔地而起，排成了一個巨大的弧形，如哨兵般將圓形的海港環繞其中。寬廣的林蔭大道和幾何形的格局體現出了井然的秩序和良好的管理：全球資本的安全港灣。
由於這片區域已被劃定為特別經濟區，深圳新的國際金融區將於2020年在這裡建成，屆時，年輕的新國際金融區將成為香港中環、美國華爾街和倫敦金融城這三個世界級金融巨人的競爭對手。
“前海是否將成為香港的競爭對手已成為人們熱議的話題，”跨國房地產企業世邦魏理仕（CBRE）的港澳臺研究部門主管陳錦平（Marcos Chan）說，“深圳這裡有一塊面積巨大的土地，最多可以建約1.5億平方呎辦公空間，如此巨大的空間潛力為其轉型成為商業服務、金融服務和專業化服務的新戰略中心提供了切實有力的條件。當地還提供了大量激勵措施，吸引企業來此落戶。
它藉助的是一個史無前例的優勢：儘管前海在實際區劃上屬於中國大陸，但它有可能將香港的法制框架引入到當地的某些商業領域中來。 ”
在過去的12個月中，已有超過10塊地皮售出，並且它們的開發商已經破土動工。
“這些地皮面積巨大，”陳錦平說，“所以開發商們往往需要承擔相當巨大的成本——每平方米的樓面價在8000元人民幣（合1萬港元）到2.8萬元人民幣之間。而且人們不僅在前海看到了商機：儘管前海目前幾乎還只是塊建築工地，但據傳聞證據顯示，深圳人已經開始在距離前海最近的住宅房產市場進行投機買賣了。”
亞洲特大城市系列報導之一：亞洲巨型都市的步步崛起（以及“超級城市圈”何以會成為未來的巨型都市）
不過，對前海而言，作為這一區域的後來者，除了相對影響力，還有更多的東西要面對。它若要擴大自身重要性，就需要與珠三角的各大重要城市連接起來，創造出全球最大的城市群，據聯合國預計，這個城市群的人口將有望達到令人難以置信的1.2億。
儘管在200年前，“城市”人口只佔全球總人口的3%，但截至2010年，這一數字已經超過了50%，預計到2050年，會有70%的人將自己劃歸為城市居民。人們普遍認為這是人類迄今為止所面臨的最大變革，身處這場變革中的我們實際已經成為了城市物種，城市的數量越來越多，規模越來越大。目前，全球十分之一的人口都定居在“特大城市”——人口超過1000萬的城市——不過，這一定義似乎也已經趕不上城市發展的規模了。單就中國來說，北京、上海已經被列為了“超特大城市”，人口超過2000萬。但在一些重要地區，比如珠三角和長三角，巨型城市會彼此融合，形成一種嶄新的城市空間——不再是特大城市，而是特大城市群（megaregion）。
“事實確實如此：我們正看著自己進入一個完全嶄新的領域，”香港大學建築學院院長克裡斯·韋伯斯特（Chris Webster）教授說，“現在的城市性質已完全不同——它們屬於一種全新的城市結構。工業時代的城市都是傳統的單一中心結構，比如倫敦和紐約，它們都是以通訊中心和火車站為城市中心。不過，在20世紀的下半葉，多中心開始成為主流的城市形態。這些形態出現在上下班通勤時間在三小時以上的城市，比如在地鐵和高架列車出現前的曼谷，為了讓居民能更輕鬆地管理日常生活，曼谷有效地將城市分成多個中心。 ”
“不過，隨後出現了兩種情況：開羅、東京、伊斯坦布爾、墨西哥城等單一中心的特大城市規模進一步擴大，人口達到或超過2000萬，而在珠三角和長三角地區，往往是四五個五百萬到七百萬人口的城市攜手發展，彼此融合，這樣就誕生了一種截然不同的城市形態：特大城市群（megacluster或megaregion均可）。”
克裡斯·韋伯斯特對全球新出現的城市形態都進行了研究。
“一切都處於快速變化之中，理論根本跟不上實際發展的速度，正如官方人口普查資料也跟不上新移民數量的實際增長一樣。我傾向於將城市分為兩類，一是自發的，先忽略政府管控因素，它們主要是通過人們以合法途徑自發來此定居而實現發展壯大的，需歷經時日才能進化為更穩定、更符合城市特徵的存在，比如墨西哥城；二是規劃出來的，以中國模式為例，先有城市規劃，才開始城市興建，在居民來此定居前，就已經建成了讓人眼花繚亂的基礎設施。
“哪種模式最好？這是個大問題！沒人知道答案！在應對城市化所帶來的巨大增長方面，二者都有其成功之處，但也都造成了浪費，不過，我個人喜歡自髮型增長模式，這一模式能夠讓窮人與富人比鄰而居，並更充分地利用城市空間。你光看看規劃過度的深圳林蔭大道就知道了，大片空間遭到了浪費：它長得很像香榭麗舍大道，但寬度卻是香榭麗舍大道的三、四倍！”難題也來了：隨著市內空間越來越緊缺，要如何安置不斷增長的人口呢？
克裡斯•韋伯斯特笑了。
“這是個很棘手的問題。”他說，“有些特大城市通過翻新基礎設施來應對人口增長，但此舉會讓城市密度越來越大。以曼谷的艾拉灣交叉路口附近為例，當地硬是在高密度的建築群中間又塞入了四五層的交通網絡。當然，你還有另一種選擇，伊斯坦布爾等城市正在進行一項令人難以置信的項目，它們將對住宅區內60%到70%的區域進行重新安排，對於一座主要靠自發形成的大城市來說，此舉將在未來的幾十年中實現有效的城區重建——不過，要運用這一方法必須有強有力的土地重建法規和強大政府的支持。”
“以增加城市空間密度來應對人口增長，是非常典型的亞洲風格，”香港城市大學能源及環境學院院長陳仲良（Johnny Chan）教授說。
“歐洲更傾向於制定法規，限制建築物的高度和建築物之間的密度，而亞洲不同，亞洲城市往往沒有這麼多自我保護的措施，它們為了最大程度地利用空間，都是將建築往盡可能高，盡可能密的方向發展。”
另外，在新興特大城市不斷奮勇發展的過程中，似乎還有其他不具備多少實用性的因素在發揮著作用。
“你會在中國看到越來越多的超級摩天大樓，這是因為地方政府都喜歡在自己的城市打造標誌性建築，那是它們的驕傲所在。”陳錦平說，“北上廣等大都市都有500米以上的巨型高樓在建，即將投入使用。上海甚至將擁有一座超過600米的高樓。這些建築的樓層數都在100層以上，它們不僅足以代表自己的城市，還能夠代表世界一些最高端的辦公租用空間——在我看來，深圳前海沒有任何要放棄這種發展模式的理由。”
不過，要是你已經高到極限了又該怎麼辦呢？
“如果這座城市位於海邊，或是像香港一樣的島嶼，那麼另一個選擇是通過大規模荒地開墾項目，將城市往海裡修，或者往地下修，”克里斯·韋伯斯特說。 “在過去的50到60年裡，我們已經讓下水道系統等公用事業設施、地鐵、停車場和人行道走入了地下，在最近的30到40年間，東京、亞特蘭大、香港銅鑼灣等地也把購物中心修到了地下——照此看來，工業、酒店和餐廳又為什麼不能進入地下呢？”這一地下發展趨勢中，最驚人的例子就是北京的地下防空洞。
“它開始於集中規劃時代，當時政府要求所有的高層建築都必須有地下防空洞——但這些防空洞從未使用過。”克里斯·韋伯斯特說，“在這座租金堪比天價的特大城市中，人們偷偷非法佔用這些防空洞也就成為了自然而然的事了。我喜歡稱呼這些地下居民為'鼠人'或'鼠族'（。它非常像《2020》（Blade Runner）裡的場景，但在（麻省理工學院和南加州大學）最近的一項聯合研究中，安妮特·金（Annette Kim）教授給出了一個保守預測，現居北京地下防空洞的鼠人數量可能有100萬。”
在密度超高的特大城市中，受其黑暗面之苦的並非只有無技術的流動工人。
研究人員對中國社會中最為邊緣化的群體進行了研究，他們發現，廣東所謂的“蟻族”，就為了能夠獲得一份工作而居住在過度擁擠的城市公寓中，生活條件非常惡劣。
據克裡斯·韋伯斯特說，在廣州、深圳的高密度城市村落中都有蟻族聚居。
令香港蒙羞的是，這里大概生活著10萬“籠民”。香港是全球最富有的城市之一，而籠民們每個月支付約1300港元的房租，租住在臭名昭著的籠屋（由金屬絲網隔起來的多層床位）、屋頂棚屋、或過度細分的群租房中。
“當土地過度擁擠，房價已攀至最頂峰，城市人口能住到哪裡去？”克裡斯·韋伯斯特問。 “正常情況下，人們不會認為他們所居住的地方（適合）人類居住。他們這樣做只是為了獲得一份'足夠好'的薪水——而政府容忍這樣的情況存在也只是為了讓城市正常運作。”
“底線在哪？還能降得多低？我曾與一戶深圳家庭聊過天，他們家由夫妻二人和一個十多歲的兒子組成，住在某城市村落一棟自建房的七樓。他們的房間被二次分割過，除去一張床就只剩下半張床大小的空間——大概三到四平方米……住三個人。他們不得不輪流睡覺。這聽著已經非常恐怖了，但還要再給如此小的空間加上四層分時床位，讓四平方米的房間裡住進八個人。我認為這已經逼近底線了。”
克裡斯·韋伯斯特正在研究高密度城市生活對人身體健康和心理健康的影響。
“通過事例，我們知道住在高層建築中對人，尤其是女性的心理健康不利，我們還知道這裡的中國人都戴眼鏡並不僅僅是個文化定勢：傳聞其實都是真的。香港人受著高度近視的折磨——原因也許是，這裡的孩子生活在狹窄的空間中，目光被局限在三到四米之內，也可能是住處的採光太差。而最大的可能是，二者皆有。”
城市化是否正影響著人類的進化呢？ “很有可能。”克裡斯·韋伯斯特說，“我們已經知道，環境會對人的健康產生巨大影響，而環境與人類遺傳特徵之間的相互作用是個非常有趣的研究領域，目前正受到越來越多的關注。
實際上，香港大學建築學院和醫學院就正在建立專門研究這一相互作用關係的全球中心。
對陳仲良來說，他最擔憂的是亞洲城市化新浪潮對環境的影響。
“亞洲的特大城市與北美洲、歐洲（的那些）差異甚大，因為前者的人口密度往往要龐大得多，尤其是在中國、印度、泰國、韓國和日本這些國家。這就會造成大量的問題，比如污染。以香港的彌敦道或皇后大道中為例，這裡有所謂的'城市街道峽谷'，道路兩側的建築物靠得很近、相互平行就會形成街穀，這種街穀會阻斷光線進來，並阻止污染物散去。
再加上亞洲人把汽車當做社會地位的象徵，對其鍾愛有加，住在這裡真的是難逃空氣質素問題，更不必說肯定還有交通擁堵的問題了。 ”
不過，陳仲良認為，能源消耗和氣候變化造成的雙重災難才是亞洲城市化長遠可持續性發展所面對的最大威脅。
“與許多歐洲國家相比，我們浪費了大量的能源。我們的建築在修建時並沒有考慮採用節能措施——比如安裝雙層玻璃和隔熱材料，甚至是安裝太陽能發電設備——因為安裝這些東西的成本非常昂貴，就算政府有強制施加嚴格的規劃限制，人們往往也不會嚴格遵守，何況這種情況基本不存在。”
“氣候變化只會讓事情越來越糟。”
隨著氣候越來越炎熱，我們將需要更多的空調設備來給本就不節能的建築物降溫，這就又會導致更多二氧化碳的產生，最終形成惡性循環。不過氣候變化除了會導致溫度升高外，還會帶來更大的降雨量，所以洪水氾濫的情況很可能會進一步增多。
由此產生的問題是：亞洲絕大多數的特大城市形成於1980年代和1990年代，當時設計的雨水道相對較小，無法應付如今龐大的降雨量，或者說應付不了氣候變化的影響。洪水已成為現代城市的一大隱憂，尤其是那些正在修建地鐵的城市——不過，沿海城市的擔憂甚至還要更甚於它們，而這些城市還容易受到颱風和風暴潮的破壞。 ”
不過，有悖我們意願的是，氣候變化還有可能造成更多旱災。
“我們的水資源其實是在減少的。”陳仲良說。
“在亞洲城市，水非常重要。試想一下：沒電我們還能活下去，但沒水卻不行。隨著人口越來越多，工業化進一步發展，電力生產增加，污染問題很可能進一步加劇，從而給本就有限的供水雪上加霜，水也因此成為了現今人們的一個巨大擔憂。
“這些都是非常嚴重的問題，需要政府和規劃者的注意，因為大城市一旦成型，基礎設施就很難翻新。香港目前正在考慮氣候變化可能帶來的洪水氾濫和海平面上升問題——在2012年，香港為了控制二氧化碳排放，通過了《建築物能源效益條例》，施加強制管控——不過中國、泰國和越南等國家都需要更嚴肅地思考這個問題，因為問題真的非常嚴重。”
“同樣地，新加坡和日本正在非常積極地進行水的回收利用，也在修建海水淡化工廠，但這些專案都非常耗電，本身就會造成一些問題。”
在克裡斯·韋伯斯特看來，這個問題的解決之道在於提前做出更好的計畫。
“目前最至關重要的事情，”他說，“是為能源、建築物、住宅建築等等投資研發一套可替代的科技，這樣一來，當選擇替代途徑的利大於成本時，我們就不會毫無準備了。在特大城市生活所受的限制複雜、多元且相互關聯，所以，如果不能協調投資，發揮創新性思維思考我們這些城市物種的未來，就很容易坐失良機。
“我認為，這些挑戰中有許多是亞洲可以解決的。”陳仲良說，“提到可再生能源，建築物太過密集，導致光線昏暗，空間狹窄，確實給太陽能和風能的使用造成了困難——不過你可以將建築物的玻璃牆換成'光伏產品'（BIPV），它們能夠在光線照射下為你供電。”
“另外一種發電方式是小規模焚化發電，這在日本、韓國和新加坡都應用得非常成功，與其他方式相比，這種方法幾乎不會對當地環境造成污染。你還可以通過碳中和技術，利用食物殘渣或農業殘留物來生產生物氣或生物燃料，再將這些能源用於當地發電。這項技術已經存在，並正在臺灣、日本等地應用，不過，要更廣泛地在城市內推廣使用，還需要當地政府提供更好的組織和管理。它無疑也能適用於香港這樣住宅區密度高的城市。”
人們可以從源頭收集廢物，就地利用這些廢棄物來發電，這樣就能同時解決垃圾污染和二氧化碳污染的問題。
似乎隨著我們的城市及其問題越來越龐大，解決之道卻需要想得越來越小了。
“未來的出路將在微計畫或納米級計畫上，”陳仲良說，“將建在城市外的傳統發電廠轉變為分散在市內各處的發電設備，此舉能夠將傳統發電廠造成的電力輸送問題一併解決。光伏建築一體化（BIPV）、廢棄物發電、節能、甚至是設計能使用電動汽車的住宅區——這些只是有助於實現特大城市可持續發展的一部分創意而已。”
加上許多特大城市都在沿海地區，我們還應該考慮如何利用海洋潮汐來發電，因為這是可再生的能源中唯一可以預測的。
不過有一點確實非常重要，那就是政府要劃撥資金，支援可持續技術的研發，還要製定相關法律，以胡蘿蔔加大棒的方式讓人們將這些技術運用到實際生活中去，好令它們都能發揮應有的作用。 ”
不過，從根本上來說，陳仲良還是認為，當能源、水和氣候變化問題變得迫在眉睫，政府和人民就會別無選擇，只能行動起來。
“我認為隨著亞洲的不斷發展，教育的日益普及和意識的不斷提升，人們將會認識到自己目前的生活方式是不利於可持續發展的。這也許是個漫長的過程，但我認為人民和政府終將醒悟過來，攜手合作，無論是在地方，還是國與國之間，都能共同計畫並共用最佳的實踐方法，尤其是當問題變得迫在眉睫之時，我對此充滿希望。
“為什麼臺北可以將其食物殘渣進行分離和回收，而香港做不到？為什麼香港的雨水道可以應對強降雨，而深圳做不到？我們需要互相學習，讓人們意識到身邊有讓生活過得好且可持續的選擇。”
“這並不是件容易的事，但卻是件可以做到的事。”
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（三）“特大城市群”的崛起
Vanessa Collingridge / 2014年7月18日
“在城市化的歷史中，我們所居住的城市從未發展到今天這般龐大！”香港大學建築學院院長克裡斯·韋伯斯特（Chris Webster）教授這樣對記者說。儘管他研究建築環境已有30年，但仍不難聽出他語氣中的欽佩之情。
“我們目前面臨的是一場完全嶄新的討論，關注的是城市的交通、通訊、結構和系統；甚至還有國際邊界的意義。”
克裡斯·韋伯斯特所指的新型城市結構就是他口中的“特大城市群”（megacluster/megaregion）——超大規模的城市向彼此內部擴張，進而創造出從德里到孟買，或者從香港到珠三角最遠邊界這樣的巨型城市走廊。這種驚人的現像在全球均有發生，只是在亞洲國家和所謂的南半球國家尤為顯著，這些國家的城市化速度和規模既令分析人士震驚，又令城市政府難以招架。
但這種現象又並非在人們的意料之外。四年前，全球的城市化發展到達轉捩點；人類成為了城市物種，過半數的人住在城鎮。據聯合國稱，亞洲城市人口將從2011年的19億飆升至2050年的33億，屆時，亞非兩洲城口人口增長比例的總和將占到全球總量的86%。這不僅是人口規模的改變，也是城市潛能的改變，這種改變已經讓強大的城市走廊地區感受到了襲來的陣陣焦慮。
“因為目前的形勢和發展速度並不明朗，聯合國、世界銀行等觀察機構都非常擔心某些城市會往極端發展——它們已經發展得過於混亂、過於龐大了——並正引起人們對城市存亡的恐慌。”克裡斯·韋伯斯特說。
“這種情況在過去40年左右的時間裡曾多次發生，或者，城市人口首次突破百萬大關時，這種情況也會發生；當與歐洲接壤的伊斯坦布爾和開羅的人口達到1000萬時，上述情況就發生了；目前，中國正在設立衡量基準，但造成問題的根源與其說是這1000萬人口，不如說是人口超過1000萬後，城市的走向何在。”
目前，業內和學界的分析人士都爭先恐後地想要弄清楚特大城市群正常運轉的實際方式：在這些龐大的城市群中，誰是贏家，誰是輸家？特大城市群的未來究竟會是什麼樣子？
對跨國房地產企業世邦魏理仕（CBRE）的港澳臺研究部門主管陳錦平（Marcos Chan）來說，這是一個關鍵時刻。
“目前，這個問題已經引發了大量討論，圍繞前海（位於香港西北邊）戰略性開發的討論尤為熱烈。
我們很有可能看到香港、深圳、廣州、珠海、甚至澳門，合併為一個龐大的大都市區，不過，儘管前海有發展成為大型金融中心的潛力，但我認為，在前海對珠三角發展越來越重要，越來越具有戰略意義的同時，香港的卓越地位和國際身份不會發生改變。 ”
不過，新的城市秩序並非只對商業重要而已。特大城市群為我們帶來了大量的挑戰，尤其是身為某個城市群居民的你該如何稱呼自己。比如說，你將會是香港人、深圳人，還是深港人？
這一前景令陳錦平忍俊不禁。 “我生在香港，長在香港，所以肯定是，也將一直是香港人，絕對不會變成深港人。”
這些城市群似乎並不會隨著覆蓋面越來越廣，而朝著單一化方向發展，各城市仍將保留住自身的獨特之處。換句話說，小依然美麗——只不過這裡的“小”是被“特大”包括在內的。
“我從未遇到過認為自己住在珠三角的人，”克裡斯·韋伯斯特說。 “只有規劃者會使用這個代表群體概念的術語，因為，在我看來，在大陸地方政府對人民的管理力度是最強的，所以人們會以地方定義自己的身份；；與此同時，香港人會驕傲地覺得自己跟大陸人截然不同。”
不過，更有趣的也許是新興特大城市和特大城市群對自己身份的認知中所釋放出的地緣政治暗示。
當它們的規模變得足夠大，經濟實力變得足夠強，可以對單一民族獨立國家的統治權構成挑戰時，又會發生什麼呢？
“已有證據表明，城邦國家正在崛起，就算沒有再現城邦國家的形式，也至少在重現它的功能。”克裡斯·韋伯斯特說，“目前，倫敦、北京、上海都已具備國家級的盈利能力，有種說法是，位於珠三角和長江流域的特大城市群已經在內部各城市間取得了能與中央政府抗衡的政治地位和經濟地位，這一說法也許並沒有錯。
“不過，我認為目前正在發生的事情有兩件：第一，經濟聯繫正在一些城市之間建立，它們能夠通過攜手週邊城市，踐行自下而上的區域地緣政治力權力，給國家的統治權構成不小的威脅。這一點已經在東京、法蘭克福、紐約和倫敦這些城市身上有了一定程度的體現——它們作為本國的核心金融中心，左右著國家的政策。”
“歐洲也是一例，某些歐洲城市認為自己與布魯塞爾的關係比與本國政府的還要親近，而這也會威脅到城市與國家之間的關係。那麼，古希臘式的城邦國家是否會再次出現呢？就某種程度而言，我認為會。城市的權力正越來越大。新加坡就是個典型的例子——這座城市通過脫離馬來西亞聯邦而成為了獨立國家；還有巴塞隆拿，它的文化與西班牙主流的'卡斯蒂利亞'文化不同，目前正在進行看似可信的公投，欲脫離西班牙。說到這裡，你當然會想到非洲，非洲重要的城市中心都被束縛在過時的地緣政治邊界系統中：只需要看看被殖民時期所繪的非洲領土劃分圖，就知道它有多麼反常了。在這次的城市化中，當然會發生改變，而這些改變很可能會造就某些強大的城邦國家：你只需要看著目前南北蘇丹之間正在發生的改組，在頭腦中將它複製到奈及利亞身上即可。”
美國政治科學家喬治·弗裡德曼（George Friedman）已在他的書《未來100年》（The Next 100 Years）中預測過，中國東部沿海地區也許會在未來十年內逐漸脫離該國經濟實力較弱的地區，並與日本結盟，開始使用日元。不過，克裡斯·韋伯斯特對亞洲的發展前景更為樂觀。
“對想要獨立的亞洲城市或地區來說，首先需要對民族和文化進行劃分，也許可以結合最近剛建立的地緣政治邊界，這一邊界的劃分正好與不同的繁榮程度相符。不過我認為就這些方面而言，亞洲國家的政治局勢太過穩定和同質，沒有供城市獨立的條件。”
不過，分析人士也曾被城市化騙倒過。
“回到1960年代和1970年代，”克裡斯·韋伯斯特說，“當時的看法是規模過大的城市會自取滅亡。學者們創建了簡練的理論，即典型且發展迅速的特大城市會存在一個最適規模，到達這一平衡狀態後，城市規模就會停止增長。但事實是，它們並沒有！它們的規模持續增長，直到現在也仍在不斷發展、變化和創造出新的形態。”
不過，並非所有專家都如此樂觀。斯蒂芬·大衛斯（Stephen Davies）過去十年都在香港進行全球海運業研究，他對該地區特大城市群的未來秉持著更為謹慎的態度。
“問題需要回歸到基礎經濟學層面。”他說，“你不能無中生有。我們在亞洲進行生產所使用的原料都是鐵礦石和石油這類的東西，體積大且笨重，會增加運輸難度。用它們製造的都是大批量生產的大眾消費品。而現代船運技術——巨型散裝貨船、超級油輪和集裝箱船——意味著每噸產品每海裡的運輸成本極低。”
正是這一技術革命讓亞洲轉型成了世界工廠。只要運輸成本一直這麼低廉，亞洲世界工廠的地位就不會動搖，這裡仍舊會是生產成本最低的地方。
“但已有兩大弊端初露端倪：第一，隨著西方國家深陷在與經濟衰退、巨額債務和福利支出不斷上漲的鬥爭之中，他們20世紀時的瘋狂消費主義就會被削弱，他們會花得更少，導致市場縮水。第二，現階段的資訊技術發展會對生產流程造成極大影響。
許多目前仍由人類來進行的工作最終都會因為人工智慧的發展而消失。首當其衝的就是各種規範化的工作，因為這種工作可以被編寫成電腦演算法。換言之，推動亞洲的工業發展、財富增長和城市化的功臣——廉價的生產線勞動力會失去立足之地。據預計，這將給亞洲的特大港口城市造成巨大的後果，畢竟過去50年來這些城市的貿易活動都依賴於這種方式。
“另一個擔憂是，整個亞洲經濟的基礎都建立在國人儲蓄和外國人消費上，如果西方消費者不再來此消費，這個基礎就會整個崩潰：我們沒有辦法適時地將當地人固有的儲蓄文化轉變為消費文化，服務於特大城市和特大港口城市。儘管我們國內有一些超級富有的人，從理論上說，他們能夠幫我們逃過此劫，但這些人都傾向於購買高端、低產的奢侈品，而非中國目前正在大量生產的大批量產品，另外，我們目前的中產階級規模還不夠大，無法形成一個替代市場。
“在此基礎上，我根本看不到能讓亞洲保持現有速度繼續擴張的方式。”
斯蒂芬·大衛斯說，“我認為真正的問題在於，現有全球貿易模型在未來是否仍行得通？我認為這個問題目前尚無睿智的解答。它也許還會繼續發展，但我覺得，在這一發展趨勢中會有大量怪事發生。”
如果就長遠來看，過去50年中的全球國內生產總值（GDP）增長率都高得很不正常，達到了4%到5%。 1%到2%左右就比這個水準要正常得多，但增長率若真下降到1%到2%左右，又會重創亞洲的特大工業城市群和特大工業港口城市。 ”
不過，與此同時，亞洲新型城市結構正秘密地、野心勃勃地不斷發展著。為了解決工業老城的社會、經濟和物流問題，未來的這種新型“互聯”城市將作為“智慧”城市進行宣傳。你會在這些城市的宣傳片中看到現實版的模擬城市（Sim City），而且據稱將出現在你附近的特大城市群中！上個月，印度人民黨的納倫德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）贏得了總理大選的勝利，而這一投票結果也明顯表達出了支持商業發展和城市化發展的傾向，為印度向全球資本中心發展提供了保障。而未來的中心就是眾多的智慧城市——超現代的新型高科技城市，要從零開始建設，但卻將是21世紀最佳的城市形態。
納倫德拉·莫迪為印度製定了宏大的發展計畫是毫無疑問的，但並非所有人都信服他。
“這位新任印度總理承諾會為發展城市化新模型提供巨額投資。”阿約那·達塔（Ayona Datta）說。阿約那·達塔是英國列斯大學公民身份與財產專業的高級講師，專門研究城市化所涉及的政治問題。
“他承諾會建立100座智慧城市，打造聯通印度各特大城市的大規模'城市走廊'。”目前在建中的城市走廊是從德里到孟買，兩座城市都將提供長達150公里的區域，用於高速公路、貨運和土地的開發。為了適應世界銀行給出的最新城市化資料，已有24座智慧城市正在規劃之中。不過，卻無人談及這種城市化模式所帶來的大規模土地徵用，本就已被邊緣化的農村人口會因此而失去土地，除了進城求職外別無選擇。 ”
據稱，在這種新型智慧城市中，許多長久以來一直阻撓著亞洲城市化進程的社會問題和環境問題都能得以避免。但這些城市究竟有多“智慧”，或者說它們是否只是國王新衣式的聰明行銷？
“無論宣傳資料裡說得有多天花亂墜，智慧城市或者'生態'城市這種東西都是不存在的。”克裡斯·韋伯斯特笑著說，“它們很棒但不現實——只是願景宣言而已。目前來說，這些都只是華麗的辭藻，但我確實認為，在未來的20年中，中國可能會出現一些，讓你能開口稱讚'這座城市碳足跡很少'的城市。不過，你不可能讓亞洲的所有城市都變成這樣，畢竟其他地方沒有與中國同等水準的控制力，印度當然也沒有。”
阿約那·達塔對印度的許多“智慧”城市計畫進行了研究，這些計畫都難以令人信服：“古加拉特邦遵循的是中國的特大城市城市化模型，聘用的卻是日本專家，為其研發智慧技術的又是國際商業機器股份有限公司（IBM）、西門子這樣的西方企業，據當地人說，這些智慧技術還將是這些城市發展的基礎。當然，印度目前正作為智慧城市發展的新興'市場'向這些資訊技術企業開放，從美國智慧城市委員會（US-based Smart Cities Council）在印度建立首個地區分會中就能看出這一點。這是涓滴理論，只是理論尚未變成現實。公民權利、社會公正、男女平等、宗教表達自由等都不過是這些城市規劃中開出的空頭支票而已。”
不過，對政治家和商人來說，數字是很難忽略。
印度目前的增長率在4.5%左右；但它想要的是8%，並期待納倫德拉•莫迪能帶領印度實現這一驚人的增長率。納倫德拉·莫迪曾任古吉拉突邦首席部長，在他的帶領下，該邦實現了10%的平均增長率。
不過，阿約那·達塔仍舊持懷疑態度。 “人們並沒有看見這個數字背後的東西，即城市化所造成的社會成本的上升，具體體現在污染加劇、兒童和產婦死亡率的升高和家庭關係日益緊張等方面。所以，儘管經濟在增長，但對那些社會經濟地位低下的人來說，幸福感卻下降了。”
儘管如此，納倫德拉•莫迪大力發展特大城市城市化的舉措還是為他在印度年輕人中贏得了廣泛的支持，年輕人認為經濟全球化會為自己帶來更好的生活。無論是在印度還是中國，對許多中產階級來說，投資全球化和國外跨國企業的進駐都是利大於弊的。另一方面，窮人為了找到工作而從農村遷居到城市，但卻因為無法適應特大城市的這些新願景，最終還是只能住在貧民窟中。
真正獲益的群體其實是居住在孟買和德里那些龐大貧民窟中的女性，至少表面看來是如此。
男孩往往會在11或12歲時被送去工作，無法完成國家教育，但被視作沒什麼經濟價值的女孩卻能因為被忽視而完成教育，這差不多也算是一種陰差陽錯了。因此，貧民窟中的女性在讀寫能力和受僱價值方面，都要大大優於貧民窟中的男性競爭者和從農村來的競爭者。
不過，正如阿約那·達塔所解釋的那樣，這一“利”的實現也有其相應的代價。
“隨著製造業向城市外遷移，男性失業者的數量也在不斷上升；與此同時，女性卻更容易找到工作了。”
她們外出工作時，丈夫卻待在家裡，這就會造成夫妻間關係緊張，比如丈夫酗酒或家暴。因此，女性在成為家裡頂樑柱的同時，也會經歷新形式的邊緣化：對她們活動的限制增加了，如果她們冒險去到離家過遠的地方，往往會被視作不道德。
“'戲弄夏娃'——噓聲嘲笑、言語虐待和身體虐待、猥褻——是印度城市女性日常生活的一部分。不過，就我在採訪中的瞭解，這些女性通常都不會把自己的遭遇告知丈夫，因為丈夫會認為她們是自作自受。這真是典型的雙重束縛；她們既要外出工作，又要承受所有的煩擾。”
儘管有大成本製作的宣傳片和徒有其表的旅遊專題報導，但亞洲這些勇敢的新興特大城市似乎正如人們對百萬人口城市的預料一般，混亂而複雜，它們成為了地球歷史上最大型的社會實驗，而人們在這場實驗中一邊過著擁擠的生活，一邊努力開創新的人生。
在這場社會實驗中，最貧窮群體忍受能力的極限也許是最值得注意之處。儘管阿約那·達塔採訪過的許多人都過著艱苦的生活，但他們仍舊未放棄尋找處理問題和堅持下去的方式。
“我在德里和孟買的所見就是，在個人的層面上，家庭是這些代價最為明顯的地方，不過，我的絕大多數故事都在講述力量與希望。不過，我長久以來的印像是，需要修復的與其說是經濟，不如說是社會價值觀。傳統社會若是在一夕之間發生了轉變，那麼它就必須非常努力地去履行新社會的功能。你需要讓社會隨著城市化一起轉變— —不能只依賴經濟增長來解決社會問題。”
克裡斯·韋伯斯特也認同這一觀點，他認為人們將會為了留在新興的特大城市中而犧牲一切。
“就算我們知道在這些城市生活可以輕易摧毀自己，也仍不會因此而離開，這一點是毋庸置疑的。人們是在為自己的抱負投資，所以，只會將上漲的房租，以及所有的社會問題和醫療問題通通嚥下。只要還能賺到真金白銀，這座城市就會為他們帶來更大的經濟幸福感。”
“這裡的每個人都是百折不撓的倖存者，要忍受很多；也許是過多。特大城市的高密度生活所造成的真正問題是，這樣的社會是否真的具有可持續性——如果沒有，那麼需要做何種調整。”
“個人並不會問這些問題。但政府應該問。”
_____________________________________
（上述系列刊登於香港《南華早報》）
2014/7/23
2014/7/20
[Foreign Affairs] How Hamas Won
Israel's Tactical Success and Strategic Failure
Israel's Tactical Success and Strategic Failure
By Ariel Ilan Roth
By Ariel Ilan Roth
JULY 20, 2014
No matter how and when the conflict between Hamas and Israel ends, two things are certain. The first is that Israel will be able to claim a tactical victory. The second is that it will have suffered a strategic defeat.
At the tactical level, the success of the Iron Dome missile defense system has kept Israeli casualties near zero and significantly reduced the material damage from the rockets fired from Gaza. Israel’s ground invasion, launched on Thursday, will also reap rewards. Indeed, it already has: Israeli forces have exposed and destroyed several Hamas tunnels, including some that were intended to allow cross-border activity into Israel and others that facilitated the movement of goods, ammunition, and militants within Gaza itself.
Such tactical achievements should not be minimized. But they do not equal a strategic victory. War, as Clausewitz famously taught, is the continuation of politics by other means. Wars are fought to realign politics in a way that benefits the victor and is detrimental to the loser. But the Israelis have lost sight of this distinction.
In fact, Israel has a history of claiming victory when in fact it has suffered defeat; the October 1973 war is the best example. Israel claimed that it had won because its forces ended their war on the western side of the Suez Canal with Egyptian forces partially encircled behind them. The reality is that Egypt achieved the strategic victory. All along, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s objective was to seize and hold some territory in order to dislodge stuck political negotiations and, ultimately, recover the occupied Sinai Peninsula for Egypt. Sadat got what he wanted.
Israelis might believe that, even though they are not likely to see a political realignment at the end of this war, at least Hamas won’t have achieved its own strategic objectives. The absence of large numbers of Israeli fatalities, the thinking goes, is a mark of Hamas’ failure. But Israelis are wrong there, too. Killing large numbers of Israelis would be a treat for Hamas, but it is not vital to the group’s definition of strategic success.
Hamas’ strategic objective is to shatter Israel’s sense of normalcy. It is only possible for Israel to exist as a flourishing and prosperous democracy under the garrisoned conditions of persistent conflict when its citizens are able to maintain the illusion that their lives are more or less similar to what they would aspire to have in London, Paris, or New York. With that illusion destroyed, several outcomes are possible, none of which are good for Israel. Despairing of the possibility of peace, small numbers of Israeli Jews may decide to emigrate. More likely is that disagreements over how to handle the Palestinian problem will deepen, sowing discord within Israeli society and undermining the core Israeli narrative based on the justice of Zionism. Cohesion around that narrative has been a key motivating force for making the sacrifices and facing the dangers that life in Israel often entails, including the long, compulsory military service that is a fact of life for most Israeli Jews. Although these internal fissures will not bring Israel to its knees, any erosion of Israeli power -- including the power of the population’s will -- is a win for Hamas.
Israel has long been eager to thwart the expansion of the influence of Islamist resistance organizations that they see as determinedly more implacable foes. Consider that the first Intifada, from 1987 to 1993, led to the weakening of the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and to the rise of dangerous and militant organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The threat of these Islamist organizations motivated Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres to bolster the failing fortunes of PLO leader Yasir Arafat and embark on the Oslo peace process, which, had it succeeded, would have been a dead end for Hamas.
Indeed it was the violence of the second Intifada, which destroyed nearly 1,000 Israeli lives between 2001 and 2004 through wave upon wave of suicide attacks in the heart of Israel’s major cities, which caused Israeli citizens’ confidence to buckle and ultimately persuaded them to support a unilateral withdrawal of citizens and settlements from Gaza. They hoped the move would appease Palestinian wrath. It did not.
The persistent, low level rocketing of Israel’s southern cities since Israel withdrew from Gaza has not caused enough disruption in the rest of Israel to bring Hamas any strategic benefits. In other words, Hamas’ attacks on the border cities have not stopped most Israelis from going about their daily business in near-total obliviousness to the political and humanitarian condition of the Palestinians in Gaza.
This new round of violence, on the other hand, has caused enormous disruption. Rockets fired from Gaza have triggered warning sirens in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Beer Sheva -- all of Israel’s major cities -- and points in between as well. Those rockets haven’t killed any people thus far, but they have sent almost everyone scrambling for shelter several times a day and shattered the illusion that what happens “there” does not affect life “here.”
That would be enough for Hamas to declare victory. But the group has been racking up additional strategic benefits as well. First, the disproportionate number of casualties in Israel and Gaza has made Israel appear, at least to many Western eyes, as the aggressor, even though Hamas shot first this time around. Second, the Iron Dome has made covering the story within Israel boring for outside journalists. “Rocket goes off, rocket gets intercepted, life goes on” is not an exciting story. Israel’s retaliations, which level Gaza’s unreinforced buildings and leave behind mangled bodies, sell more newspapers. And so, the world has focused on Gaza. Israel’s friends may bemoan that as unfair -- Israel is being punished for successfully defending its citizens, while Hamas leaves its own vulnerable. But that misses the point. War is not an exercise in fairness, but in the attainment of strategic objectives.
And, on that score, Hamas has already won. It has shattered the necessary illusion for Israelis that a political stalemate with the Palestinians is cost-free for Israel. It has shown Israelis that, even if the Palestinians cannot kill them, they can extract a heavy psychological price. It has also raised the profile of the Palestinian cause and reinforced the perception that the Palestinians are weak victims standing against a powerful aggressor. Down the road, that feeling is sure to be translated into pressure on Israel, perhaps by politicians and certainly by social movements whose objective is to isolate Israel politically and damage it through economic boycotts.
There are still those who will fantasize that this defeat will come with the same silver lining as Israel’s loss in 1973. Although Sadat’s attacks on Israelis in the Sinai shattered the feeling of invincibility that Israelis had nurtured since the end of the 1967 war, the war at least resulted in the Camp David accords and a durable, if cold, peace that has underwritten Israel’s regional security since the late 1970s. Perhaps Hamas’ strategic victory in this conflict will yield similar dividends for Israel down the road. However, such an outcome seems quite unlikely. Sadat had concrete objectives, namely the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt -- objectives that were reconcilable with Israel’s own needs. Hamas, on the other hand, calls for Israel’s elimination, an objective that leaves scant room for negotiation.
In the end, this round will go to the Palestinians, as did the previous major round of fighting in 2008. Focusing on tactical success should not blind Israel to the dangers it faces from these repeated strategic defeats. There is not much that Israel can do to change Hamas’ behavior. What it must do, however, to prevent Hamas from capitalizing on its strategic success is to remind contemporary Israelis of what their early leaders knew all too well. As Moshe Dayan, an Israeli army chief of staff and later defense minister, said, ‘‘We know that in order for their [the Arab] hope of annihilating us to die away, it is incumbent on us -- morning and night -- to be armed and ready.” The challenge for Israel is to maintain that state of readiness while at the same time making the humane and appropriate choices that ensure its security, enhance Israel’s attractiveness as a strategic and commercial partner for Western nations, and maintain its internal social cohesion over the long haul. This trifecta may seem impossible, but the first 19 years of Israel’s national existence suggest otherwise.
At the tactical level, the success of the Iron Dome missile defense system has kept Israeli casualties near zero and significantly reduced the material damage from the rockets fired from Gaza. Israel’s ground invasion, launched on Thursday, will also reap rewards. Indeed, it already has: Israeli forces have exposed and destroyed several Hamas tunnels, including some that were intended to allow cross-border activity into Israel and others that facilitated the movement of goods, ammunition, and militants within Gaza itself.
Such tactical achievements should not be minimized. But they do not equal a strategic victory. War, as Clausewitz famously taught, is the continuation of politics by other means. Wars are fought to realign politics in a way that benefits the victor and is detrimental to the loser. But the Israelis have lost sight of this distinction.
In fact, Israel has a history of claiming victory when in fact it has suffered defeat; the October 1973 war is the best example. Israel claimed that it had won because its forces ended their war on the western side of the Suez Canal with Egyptian forces partially encircled behind them. The reality is that Egypt achieved the strategic victory. All along, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s objective was to seize and hold some territory in order to dislodge stuck political negotiations and, ultimately, recover the occupied Sinai Peninsula for Egypt. Sadat got what he wanted.
Israelis might believe that, even though they are not likely to see a political realignment at the end of this war, at least Hamas won’t have achieved its own strategic objectives. The absence of large numbers of Israeli fatalities, the thinking goes, is a mark of Hamas’ failure. But Israelis are wrong there, too. Killing large numbers of Israelis would be a treat for Hamas, but it is not vital to the group’s definition of strategic success.
Hamas’ strategic objective is to shatter Israel’s sense of normalcy. It is only possible for Israel to exist as a flourishing and prosperous democracy under the garrisoned conditions of persistent conflict when its citizens are able to maintain the illusion that their lives are more or less similar to what they would aspire to have in London, Paris, or New York. With that illusion destroyed, several outcomes are possible, none of which are good for Israel. Despairing of the possibility of peace, small numbers of Israeli Jews may decide to emigrate. More likely is that disagreements over how to handle the Palestinian problem will deepen, sowing discord within Israeli society and undermining the core Israeli narrative based on the justice of Zionism. Cohesion around that narrative has been a key motivating force for making the sacrifices and facing the dangers that life in Israel often entails, including the long, compulsory military service that is a fact of life for most Israeli Jews. Although these internal fissures will not bring Israel to its knees, any erosion of Israeli power -- including the power of the population’s will -- is a win for Hamas.
Israel has long been eager to thwart the expansion of the influence of Islamist resistance organizations that they see as determinedly more implacable foes. Consider that the first Intifada, from 1987 to 1993, led to the weakening of the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and to the rise of dangerous and militant organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The threat of these Islamist organizations motivated Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres to bolster the failing fortunes of PLO leader Yasir Arafat and embark on the Oslo peace process, which, had it succeeded, would have been a dead end for Hamas.
Indeed it was the violence of the second Intifada, which destroyed nearly 1,000 Israeli lives between 2001 and 2004 through wave upon wave of suicide attacks in the heart of Israel’s major cities, which caused Israeli citizens’ confidence to buckle and ultimately persuaded them to support a unilateral withdrawal of citizens and settlements from Gaza. They hoped the move would appease Palestinian wrath. It did not.
The persistent, low level rocketing of Israel’s southern cities since Israel withdrew from Gaza has not caused enough disruption in the rest of Israel to bring Hamas any strategic benefits. In other words, Hamas’ attacks on the border cities have not stopped most Israelis from going about their daily business in near-total obliviousness to the political and humanitarian condition of the Palestinians in Gaza.
This new round of violence, on the other hand, has caused enormous disruption. Rockets fired from Gaza have triggered warning sirens in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Beer Sheva -- all of Israel’s major cities -- and points in between as well. Those rockets haven’t killed any people thus far, but they have sent almost everyone scrambling for shelter several times a day and shattered the illusion that what happens “there” does not affect life “here.”
That would be enough for Hamas to declare victory. But the group has been racking up additional strategic benefits as well. First, the disproportionate number of casualties in Israel and Gaza has made Israel appear, at least to many Western eyes, as the aggressor, even though Hamas shot first this time around. Second, the Iron Dome has made covering the story within Israel boring for outside journalists. “Rocket goes off, rocket gets intercepted, life goes on” is not an exciting story. Israel’s retaliations, which level Gaza’s unreinforced buildings and leave behind mangled bodies, sell more newspapers. And so, the world has focused on Gaza. Israel’s friends may bemoan that as unfair -- Israel is being punished for successfully defending its citizens, while Hamas leaves its own vulnerable. But that misses the point. War is not an exercise in fairness, but in the attainment of strategic objectives.
And, on that score, Hamas has already won. It has shattered the necessary illusion for Israelis that a political stalemate with the Palestinians is cost-free for Israel. It has shown Israelis that, even if the Palestinians cannot kill them, they can extract a heavy psychological price. It has also raised the profile of the Palestinian cause and reinforced the perception that the Palestinians are weak victims standing against a powerful aggressor. Down the road, that feeling is sure to be translated into pressure on Israel, perhaps by politicians and certainly by social movements whose objective is to isolate Israel politically and damage it through economic boycotts.
There are still those who will fantasize that this defeat will come with the same silver lining as Israel’s loss in 1973. Although Sadat’s attacks on Israelis in the Sinai shattered the feeling of invincibility that Israelis had nurtured since the end of the 1967 war, the war at least resulted in the Camp David accords and a durable, if cold, peace that has underwritten Israel’s regional security since the late 1970s. Perhaps Hamas’ strategic victory in this conflict will yield similar dividends for Israel down the road. However, such an outcome seems quite unlikely. Sadat had concrete objectives, namely the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt -- objectives that were reconcilable with Israel’s own needs. Hamas, on the other hand, calls for Israel’s elimination, an objective that leaves scant room for negotiation.
In the end, this round will go to the Palestinians, as did the previous major round of fighting in 2008. Focusing on tactical success should not blind Israel to the dangers it faces from these repeated strategic defeats. There is not much that Israel can do to change Hamas’ behavior. What it must do, however, to prevent Hamas from capitalizing on its strategic success is to remind contemporary Israelis of what their early leaders knew all too well. As Moshe Dayan, an Israeli army chief of staff and later defense minister, said, ‘‘We know that in order for their [the Arab] hope of annihilating us to die away, it is incumbent on us -- morning and night -- to be armed and ready.” The challenge for Israel is to maintain that state of readiness while at the same time making the humane and appropriate choices that ensure its security, enhance Israel’s attractiveness as a strategic and commercial partner for Western nations, and maintain its internal social cohesion over the long haul. This trifecta may seem impossible, but the first 19 years of Israel’s national existence suggest otherwise.
ARIEL ILAN ROTH is the Executive Director of The Israel Institute.
2014/7/16
[Foreign Affairs] Bibi's First War
Why Benjamin Netanyahu Has Never Liked Military Conflict
by Hussein Ibish
July 16, 2014
SNAPSHOT
The best description of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political style is that he is risk-averse. His entire career has been defined by careful calculation, caution, and a steadfast commitment to the status quo. Few in Israel seem to love him, but they do regard him as safe and reliable. And that has been a remarkably effective formula for staying in power in a country whose governments rarely serve out their full term.
Yet suddenly, Netanyahu has found himself well outside of his comfort zone. His government has been sucked into a major conflict with Hamas and other extremists in Gaza, and it has no clear strategic goal or even an obvious exit strategy. Netanyahu is thus in the very position he's least at ease with: he is at the mercy of events and other actors outside his control. He might hope that when tensions calm he will end up where he wants to be -- the familiar status quo that he has always found politically comfortable. But that status quo, characterized by occupation and radical inequality in the Palestinian territories, is unsustainable and exceptionally dangerous for Israel, Palestine, and the region as a whole.
Netanyahu's remarkable rise to prolonged political power in Israel, particularly in his extended second term, has been based on his impressive ability to position himself between Israel’s two poles: those who want peace with the Palestinians and those who want to consolidate control over the occupied territories. He is a supporter of the settler movement, but not a rabid one. Settlers and their leaders have frequently accused him of "silent" or "de facto" building freezes, and his government has demolished a number of wildcat settlement outposts (although it has also recognized many others).
He professes to be a proponent of a two-state solution, but both his policies and his rhetoric leave grave doubts about his commitment to that outcome. At a recent press conference, Netanyahu undermined any hopes that he is truly open to a real two-state solution. “I think the Israeli people understand now what I always say: that there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan,” Netanyahu said, effectively ruling out the establishment of a truly independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state. In other words, his vision of the long-term future between Israel and the Palestinians is the status quo, defined by occupation and the rule over another people deprived of rights and citizenship, extended indefinitely.
Netanyahu seems content to leave things basically as they are, tinkering on the margins with new settlements and other small changes that may have a profound cumulative effect, but only in the long run. Anything else would be too risky. To restrain the settlers would mean a confrontation with the far right. To go in for annexation would provoke a massive diplomatic crisis. Netanyahu prefers, instead, to just allow the possibility of a two-state solution to fade away slowly, but inexorably. Indeed, in spite of widespread psychological speculation about the influence of his late father, a noted anti-Arab extremist, and his wife, whose cantankerous personality has been well documented, Netanyahu seems very much to follow his own counsel, which is apparently driven by a belief that the less done on major issues, the better for him.
Netanyahu does have some history of recklessness, but only when it comes to other people's fortunes. Supporters of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in 1995, bitterly accuse Netanyahu of orchestrating a campaign of public vilification that led to Rabin’s murder. And there is plenty of evidence that he did: Netanyahu appeared at rallies featuring posters of Rabin in Nazi SS uniforms and with crosshairs over his face.
Netanyahu fulminated [1] that Rabin's government was “removed from Jewish tradition ... and Jewish values” by seeking peace with the Palestinians. Rabin warned that Netanyahu was promoting a climate of violence, an evaluation that proved apt when Rabin was soon after gunned down by a young Jewish extremist.
Another risky political move was merging his Likud party list with that of the far-right party Yisrael Beytenu in the last elections. It was a personal and ideological mismatch from the outset, and seemed to cost both parties at the polls. The merger recently fell apart [2], which has probably only reinforced Netanyahu's risk aversion.
With all his caution, Netanyahu has managed during his time in power to avoid leading the country in a major conflict. He was prime minister during a significant eight-day flare-up with Gaza in November 2012, but that couldn't be characterized as a fully fledged war in the same way that the current conflagration must be because it was short and contained, and Netanyahu always appeared to be in control of events as they unfolded.
By contrast, the current conflict seems to embody Netanyahu's deep aversion to unpredictable politics. It began with the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank by militants that were associated with Hamas but had quite possibly gone rogue. The Israeli authorities knew all along that that the teenagers had been killed soon after the kidnapping, thanks to a phone call that they made to the police in which their murder could clearly be heard. But the authorities withheld that information from the public in order to carry out a massive crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank, disguised as an effort to rescue the boys.
When their bodies were discovered after 18 days, Netanyahu’s government seemed ready to call it a day. He signaled that he wasn't interested in a major escalation in Gaza; Israelis had been down that road before, twice in a significant way, and had learned that blowing up buildings and killing people doesn't change Hamas' behavior or the strategic situation on the ground. But because Netanyahu’s government had deceived the public, the recovery of the boys’ bodies unleashed a fresh wave of anger. When Jewish Israeli fanatics nabbed, tortured, and burned alive a 16-year-old Palestinian boy in Jerusalem, and then video emerged of the Israeli border police brutally beating his 15-year-old cousin, events took on a life of their own. Unrest spread throughout the West Bank and in Palestinian areas of Israel. The Israeli crackdown intensified. Rocket attacks from Gaza increased, and Netanyahu ultimately felt politically compelled to act, despite evident [3] misgivings from the military.
And so now, for the first time in his career, Netanyahu finds himself presiding over the chaos of a war that seems very much outside his control. Hamas has launched countless rockets at Israel, including parts of the country previously beyond its range, and Netanyahu has unleashed an enormous barrage against a vast range of targets in the Gaza Strip, including the homes and neighborhoods of Hamas leaders [4]. Israeli airstrikes have left more than 200 Palestinians dead, and the United Nations estimates that 80 percent of them are civilians. An intensified fear hangs over Israel as Hamas and other groups demonstrate the reach of their latest rockets. Although the Hamas rockets have been largely ineffectual, several Israelis have been injured and at least one has been killed.
It would've taken real courage, and a willingness to embrace political risk, for Netanyahu to listen to wiser counsel and avoid this pointless exchange of violence. It isn’t clear whether Israel can achieve any major objectives in this war beyond killing people and blowing up civilian property and paramilitary installations, which is unlikely to achieve any major political or strategic goals and could do significant further harm to Israel's international and regional reputation. And the conundrum is made worse by the fact that Israel actually wants Hamas to stay in power in Gaza, both because Hamas is a known quantity that can be held accountable for its transgressions and because Israel fears the anarchy or the other, more extreme, groups that could rise in its absence. So Israel can go only so far unless it decides to, once again, assume wholesale responsibility for what happens in, and who controls, Gaza.
In recent days, a number of influential Israeli voices have advocated just that. On Tuesday Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman criticized Netanyahu's "hesitation" and declared [5] that the current offensive should end with “a full takeover of the Gaza Strip" by Israel. Netanyahu responded [6] by saying that he would ignore "background noise," a clear rebuke to Lieberman. And after coming under severe criticism by Likud leader and Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon, Netanyahu curtly dismissed [7] him. The far right continues to push for a major ground operation in Gaza, but Netanyahu seems determined to stick to aerial bombardments and small-scale ground incursions if he can.
As things stand, this conflict bears all the hallmarks of a classic lose-lose scenario, at least in the short run. Netanyahu might calculate that the price of being sucked into a pointless and bloody attack on Gaza was worth paying to avoid the political harm that would come from doing nothing in the face of enormous public pressure. But the risk-averse and cautious Israeli politician cannot be comfortable this week. The most Netanyahu can hope for is that when the dust settles the new normal in Gaza looks comfortingly like the old normal, something both Netanyahu and the Israeli public believe they can live with, at least for now. But with everything in the region in flux, that expectation may be unrealistic. In a worst-case scenario, Hamas could emerge from this conflict bloodied and battered, but with much greater political and nationalist clout and credibility throughout Palestinian society, including the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority has been systematically weakened and looks utterly irrelevant and ineffectual.
Under Netanyahu's leadership, Israel is treading water, both in the Gaza campaign and with regard to the biggest questions it faces about its future. It is postponing the day of reckoning, putting off decisions about the occupied territories and the Palestinians, and pretending everything will somehow be all right. Avoiding the toughest issues, which most Israelis don't want to deal with and about which they share no consensus, may be an excellent strategy for Netanyahu’s personal political ambitions. But it is a terrible abrogation of his broader national duties: making the hard and necessary decisions, taking prudent and wise risks, and putting the country's interests above his own political career and fortunes.
Yet suddenly, Netanyahu has found himself well outside of his comfort zone. His government has been sucked into a major conflict with Hamas and other extremists in Gaza, and it has no clear strategic goal or even an obvious exit strategy. Netanyahu is thus in the very position he's least at ease with: he is at the mercy of events and other actors outside his control. He might hope that when tensions calm he will end up where he wants to be -- the familiar status quo that he has always found politically comfortable. But that status quo, characterized by occupation and radical inequality in the Palestinian territories, is unsustainable and exceptionally dangerous for Israel, Palestine, and the region as a whole.
Netanyahu's remarkable rise to prolonged political power in Israel, particularly in his extended second term, has been based on his impressive ability to position himself between Israel’s two poles: those who want peace with the Palestinians and those who want to consolidate control over the occupied territories. He is a supporter of the settler movement, but not a rabid one. Settlers and their leaders have frequently accused him of "silent" or "de facto" building freezes, and his government has demolished a number of wildcat settlement outposts (although it has also recognized many others).
He professes to be a proponent of a two-state solution, but both his policies and his rhetoric leave grave doubts about his commitment to that outcome. At a recent press conference, Netanyahu undermined any hopes that he is truly open to a real two-state solution. “I think the Israeli people understand now what I always say: that there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan,” Netanyahu said, effectively ruling out the establishment of a truly independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state. In other words, his vision of the long-term future between Israel and the Palestinians is the status quo, defined by occupation and the rule over another people deprived of rights and citizenship, extended indefinitely.
Netanyahu seems content to leave things basically as they are, tinkering on the margins with new settlements and other small changes that may have a profound cumulative effect, but only in the long run. Anything else would be too risky. To restrain the settlers would mean a confrontation with the far right. To go in for annexation would provoke a massive diplomatic crisis. Netanyahu prefers, instead, to just allow the possibility of a two-state solution to fade away slowly, but inexorably. Indeed, in spite of widespread psychological speculation about the influence of his late father, a noted anti-Arab extremist, and his wife, whose cantankerous personality has been well documented, Netanyahu seems very much to follow his own counsel, which is apparently driven by a belief that the less done on major issues, the better for him.
Netanyahu does have some history of recklessness, but only when it comes to other people's fortunes. Supporters of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in 1995, bitterly accuse Netanyahu of orchestrating a campaign of public vilification that led to Rabin’s murder. And there is plenty of evidence that he did: Netanyahu appeared at rallies featuring posters of Rabin in Nazi SS uniforms and with crosshairs over his face.
Netanyahu fulminated [1] that Rabin's government was “removed from Jewish tradition ... and Jewish values” by seeking peace with the Palestinians. Rabin warned that Netanyahu was promoting a climate of violence, an evaluation that proved apt when Rabin was soon after gunned down by a young Jewish extremist.
Another risky political move was merging his Likud party list with that of the far-right party Yisrael Beytenu in the last elections. It was a personal and ideological mismatch from the outset, and seemed to cost both parties at the polls. The merger recently fell apart [2], which has probably only reinforced Netanyahu's risk aversion.
With all his caution, Netanyahu has managed during his time in power to avoid leading the country in a major conflict. He was prime minister during a significant eight-day flare-up with Gaza in November 2012, but that couldn't be characterized as a fully fledged war in the same way that the current conflagration must be because it was short and contained, and Netanyahu always appeared to be in control of events as they unfolded.
By contrast, the current conflict seems to embody Netanyahu's deep aversion to unpredictable politics. It began with the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank by militants that were associated with Hamas but had quite possibly gone rogue. The Israeli authorities knew all along that that the teenagers had been killed soon after the kidnapping, thanks to a phone call that they made to the police in which their murder could clearly be heard. But the authorities withheld that information from the public in order to carry out a massive crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank, disguised as an effort to rescue the boys.
When their bodies were discovered after 18 days, Netanyahu’s government seemed ready to call it a day. He signaled that he wasn't interested in a major escalation in Gaza; Israelis had been down that road before, twice in a significant way, and had learned that blowing up buildings and killing people doesn't change Hamas' behavior or the strategic situation on the ground. But because Netanyahu’s government had deceived the public, the recovery of the boys’ bodies unleashed a fresh wave of anger. When Jewish Israeli fanatics nabbed, tortured, and burned alive a 16-year-old Palestinian boy in Jerusalem, and then video emerged of the Israeli border police brutally beating his 15-year-old cousin, events took on a life of their own. Unrest spread throughout the West Bank and in Palestinian areas of Israel. The Israeli crackdown intensified. Rocket attacks from Gaza increased, and Netanyahu ultimately felt politically compelled to act, despite evident [3] misgivings from the military.
And so now, for the first time in his career, Netanyahu finds himself presiding over the chaos of a war that seems very much outside his control. Hamas has launched countless rockets at Israel, including parts of the country previously beyond its range, and Netanyahu has unleashed an enormous barrage against a vast range of targets in the Gaza Strip, including the homes and neighborhoods of Hamas leaders [4]. Israeli airstrikes have left more than 200 Palestinians dead, and the United Nations estimates that 80 percent of them are civilians. An intensified fear hangs over Israel as Hamas and other groups demonstrate the reach of their latest rockets. Although the Hamas rockets have been largely ineffectual, several Israelis have been injured and at least one has been killed.
It would've taken real courage, and a willingness to embrace political risk, for Netanyahu to listen to wiser counsel and avoid this pointless exchange of violence. It isn’t clear whether Israel can achieve any major objectives in this war beyond killing people and blowing up civilian property and paramilitary installations, which is unlikely to achieve any major political or strategic goals and could do significant further harm to Israel's international and regional reputation. And the conundrum is made worse by the fact that Israel actually wants Hamas to stay in power in Gaza, both because Hamas is a known quantity that can be held accountable for its transgressions and because Israel fears the anarchy or the other, more extreme, groups that could rise in its absence. So Israel can go only so far unless it decides to, once again, assume wholesale responsibility for what happens in, and who controls, Gaza.
In recent days, a number of influential Israeli voices have advocated just that. On Tuesday Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman criticized Netanyahu's "hesitation" and declared [5] that the current offensive should end with “a full takeover of the Gaza Strip" by Israel. Netanyahu responded [6] by saying that he would ignore "background noise," a clear rebuke to Lieberman. And after coming under severe criticism by Likud leader and Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon, Netanyahu curtly dismissed [7] him. The far right continues to push for a major ground operation in Gaza, but Netanyahu seems determined to stick to aerial bombardments and small-scale ground incursions if he can.
As things stand, this conflict bears all the hallmarks of a classic lose-lose scenario, at least in the short run. Netanyahu might calculate that the price of being sucked into a pointless and bloody attack on Gaza was worth paying to avoid the political harm that would come from doing nothing in the face of enormous public pressure. But the risk-averse and cautious Israeli politician cannot be comfortable this week. The most Netanyahu can hope for is that when the dust settles the new normal in Gaza looks comfortingly like the old normal, something both Netanyahu and the Israeli public believe they can live with, at least for now. But with everything in the region in flux, that expectation may be unrealistic. In a worst-case scenario, Hamas could emerge from this conflict bloodied and battered, but with much greater political and nationalist clout and credibility throughout Palestinian society, including the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority has been systematically weakened and looks utterly irrelevant and ineffectual.
Under Netanyahu's leadership, Israel is treading water, both in the Gaza campaign and with regard to the biggest questions it faces about its future. It is postponing the day of reckoning, putting off decisions about the occupied territories and the Palestinians, and pretending everything will somehow be all right. Avoiding the toughest issues, which most Israelis don't want to deal with and about which they share no consensus, may be an excellent strategy for Netanyahu’s personal political ambitions. But it is a terrible abrogation of his broader national duties: making the hard and necessary decisions, taking prudent and wise risks, and putting the country's interests above his own political career and fortunes.
Hussein Ibish is a Senior Fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine.
2014/7/14
[Foreign Affairs] Expendable Egypt
Why Cairo Can't Broker a Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas
JULY 14, 2014
The similarities between this month’s hostilities between Hamas and Israel and those during their last major confrontation, in November 2012, are striking. Hamas and other Palestinian groups fire rockets deep into Israel, and the Iron Dome defense system knocks the projectiles out of the sky. Israel launches aerial strikes on densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip, and militants there shoot rockets back at Israeli civilians.
Yet one thing has changed: the relationship between Hamas and Egypt. In the fall of 2012, Hamas was able to count on the political support of the Egyptian government of President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader. The rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt earlier that year had simultaneously provided Hamas with a new regional ally and redefined relations between the group and Egypt, moving from the mutual deep-seated suspicion and antagonism of the Mubarak years to a relationship built on shared political ideals and respect.
After Morsi was ousted in July 2013, the new Egyptian government launched a crackdown on the Brotherhood at home and assumed an especially harsh posturetoward Hamas, calling the group, which was once a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, a threat to national security. Most significantly, Egypt’s repeated restrictions on the flows of goods and people to and from Gaza and its campaign to crack down on underground tunnels between the strip and Sinai have deeply hurt Hamas’s finances. In March 2014, moreover, Egypt’s judiciary banned Hamas from conducting any political activities in the country.
Unsurprisingly, Hamas felt the loss of Egypt’s political friendship very deeply. Now that it was regionally isolated, internal divisions arose over how to confront the new challenges, with discussions about rekindling relations with Iran as well as about the group’s balance between governance and resistance. Hamas’s troubles also led competing armed factions to challenge the group’s monopoly of force in Gaza, for example by engaging in uncoordinated rocket attacks against Israel. The group also faced a significant cash-flow problem. All together, these pressures arguably pushed Hamas to enter a unity deal with the Fatah movement that controls the West Bank–based Palestinian Authority. In exchange for relinquishing some control of Gaza to Fatah, it seems, Hamas was hoping to receive badly needed financial help from Fatah so that it could pay the salaries of the public employees on its payroll.
In the end, the deal seems to have destabilized Hamas still further, at least in the short term. For years, Hamas had carefully balanced the need to project strength and credibility as the “Islamic resistance” with the desire to preserve full control over Gaza. In turn, Hamas has agreed to enforce cease-fires in Gaza when it was worried that an escalation might jeopardize its status as ruler, going as far as policing other armed factions.
The unity deal shifted the balance, temporarily tilting Hamas toward resistance. It is overly simplistic, of course, to argue that the combination of Egyptian pressure and the unity deal pushed Hamas toward aggression against Israel; yet these factors did substantially change the group’s calculations, with Hamas increasingly less focused on controlling Gaza and progressively more interested in positioning itself on the national political scene. This might help explain why the group met Israel’s military operations in the West Bank with a rapid escalation.
ENTER EGYPT
If the way the most recent conflict between Israel and Hamas started is different from last time, so is the way it will end. In the course of the November 2012 confrontation between Israel and Hamas, Egypt took a direct and public role, pushing for a settlement. Morsi’s government was not an honest broker -- Morsipulled Egypt’s ambassador from Tel Aviv, sent his prime minister on a solidarity mission to Gaza, and threatened Israel in his rhetoric -- but it was a responsible one. As the United States pressured Israel, Egypt leveraged its political influence on Hamas. Together, they brought the conflict to a relatively swift end.
This time, given the far more adversarial relationship between Hamas and Egypt’s new president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the political and military actions his government has taken against Hamas in Gaza, it seems unlikely that Cairo will be able to deliver a cease-fire. Indeed, on July 10, U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki acknowledged the lack of influence the current Egyptian leadership has in Gaza, saying, “there’s a difference between the relationship between the prior government to Hamas and the current government to Hamas.”
Early Egyptian attempts to diffuse the hostilities between the parties reportedly failed, rebuffed by Hamas. On July 9, Egyptian foreign ministry spokesperson Badr Abdelatty tried to save face by arguing that Egypt was not negotiating an agreement but is simply attempting to end the violence on both sides. But the minimalist goals may have been the obstacle in the first place. Cairo initially sought a cease-fire deal akin to those of 2008 and 2009, a pure cessation of hostilities; but Hamas, less interested in following Egypt’s lead this time around, proved unwilling to give up the political gains it was supposed to make with the 2012 cease-fire.
The 2012 Gaza war was an important test for Egypt’s last president. So, too, is the current conflict a test for Sisi. The Egyptian president has openly stated his desire to be directly involved in restoring calm. Egyptian intelligence and security leaders recognize the detrimental effect of tensions on Egypt’s borders. And so, Israel and the international community are watching to see if Sisi can be an effective partner. At an even deeper level, if Sisi can reach an agreement with Hamas, despite the vitriolic rhetoric directed at the Palestinian group from Cairo, it could also signal the new president’s potential to reconcile with domestic political opponents that have been on the receiving end of similar rhetoric.
Given its regional status and historical role in brokering these types of agreements, there has also been significant international pressure on Egypt to play a productive role in the latest round of the Hamas-Israel saga. Last night, Egyptian officials tried again, floating a proposal that, on paper, would be great for Israel and good for Hamas. The parameters of the deal included not only cessation of hostilities, but also a gradual “opening of the crossings,” a formula with some similarities to the 2012 deal. Israel accepted the deal this morning, whereas Hamas rejected it before even formally receiving the plan.
For Hamas, Egypt’s involvement must go further than reinstating a simple cease-fire based on “quiet-for-quiet” between the two sides, while leaving political developments for future discussions. The recent proposal is strikingly similar to the 2012 agreement, which began to fall apart soon after it became clear that the promised normalization of Gaza would not be forthcoming. Stability between Hamas and Israel will require a long-term political approach for Gaza. Hamas could reasonably conclude that, if the sympathetic Morsi government could not achieve such an outcome, there is little chance that the anti-Hamas Sisi government would accept such a paradigm shift. And, to date, it is indeed unclear that they would.
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